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Abstract
This thesis offers an account of information and communication tech-
nologies (ICTs) that draws on the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. It
argues that Heidegger’s ontological approach presents a welcome an-
tidote to reductionist accounts of the ‘revolutionary’ nature of these
technologies that pervade much mainstream commentary. It consid-
ers Heidegger’s inquiry into technology within the context of his wider
inquiry into the ‘meaning of Being’, resulting in a range of valuable
insights into the realities of our technological environment, how we en-
gage with it, and ultimately into what consequences this engagement
might have for our Being-in-the-world. Drawing on the conceptual
framework developed by Heidegger it offers a critical theoretical ac-
count outside the bounds of Critical Theory approaches to ICTs that
seeks dialogue with these positions. It seeks to encourage the opening
up of a field that has closed itself off, for reasons that are explored
in this thesis, to engaging with the valuable insights Heidegger can
offer for understanding phenomena such as the ubiquity of contempo-
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1.1 Living in Times of Crisis and the Role of
ICTs
My advice would be, because I don’t have simple answers, precisely to start
thinking. Don’t get caught into this pseudo-activist pressure. Do something.
Let’s do it, and so on. So, no, the time is to think. I even provoked some of
the leftist friends when I told them that if the famous Marxist formula was,
“Philosophers have only interpreted the world; the time is to change it?”
[thesis 11 on Feuerbach], that maybe today we should say, “In the twentieth
century, we maybe tried to change the world too quickly”. The time is to
interpret it again, to start thinking.
Zˇizˇek, 2012
In the short period of time that has passed since the beginning of the new
millennium, we have already witnessed a number of significant challenges to the
existing economic, political and social order. In 2008, the highly speculative be-
haviour of banking corporations on the financial markets plunged the Western
world into an economic crisis, with devastating consequences for the economies of
poorer countries and job markets everywhere. In the climate of economic and po-
litical uncertainty that followed, a number of protest movements emerged around
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the world: from New York the Occupy Movement spread in 2011 across other ma-
jor cities around the globe in protest against economic and social inequality. In
Spain the Indignados organised large-scale protests against a corrupt government
and the lack of opportunity for the young generation. In 2010 students took to
the streets in their thousands in cities around the UK to demonstrate against the
marketization of higher education. Parallel to these movements in the West, a
wave of political protests began to shake the Arab world, tearing down dictatorial
regimes in countries like Tunisia, Egypt and Libya and destabilizing governments
elsewhere. The conflict in Gaza is the most recent in a series of developments
that have lead academics and media commentators to agree that we are living ‘in
times of crisis’.
The movements listed above have very complex causes, and they are as cul-
turally diverse as the various forms of power abuse that they have been targeting,
but there is a narrative that has proven very powerful in subsuming these differ-
ences: it has widely been argued that the internet, and social media in particular,
have been pivotal in the planning and realisation of these protests. The idea is
that sites like Twitter and Facebook have provided users with a platform outside
the limiting confines of traditional media, where they can engage in free debate
and promote and organise democratic action. The prediction made by the blog-
ger Andrew Sullivan that the political upheavals in Iran will turn out to be a
‘Twitter Revolution’, is emblematic of the widespread optimism placed in these
technologies that is also pervasive in academic commentary. Though emphasising
that the protests in the Arab world weren’t dependent on technology alone, the
Spanish sociologist Manuel Castells for instance sees them as a clear sign of
how changes to communication technologies create new possibilities
for the self-organisation and self-mobilisation of society, by-passing
the barriers of censorship and repression imposed by the state. (Media
Ecologies and Digital Activism (blog), 2011)
New media, it seems, have placed in our hands the capacity to act with speed,
collectively, and more decisively, than before. Placed alongside these arguments
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about the new possibilities for social mobilisation opened up by the internet,
Zˇizˇek’s appeal “Don’t Act. Just think”, quoted at the beginning of this Intro-
duction, smacks of disillusionment and cynicism. It is a call that is directly
antithetical to the kind of quick response urged by the 140 character Tweet.
Yet Zˇizˇek’s call not to get caught up in “pseudo-activist pressure”, and to
instead dedicate more time to thought, is timely. The internet does indeed offer
a range of seductive possibilities for seemingly instant mobilisation, but this vir-
tual democratic potential does not always find its equivalent in the offline world.
A poignant reminder of this was the widely hyped campaign Kony 2012, a viral
video campaign designed to raise awareness of the Ugandan war criminal Joseph
Kony with the hope that this would lead to his capture. The video has been
viewed nearly 100 million times on YouTube and attracted attention worldwide,
eventually also in academic circles, where the notions of ‘clicktivism’ and ‘slack-
tivism’ have since gained currency to denote activism via social media. They
raise questions about the effectiveness of online activism, where ‘support for a
cause’ can be expressed at the click of a mouse, but where this rarely leads to
change in the real world, Kony 2012 being a case in point.
The argument this thesis is premised upon is that amidst the hype that has
existed around the internet since its early days, which has been fuelled by talk
of ‘new media revolutions’, there remains a lack of understanding of the true
significance of digital technologies for society and culture. As Vincent Mosco
points out, media, policy and academic debates are
filled with variations on the theme that society and culture are in the
process of a great transformation brought about by the introduction
of computers and communication technology. (Mosco, 2004, p. 18)
However, as Mosco argues, it is hard not to notice that the exact same promises
were made concerning the introduction of Cable TV in the 1980s. It too was seen
as ushering in a new era of communication that would bring human beings closer
together, create communities, revolutionize education and gradually eliminate
poverty (ibid.). If we go back further, we can find that Walter Benjamin expressed
3
1.1 Living in Times of Crisis and the Role of ICTs
similar hopes for the invention of the medium of film in his 1936 essay The Work
of Art in the Age of Technological Reproduction (2008 [1936]).
Yet these hopes for the democratising potential of technology that pervade
much new media commentary stand in stark contrast to the recent exposure of
the extent to which these technologies also enable the surveillance of our everyday
lives by governments and corporations. Details of the US surveillance programme
PRISM were leaked to the media by Edward Snowdon in 2013, unveiling the full
scale of cooperation between telecommunication providers and US law enforce-
ment agencies that enabled the US government to spy on its citizens at home and
abroad. The majority of the data came from Microsoft, Google and Yahoo - the
world’s leading ICT companies (Gellman & Poitras, 2013), other companies that
shared their customers’ data include Apple, Facebook, YouTube and Skype. It
is clear that the technologies that have been lauded for their potential to help
overthrow dictatorships and democratise societies, are the same technologies that
facilitate the curtailing of individual freedoms by governments through surveil-
lance. Article 12 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights
states that
[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and
reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against
such interference or attacks. (United Nations, 2014, emphasis added)
In trying to gain an understanding of information and communication tech-
nologies there is clearly a need to reconcile these two perspectives: those that
emphasise the capacity of Web 2.0 for fostering creativity (Gauntlett, 2011),
community (Shirky, 2009) and democratic debate (Coleman, 1999), with those
that are keen to highlight how our activities on the internet and social media
are consistently tracked, commercially exploited and monitored by corporate and
political entities with potentially very serious consequences for our life chances
(Lyon, 2013). My argument is that philosophy, the branch of knowledge accused
by Marx of thinking too much and acting too little, can make a valuable con-
tribution to our understanding of ICTs precisely because of this tendency. As
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John Durham Peters put it, “in philosophy the job is to get as basic as possible”
(Peters, 2008, p. 1), and I argue that it is precisely the basic questions addressed
by philosophy of technology, such as ‘what is a technological object?’ that we
need to ask of ICTs in order to avoid assessments that are either simplistic in
their determinism, overly optimistic, or overly pessimistic about their impact on
social life.
The thinker that I want to draw particular attention to is Martin Heidegger
(1889-1976), a German philosopher whose work on technology has significantly
shaped the small sub-branch of philosophy dedicated explicitly to the study of
technology, but who has made very little impact on the study of media and com-
munication technologies. This lack of interest is partly due to a more general
“aversion to theory” that characterises large parts of Media & Communication
Studies as a field (Hammer & Kellner, 2009), and as Winner notes, the reputa-
tion of philosophy for being ”vacuous and armchair-bound” seems to render it
particularly useless in questions of technology in contrast to the rich detail of
historical and social science approaches (Winner, 2003). However, engagement
with Heidegger’s ideas has been hampered by another reason: in the words of the
American philosopher John Searle, Heidegger is largely perceived as ‘an obscurant
muddlehead at best or an unregenerate Nazi at worst’ (2000, p. 73). Though Hei-
degger is notoriously difficult to read, it is the latter that has traditionally posed
the greater barrier, especially for Critical Theory (I capitalise Critical Theory to
emphasise that I am referring to work in the tradition of the Frankfurt School and
to distinguish it from approaches that call themselves ‘critical’ in a less specific
sense).
It is true that Heidegger was a member of the German Nazi party from 1933,
and that he never accounted publicly for this affiliation. Some also accuse him of
having propagated the ideologies of the party through his work, especially in the
early part of his career when he wrote his main work, Being and Time. I deal with
these accusations in more detail in chapter eight, as despite much having already
been written on the question of Heidegger’s politics, it has been claimed that ‘how
one deals with Heidegger’s politics is in itself political’ (Fried, 2012). Briefly, my
position is that the so-called ‘Heidegger controversy’ is muddled with untruths
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and that Heidegger’s profound intellectual influence on his Jewish students (with
Hannah Arendt he also entertained a romantic relationship) is frequently over-
looked. This influence highlights the simple fact that whoever thinks he is ig-
noring Heidegger himself, will still be within the realm of his thought; why then
not engage with the source directly? Most importantly, however, I argue that
the profoundness of his insights into technology is such that they should not be
passed over - and even his severest critics acknowledge the radically new footing
on which he placed all philosophical conceptions of technology (Ihde, 2003).
As Don Ihde has argued, Heidegger was the first philosopher to see technology
as a “central concern for philosophy”, to see it as a “genuine ontological issue”
(Ihde, 2003, p. 277). Previously, the dominant understanding of technology was
that it constituted a means to an end, something we humans use in our pursuit
of a certain outcome, like using a hammer to drive a nail into a plank of wood.
Technology is thus understood from the perspective of the human, as something
we do, a human activity. Heidegger set out to challenge this “subjectivistic”
understanding of technology, where technology is ”merely the invention of a ‘sub-
ject’”, a mere ”neutral instrument” (ibid., p. 278) that can be deployed for both
positive and negative ends.
His essay ”The Question Concerning Technology”, originally published in Ger-
man in 1954 as Die Frage nach der Technik, begins with the simple question of
what we generally perceive technology to be. The most common conceptions of
technology, which is that it constitutes a ‘means to an end’ and a ‘human activity‘
is an understanding that we can easily justify by looking at the uses of technol-
ogy in everyday life. Nevertheless, Heidegger argues that these ‘instrumental’ or
‘anthropological’ definitions do not tell us what we really need to know about the
subject of technology - rather, they obscure what he calls technology’s essence:
the essence of technology is by no means anything technological?. We
shall never experience our relationship to the essence of technology so
long as we merely conceive and push forward the technological, put
up with it, or evade it. Everywhere we remain unfree and chained
to technology, whether we passionately affirm or deny it. But we
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are delivered over to it in the worst possible way when we regard it
as something neutral; for this conception of it, to which today we
particularly like to do homage, makes us utterly blind to the essence
of technology. (Heidegger, 1977, p. 4)
Heidegger’s insistence that the ‘essence of technology is by no means anything
technological? might sound like a play on words, but in fact signifies Heidegger’s
most profound insight into technology. It is at the same time the most compelling
one for the aim pursued by the present thesis, which is to show how Heidegger’s
thinking can help illuminate some of the features of the current information-
technological landscape. Substantial parts of subsequent chapters will be dedi-
cated to unravelling this apparently peculiar claim, and exploring its significance
for ICTs, but in simple terms we could say that the technological objects and pro-
cesses that we usually think of as technology are merely a superficial symptom
of a deeper underlying technicality that is increasingly shaping the way we think
and engage with the world around us. Taking this insight it becomes apparent
that most mainstream accounts of technology concern themselves with symptoms
rather than causes, as their concept of technology prevents them from conceiving
the underlying technicality, or instrumentality that, for Heidegger, constitutes
the real essence of technology.
Where Heidegger’s concept of the ‘essence of technology’ has frequently been
criticised, even in philosophical circles, for being overly abstract, I argue that
these abstract tendencies are in fact uniquely suited to a theoretical framework
in which to think about ICTs. They allow us to draw attention to the existence of
an immaterial matrix of data flows beneath the material manifestations of these
technologies. I argued earlier that current accounts of the social significance of
ICTs can broadly be split into two categories: either they emphasise the ben-
efits to individuals, such as increased mobility and flexibility (e.g. through the
introduction of smart card systems for travel such as “Oyster”) or the ability
to connect and share information across great geographical distances (through
social networks), and society as a whole (e.g. through e-voting systems), or they
emphasise how this progressive computerisation of all aspects of our lives enables
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corporations and governments to tap our activities for commercial gains or law
enforcement purposes. What Heidegger’s concept of the essence of technology al-
lows us to grasp conceptually is the logic of technicality that is inscribed into the
digital matrix, and which manifests itself in all information-technological arte-
facts and practices. For instance, the social networking site Facebook claims to
allow us to ‘connect with friends and the world around us”, but the easy growth
of these networks of “mass self-communication”, to use Castells’ (2013 [2009])
phrase, belies the frailty of these connections. After all, every person ‘friended’
can be ‘unfriended’ at the click of a mouse.
1.2 Developing a Heideggerian Framework for
Thinking about ICTs
The conceptual framework developed by Heidegger for thinking about technology
is ontological, which facilitates its application to a broad range of technological
applications, although its suitability for thinking about ICTs is arguably unique:
no other technological paradigm can claim a similar pervasiveness that calls for
an investigation of how technology interacts with human experience. However, it
is important to note that Heidegger’s approach is not intended, neither by himself
nor in this thesis, to black out or eclipse other modes of thinking, rather, it gains
its sharpness and validity through engaging in dialogue with other concepts and
approaches.
1.2.1 Techne¯ as Poie¯sis: Revealing and Bringing Forth
Heidegger’s thinking takes place in conversation with past philosophers, and it
is the thinking of the Ancients that, ironically perhaps, is uniquely suited to
shedding light on modern phenomena. Thus thinking about the Greek origins of
the concept of technology helps us understand in which sense digital ICTs are
fundamentally different from earlier media technologies. For Heidegger, every
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technology also constitutes what he calls a mode of ‘revealing’, a bringing forth
into Being of something so that it may show its true nature. This is because tech-
nology’s origins lie in the Ancient Greek concept of techne¯, which, as Heidegger
reminds us, is a name
not only for the activities and skills of the craftsman, but also for the
arts of the mind and the fine arts. Techne¯ belongs to bringing-forth,
to poie¯sis; it is something poie¯tic. (Heidegger, 1977, p. 13)
Poie¯sis in its purest form we find in nature, where things are ‘brought forth’
out of their own accord, without the need for human intervention. Techne¯, by
contrast, requires a human being in this process of bringing-forth, but what is
most important, Heidegger argues, is not that the human being is ‘making’ or
‘manipulating’ something, and even less that he is using a ‘means’ to do it, but
that he is involved in a process of ‘revealing’ (ibid.) For instance, the achievement
of the Italian Renaissance artist Michelangelo in carving his statue of David from
the marble, was not so much that he was particularly adept at using his chisel,
rather, in that he was able to reveal a form that was already slumbering in the
material.
1.2.2 Departing from Poie¯sis: The Gestell
For Heidegger, the reason modern technology is different to these older kinds of
craft technology is not because modern technology is more complex (though this
is undeniably the case), it is because the mode of ‘revealing’ has changed. A
farmer ploughing a field in a traditional way, with a horse and a hand plough, is
bringing forth into Being the abundance that is slumbering in the soil. Modern
means of technological extraction however follow a different logic in that they ‘set
upon’ the earth to extract from it its maximum yield. Approached through mod-
ern technology, the earth becomes mere raw material, or what Heidegger refers to
as ‘standing reserve’. This exploitative essence of modern technology is what Hei-
degger calls the Gestell, to underline that even though all technologies are forms
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of revealing, the way in which modern technology reveals is fundamentally differ-
ent. So unlike earlier and less heavily mediated forms of communication, digital
technologies reduce human relationships to a form of commodity: quantification
and standardisation are a defining feature of mass-produced commodities, a fea-
ture that is augmented by digital technology. Here human relationships become
quantified and exploited for commercial gain - the advertising which companies
like Google and Facebook present their customers with is carefully targeted to
their likes and interests, based on the mining, filtering and algorithmic processing
of the data these customers create through their online activities.
1.2.3 Encountering Marx
It might be argued that the Marxist critique of capitalism, as it continues to be
utilised by current Critical Theory approaches to ICTs, already offers a frame-
work for critiquing the surveillance and commercial exploitation of our internet
usage as undertaken within the frameworks of large-scale surveillance programmes
like PRISM. Recent years have seen a resurgence of interest in Karl Marx and
a proliferation of critical literature on the digital economy that grounds itself
in concepts like commodification, exploitation and alienation. Christian Fuchs
(2013) for instance refers to the increasing collaboration between private cor-
porations and state-led security measures as a ‘surveillance-industrial complex’,
within which users’ activities are commodified and commercially exploited. There
are also arguments that Marxist political economy offers a suitable framework for
critiquing surveillance, which has previously been theorised by drawing mainly on
the concept of the Panopticon, developed by Bentham and taken up by Foucault
(Foucault, 1991). My suggestion is not that these approaches can be replaced
by the kind of philosophical approach offered by Martin Heidegger, but that the
simple process of questioning technology and the common understanding we have
of it, can usefully supplement such critiques. Where Heidegger is accused of being
overly abstract and removed from everyday life, I would argue that any abstrac-
tion in fact results from the very proximity of his questioning to everyday life, for
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instance when he explores how we encounter technological objects in the world
around us.
1.2.4 Summary: Heidegger’s Ontology of Technology and
ICTs
The questions that Heidegger asks of technology, such as what technology actually
is, are ontological questions. Ontology is the fundamental discipline of philosophy
that enquires into the fundamentals of existence, asking questions such as ‘what
is there?’. However, Heidegger’s ontological investigation into technology forms
part of a much larger project, which is an inquiry into the meaning of Being. As
he argues at the beginning of his main work Being and Time:
It is said that ‘Being’ is the most universal and the emptiest of
concepts. As such it resists every attempt at definition. Nor does
this most universal and hence indefinable concept require any defini-
tion, for everyone uses it constantly and already understands what he
means by it. In this way, that which the ancient philosophers found
continually disturbing as something obscure and hidden has taken on
a clarity and self-evidence such that if anyone continues to ask about
it he is charged with an error of method. (Heidegger, 2008, p. 2)
Western philosophy, Heidegger argues, has investigated beings, rather than Being
itself, which Heidegger spells with a capital ‘B’ to emphasise the difference. He
also refers to the former as the realm of the ‘ontic’, whereas ‘ontological’, con-
taining the word ‘logos’ (idea, concept) refers to questions about the meaning
of Being. An ontological inquiry, for Heidegger, doesn’t limit itself to the ques-
tion of ‘what exists’ but aims at investigating in what relationships these entities
stand to each other as well as their relationships to time and space. To emphasise
this important difference, Being in the Heideggerian sense is spelt with a capital
‘B’ throughout the present work. I perceive the above questions to be of great
significance for understanding technology, and how we ourselves relate to it. This
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is why this thesis will go beyond Heidegger’s essay “The Question Concerning
Technology”, to which most accounts of Heidegger’s philosophy of technology
are limited, and also draw on the work undertaken by Heidegger in Being and
Time and a number of other essays where Heidegger develops his own ontological
framework. His concept of ‘readiness-to-hand’, for instance, which denotes how
we encounter things not as self-contained objects but in terms of what we do
with them (we encounter language for instance, not a system of words and gram-
mar rules but as a means for communicating), is crucial to understanding how
we engage with technology in everyday life ? namely as instrumental, in terms
of what it allows us to do. I will show how this instrumental understanding of
technology is what facilitates the effectiveness of the rhetoric around surveillance
technologies as seen in CCTV camera warning signs that justify surveillance for
the purposes of ‘safety, security, and crime prevention’.
1.3 Thesis Structure
This thesis will be structured as follows: Chapter 2 clarifies the research ques-
tion, research aims and the methodological approach taken, which given that this
thesis is concerned with the relevance of Heidegger’s philosophy of technology for
ICTs is theoretical: it seeks to establish a framework for thinking about ICTs that
draws on Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. As such the work undertaken in
this thesis constitutes an in-depth engagement with Heidegger’s ideas, contrast-
ing and comparing them with the ideas of other thinkers where such dialogue
helps clarify Heidegger’s position and its explanatory power for understanding
contemporary issues in the field of ICTs, themes such as surveillance and the
commercial exploitation of users’ online activities.
Chapter 3 looks at how Heidegger’s warning that an overemphasis on the
merely ‘technological’ obscures technology’s underlying essence could be directed
towards mainstream academic discourses around the societal impact of ICTs. Uti-
lizing Heidegger’s distinction between truth and correctness, I argue that ‘correct
determinations’ (Heidegger, 1977, p. 26) frequently stand in the way of deeper
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questions about the more fundamental, true dimensions of these technologies.
This is evident, for instance, in approaches that present social media as a tool for
democracy whilst ignoring the profoundly anti-democratic ways in which freedom
of speech in the online realm is managed. This chapter argues that Heidegger’s
conception of technology avoids both the pitfalls of excessive optimism, as well
as reductive technological determinism.
Chapter 4 explores the ideology of technological neutrality in the context of
digital surveillance, thus illustrating the implications of our limited perspective
on technology problematised in the previous chapter. It looks at how this ideology
is utilised by state and private entities to justify the use of ICTs for surveillance
purposes, looking at the rhetoric of CCTV camera warning signs as an example. It
then addresses the problem of critiquing ideological language (how do we critique
ideological language if critique must also rely on language). Although there is no
outside to language, Heidegger’s approach is useful in helping us reflect on how
we are put into ideology by language, that is, how ideological language actually
works in the case of the surveillance ideology.
In Chapter 5 we explore the ontological framework that Heidegger develops
in response to his critique of Western philosophy’s ‘forgotteness of Being’. This
‘network ontology’ embraces the mutual imbrications between human and non-
human beings, and provides a basis from which we can understand how the
ideology of technological neutrality is grounded in the ontological structure of
equipment. The chapter begins by briefly summarising Heidegger’s critique of
the original contributions made by Plato and Aristotle to the question of Being
and then introduces his concept of readiness-to-hand as the Being of technological
structures. Part two of this investigation examines the nature of the privileged
position that Heidegger grants to human Being, which he refers to as Dasein, in
his ontology. By means of a comparison between Heidegger’s network ontology
with Bruno Latour’s actor-network-theory, I will seek to show why a truly critical
analysis of ICTs depends on retaining the ontological difference between the Being
of humans and non-human entities, which Latour negates.
Obscured by the readiness-to-hand of modern technology lies its essence: a
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deeper technological rationality, which Chapter 6 traces back to its origins in the
Western philosophical tradition. It engages with Heidegger’s essay ‘The Age of
the World Picture’ where he argues that Western metaphysics, the philosophical
inquiry into the first causes of things, developed in such a way as to posit the world
as something knowable, and hence objectifiable, for the human subject. From this
perspective, modern technology emerges as a manifestation of, rather than a cause
of, technological rationality, with ICTs being the most recent symptom of our
tendency to reduce the world to something that can be calculated, manipulated,
stored and called upon to yield productivity at our convenience.
Chapter 7 draws attention to the ways in which the logic of technicality
characterising the essence of modern technology manifests itself explicitly in our
information-technological environment. In order to do clarify the links between
the Gestell, which we have so far characterised as ‘technical’ or ‘instrumental’
thinking, and concrete technological objects, I introduce Heideggerian concepts
such as revealing and withdrawal to focus our sights on what gets lost through
the growing instances of mediation. Heidegger thus becomes a relevant thinker
for analysing concrete examples of WEB 2.0 technologies like the dating app
‘Tinder’. In a second stage, this chapter explores how Heidegger’s concept of the
Gestell can be used to highlight how the online social activities that are at the
heart of much enthusiastic commentary on new media are always already co-opted
by powerful actors such as governments and corporations, who take advantage of
the data produced for political and economic gain. I thus show how Heidegger’s
thinking can usefully supplement existing critiques brought forward by Critical
Theory approaches by providing an ontological understanding of processes like
surveillance and the exploitation of digital lfootbour.
Chapter 8 addresses what O’Brien (2010) refers to as the “Heidegger con-
troversy”. It has been argued that not dealing with Heidegger’s politics might in
itself be construed as a political statement, and that by not raising the issue one
runs the risk of ceding the ground to those who dismiss Heidegger on the grounds
of his politics. This chapter argues that such dismissiveness is based on a failure
to engage with the complexity of Heidegger’s thinking, and a failure in particular
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to recognise the profound nature of his insights into what happens when techno-
logical rationality is taken to the extreme. By engaging in a dialogue with other
thinkers like Zygmunt Bauman, this chapter distils from Heidegger’s thinking a
more radical politics than those advanced by his critics. This politics shed light
on a variety of phenomena, from the Nazi genocide to our own hyper-rational,
information-technological environment.
Chapter 9 presents the conclusions to this thesis, presenting again the case
for why Heidegger constitutes a key thinker for critical studies of information and
communications technology. I summarise the ways in which Heidegger’s approach
avoids the pitfalls of technological determinism, as well as the excessive optimism
that characterises much current thinking on ICTs. Importantly, however, I also
show that Heidegger’s thinking contains no grounds for the doomed thinking
that many accuse him of. While Heidegger’s understanding of technology does
not allow for the hopes harboured by orthodox Marxism that technologies could
be freed from the grasp of oppressors and turned back upon them, there are
grounds for hope. These emerge from profound and critical reflection upon our
‘technological condition’, to which this thesis seeks to make a contribution. In





The research question this thesis addresses is this: how can Martin Heidegger’s
philosophy of technology help us better understand current developments in In-
formation and Communication Technology (ICTs)? Within the context of this
wider question it asks two more specific questions: firstly, how Heidegger’s cri-
tique of the dominant position on technology, which is that it constitutes a neutral
means to a beneficial end (the ideology of technological neutrality), can help us
understand the largely uncritical acceptance of citizen surveillance by the state
and corporations. Secondly, it asks how Heidegger’s more general inquiry into
the meaning of Being can be applied to technology in a way that allows for an
understanding of technological objects that is non-neutral but at the same time
avoids the pitfalls of simple technological determinism.
2.2 Research Aims
As stated in the main research question, this thesis is concerned with the work
of the German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). Specifically, it asks
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how Heidegger’s approach to technology can shed light on some of the realities
we are faced with due to the dominance and pervasiveness of digital information
and communication technologies in close to every area of public and private life.
These include, for instance, the growing levels of citizen surveillance that states
are engaging in in the name of security. The 2013 exposure of the large-scale
governmental surveillance programmes PRISM (in the US) and TEMPORA (in
the UK) by the whistle-blower Edward Snowdon has revealed a highly discon-
certing picture of the kind of comprehensive surveillance facilitated by our use of
everyday information and communications technology. Smartphones and social
networking sites have become part of a global informational system that is ubiq-
uitous and pervasive, a system that has material entry points (e.g. through our
devices) but that is essentially immaterial as it consists of digital data flows. It
is this combination of pervasiveness and immateriality that constitutes the “rev-
olutionary” nature of this technological system - yet it is one that is ignored by
most mainstream accounts of new media. It is a characteristic that is increasingly
exploited for commercial gain: for instance, where companies like Facebook sell
the data created by their users in order to generate advertising revenue. This
immateriality also means, however, that commercial and governmental interests
are becoming increasingly entangled, with state and private entities cooperating
to form what Fuchs (Fuchs, 2013) refers to as a “surveillance-industrial complex”.
These questions have already been highlighted from a number of different
angles, amongst them Surveillance Studies, and more recently, Critical Theory
approaches to ICTs and social media. Indeed, the complexity of these issues, in-
volving both technological and social dimensions, requires a multidisciplinary ap-
proach. Beyond questions regarding the ethical usage of ICTs however philosophy
has so far been largely absent in the debate around the rise of our information-
technological landscape. The present thesis seeks to redress this imbalance and
seeks to show that philosophy of technology, and specifically the work of Martin
Heidegger, can make an important contribution to these perspectives: a Hei-
deggerian approach places questions about how ICTs are applied and how these
applications affect greater society in the context of questions about the nature
of technology as such. It asks questions such as ‘How can we define technology
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in general?’, and ‘What is the place of technology in the relationship between
humans and their surroundings and in the relationship human beings have with
other human beings?’. From these fundamental questions it then becomes pos-
sible to move on to more specific questions such as whether any technology can
be said to be intrinsically good or bad, and moreover to apply these frameworks
to thinking about digital technologies to see whether and to what extent digital
technology is in fact fundamentally different from earlier analogue technologies
as claims about a ‘digital revolution’ or a ‘new media revolution’ seem to suggest.
This thesis is concerned with the ways in which Heidegger’s work allows us to
ask these questions and find answers that help us better understand some of the
critical issues we are facing today as a result of our everywhere reliance on ICTs.
2.3 The Place of Philosophy in Interdisciplinary
Debates about ICTs
The research aim of the present thesis, which is the investigation of the relevance
of Heidegger’s work for a better understanding of ICTs, demands a theoretical
or philosophical approach. However, given the widely perceived remoteness of
philosophy from such pressing real-life questions such as citizen surveillance it
I would like to further justify this approach by quoting Andrew Feenberg who
writes that
in the midst of technology ... technical knowledge itself cannot help us.
Philosophy of technology belongs to the self-awareness of a society like
ours. It teaches us to reflect on what we take for granted, specifically,
rational modernity. The importance of this perspective cannot be
overestimated. (Feenberg, 2003).
Feenberg is of course speaking as a philosopher himself but even such techni-
cally oriented fields such as Information Systems are increasingly calling for a
more philosophically grounded understanding of information and communication
technologies. Willcocks & Whitely for instance argue that
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social theory and philosophy should not be marginalized as they so
often are ... but need to be placed at the core of trying to under-
stand information and communication technologies. (Willcocks cited
in Latour, et al., 2011, p. 21)
Mainstream accounts, and especially those that expound the revolutionary nature
of digital technologies, continue to be antagonistic towards philosophy as a viable
approach to questions of technology, and continue to approach these questions
through the lens of social scientific methods. Even the debate around the need to
“upgrade” the discipline of Media Studies to “Media Studies 2.0” some years ago
brought no significant changes in how to study socio-technological transforma-
tions. In this sense this thesis is pushing boundaries as it is taking the arguably
radical step of using philosophy to question whereof the purported “revolution-
ary” nature of digital technologies consists. I wish to emphasise, however, that
the point is not that philosophy should replace other approaches in understanding
contemporary ICTs. Rather, the perspectives of Feenberg, Willcocks and Whitely
should be seen as arguments in favour of an interdisciplinary debate around these
problems where philosophers are given a place at the same table as sociologists,
information scientists etc. It is the aim of this thesis to contribute to this inter-
disciplinary debate with an analysis of Heidegger’s relevance for understanding
both information-technological objects and our interactions with them.
2.4 Methodology
Given the theoretical nature of the research question the approach taken to an-
swering it is also theoretical: the principle methodological approach is a revisiting
of Martin Heidegger’s work and a distilling of those aspects that are relevant to
the question of technology and more specifically of those that are useful for an
understanding of contemporary information and communication technologies. In
order to bridge what might appear as an unbridgeable gap between philosophy
and the state-of-the-art in information and communications technology, I will be
illustrating Heidegger’s conceptual points with topical examples from the world
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of ICTs, thereby rendering his thinking a valuable critical framework for thinking
about the most pressing socio-technological questions.
Martin Heidegger’s oeuvre is substantial and this thesis does not claim to have
exhausted the depth of his work in its investigations. However, it goes much fur-
ther than past discussions of Heidegger’s thinking on technology, which largely
limit themselves to his well-known essay “The Question Concerning Technol-
ogy”. It takes this essay as a focal point but also draws on those works where key
themes from the essay are either prepared or elaborated on further - importantly,
Heidegger’s main work Being and Time, which is rarely cited in the context of
Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. However, everywhere the themes that are
drawn out and elaborated on are made relevant to the main question, which is
how they can further an understanding of the ubiquity of ICTS and its implica-
tion for social life. In this context the thesis understands itself to be an ‘updating’
of Heidegger’s question concerning technology for information and communica-
tion technology at the beginning of the 21st century. The thesis does not contain
any empirical research as such but draws on empirical, that is real-life examples
throughout to illustrate the relevance of the theoretical point being made.
2.5 Heidegger’s Texts and their Translations
Of the texts from Heidegger’s oeuvre that I draw upon in this thesis, two are of
major importance: they are the essay on “The Question concerning Technology”,
and his major work Being and Time. Both of these have been studied in the orig-
inal German and in their English translation, where the translation for the former
is William Lovitt’s translation, published in a collection of essays under the same
title, by Harper Perennial in 1977. There are two translations of Being and Time,
the first, by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson was published in 1962 by
Wiley-Blackwell, and the more recent by Joan Stambaugh, published in 1996 by
the State University of New York Press. This thesis relies on the translation by
Macquarrie and Robinson on the basis that it is felt that the meaning of a num-
ber of Heideggerian concepts in Stambaugh’s translation has not been rendered
accurately. These include key concepts in Heidegger’s ontology of technology
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which are of great significance in the present context. For instance, Heidegger’s
differentiation between Vorhandenheit and Zuhandenheit, the difference between
a thing being ‘simply present’ as an object in some way and its approaching
us through its purpose, is translated by Stambaugh as “objective presence” and
“handiness” (Heidegger, 2010 [1953], pp. 7 and 69 respectively). Now, aside
from the word ‘objective’ introducing connotations that are simply not present
in the German original, and the word “handy” placing too great an emphasis on
usefulness, Stambaugh’s translation passes over the common etymological root of
these terms: in German both contain the word “hand” [hand]. This is crucial,
as the common root denotes the fact that both express ways of Being, and the
fact that objects can switch between the two. For instance, the usual mode of
Being of a tool is zuhanden, as it approaches us through how we might use it:
we engage with a hammer for instance as an implement for driving nails into a
plank of wood. Only when the tool becomes broken and can no longer fulfil its
purpose does it become a mere object or vorhanden. Our everyday engagement
with ICTs follows the same principle, with significant consequences as we will see.
Hence it is important to use an adequate translation for the ontological pairing of
Vorhandenheit and Zuhandenheit even if this ends up being somewhat unwieldy.
This is arguably the case in Macquarrie and Robinson, who translate Vorhan-
denheit and Zuhandenheit as “presence-at-hand” and “readiness-to-hand”. Here
the common root of the terms is retained, and the fact that they constitute two
modes of Being emphasised.
Amongst scholars there is widespread agreement that Heidegger is notoriously
difficult to translate. As the above example shows, Heidegger has a tendency
to imbue words from our everyday vocabulary with seemingly strange meanings,
and to create apparent neologisms where a suitable concept does not already
exist. However, where some see Heidegger as wilfully confusing us he is in fact
doing the very opposite: he is in fact taking us back to the original etymological
meaning of concepts, in order to show us how through centuries of rumination
and translation, these meanings have become obscured. For Heidegger, think-
ing is not merely a means to an end but a process of questioning that unfolds
along paths of language. For this reason it is vitally important to pay attention
to the nuances of his language, and I will be commenting upon instances where
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the translation of specific terms is problematic or misses out some of the mean-
ings present in the German original, thus hopefully bringing something new to
the reading of Heidegger, which Lovitt has rightly described as “an adventure”
(1977, p. xiii). Finally, references from Being and Time are provided based on
Heidegger’s original pagination, rather than that of the translators’, to facilitate




Privileging the Correct over the
True: A Heideggerian Critique of
Mainstream Accounts of ICTs
3.1 Introduction
For that reason the merely correct is not yet the true. Only the true
brings us into a free relationship with that which concerns us from out of its
essence. Accordingly, the correct instrumental definition of technology still
does not show us technology’s essence. In order that we may arrive at this,
or at least come close to it, we must seek the true by way of the correct.
Heidegger, 1977, p. 6
This chapter employs some of the fundamental tenets of Heidegger’s thinking
to highlight some of the pitfalls in mainstream academic discourses around ICTs
and their societal impact. In particular, it will focus on Heidegger’s distinction
between truth and correctness, which exposes how in current discourses about
media and information technologies, “correct determinations” (Heidegger, 1977,
p. 26) frequently stand in the way of deeper questions about the implications of
these ubiquitous technologies for human being-in-the-world. It argues that both
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overly optimistic accounts such as those celebrating the internet as a the new
public sphere, fostering democratic debate and engagement, and negative views
that emphasise how users’ online activities are subject to commercial exploitation
and governmental control, miss some of the more fundamentally calculative and
systemic properties ICTs exhibit. These properties are what Heidegger calls the
essence of modern technology: an essence that in itself is “by no means anything
technological”, yet it is precisely because of this immaterial quality that it is all
the more pervasive.
This paradox brought to the fore by Heidegger is uniquely applicable to ICTs,
given the immaterial and systemic nature of our global informational network of
which these technologies are merely a material manifestation. In the follow-
ing pages I will show how various tendencies in mainstream debates about the
significance of ICTs regularly get in the way of grasping the essence of these tech-
nologies by fetishising the realm of the “merely technological”, as Heidegger calls
it: our digital devices and applications, before in the following chapter delving
deeper into the nature of this essence so obscured. For, as Heidegger insists in
the above quotation, to arrive at technology’s essence “we must seek the true
by way of the correct” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 6). The essence of technology and
the distinction between truth and correctness are key ideas that allow us to see
how Heidegger’s understanding of technology illuminates critical features of our
modern information-technological landscape commonly ignored by mainstream
accounts.
3.2 Truth and Correctness
To be sure. The correct always fixes upon something pertinent in whatever
is under consideration. However, in order to be correct, this fixing by no
means needs to uncover the thing in question in its essence. Only at the
point where such an uncovering happens does the true come to pass. For
that reason the merely correct is not yet the true.
Heidegger, 1977, p. 6
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The distinction between truth and correctness runs through substantial parts
of Heidegger’s thinking and holds a great deal of value for understanding the
limitations of contemporary approaches to technology and specifically ICTs. In
everyday language we use these terms interchangeably, so it is important to un-
derstand why and how Heidegger draws his distinction, how he arrives at his
conclusion that the ”merely correct”, as he states in the above quotation, “is
not yet the true” and “does not uncover the thing in question in its essence”
(ibid., emphasis added). In his essay on technology Heidegger does not go into
the distinction in any detail, but we can look to Being and Time for an expla-
nation - I will summarise the main points of his discussion and then move on to
how correctness emerges as the demonstrable, but rather banal determinations
characterising ICT discourse that detract from far more significant underlying
concerns.
The question of what truth is is a crucial one for Heidegger, since the concept
is intimately connected with the question of being. What is true, we might say,
is understood as what a thing ‘really’ is. It stands to reason then that in trying
to get to grips with what technology really is, how we can decide whether we
have reached the true answer to this question is an important one. Heidegger
argues that our traditional conception of truth goes back to the Ancient Greek
philosopher Aristotle, the father of logic. It is here that it was originally decided
that truth is essentially the truth of a statement or an assertion. For instance, if
a person makes the simple claim that “it is raining”, we will look to the window
and, if we can see raindrops falling outside, we will deem this statement to be
true. Heidegger uses the example of a person who claims that a picture is hanging
askew on a wall without actually looking at it. The truth of this claim will have
been established once this person turns around and his assertion meets its object,
as it were - the picture on the wall actually hanging askew. Truth has become
ingrained in our thinking as the correspondence of a judgement with its object.
However, for Heidegger the point is that the statement about the object is
an act of Being in itself, that happens upon the being that is the object of the
statement. What is actually happening when the person turns around to see the
picture hanging askew on the wall is that the object discloses itself to the person
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as hanging in this position, it reveals itself to him as being in this state. The real
import of truth then, is not correspondence, but what Heidegger calls unconceal-
ment. The reason being that before we can decide that the statement corresponds
with its object, the object needs to reveal itself to us as what it is - only then
can it be judged. Thus there is a prior dimension that the correspondence the-
ory of truth already presupposes, and this is the dimension of unconcealment.
This, Heidegger argues, is the proper understanding of the Greek word ale¯theia:
openness, un-hiddenness, or unconcealment. Rather than being equivalent to
correctness, truth in the sense of openness or unconcealment is the condition for
all correctness.
By asking us to review our understanding of truth Heidegger is forcing us
to review one of the most fundamental concepts in our thinking, a concept that
is integral to the way we make sense of the world around us. Throughout this
discussion we will encounter numerous instances where Heidegger forces us to
do battle with our most basic and fundamental assumptions, but what does this
reviewed notion of truth mean for the concept of correctness, and more impor-
tantly, how precisely does it help us critique mainstream notions about ICTs?
After all, Heidegger has not got rid of the notion of correctness, nor has cor-
rectness been exposed as the opposite of truth, as falsehood. The key is in the
complex relationship truth and correctness entertain which Heidegger explains in
the quotation at the beginning of this section, so it is worth repeating here:
The correct always fixes upon something pertinent in whatever is un-
der consideration. However, in order to be correct, this fixing by no
means needs to uncover the thing in question in its essence. Only at
the point where such an uncovering happens does the true come to
pass. For that reason the merely correct is not yet the true. (1977, p.
6, emphasis added)
A correct statement will always stand as such, but as Heidegger says, it won’t
“uncover the thing in question in its essence”. This is precisely the point in
the present context: mainstream media commentary involves a range of “correct
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determinations” (ibid., p.26), but these fall short of uncovering the “essence” of
digital technologies. To give an example (and I will develop this further over
the following pages), when Henry Jenkins speaks of a “participatory culture”
emerging online, this might highlight the content-sharing activities of web users
but fails to grasp the wider logic of calculation, commodification and control that
governs the infrastructure where these sharing activities take place. Jenkins’
argument represents a “correct determination”, but doing so it misses the wider
truth that the digital matrix underlying these sharing activities is precisely the
same that enables their surveillance and exploitation, a point that I will keep
returning to throughout this thesis. The problem is that in actual terms the
correct often tends to obscure the true: where we don’t recognise the correct as
being only “partially true”, this partial truth tends to be taken for the whole
truth and those aspects of the truth that correctness does not cover are lost.
For Heidegger, one of the most problematic “correct determinations” about
technology is the ideology of technological neutrality, the idea that technology
constitutes a neutral means to an end outside itself. Langdon Winner aptly
described this idea, and the “tool-use ethic”, as “truisms striving to become
bromides” (Winner, 1977, p. 27) and as we saw in chapter two, they are incred-
ibly successful when utilised to market personal electronics or to justify growing
surveillance. The marketing slogan used by Nokia “It’s not technology, it’s what
you do with it” (Youtube, 2010) is a prime example of the corporate promotion
of the myth of technological neutrality. Such messaging is aimed at getting us
to focus on the benefits these technologies bring to our lives - more fun, more
freedom (in the case of smartphones), or, in the case of surveillance technologies,
more “safety and security”, as we will see in examples of CCTV warning signs.
As Heidegger argues in his essay,
Who would ever deny that it is correct? ... The instrumental defini-
tion of technology is indeed so uncannily correct that it even holds for
modern technology, which, in other respects, we maintain with some
justification that it is, in contrast to the older, handwork technology,
27
3.2 Truth and Correctness
something completely different and therefore new. (Heidegger, 1977,
p. 5)
As Heidegger says, even the most sophisticated technological innovations are
means to ends, an idea that is regularly reinforced even by academic discourse
around ICTs. For instance, we speak of computer-mediated communication
(CMC), of social networking tools and so on.
A prime example of this discourse is the work of the Spanish sociologist Manuel
Castells, whose Information Age trilogy The Rise of the Network Society (2009),
The Power of Identity (2009) and End of Millennium (2010) constitutes some of
the most influential and widely accepted commentary on the impact of digital in-
formation and communication technologies. Castells (2013 [2009]) explores what
for him constitute the transformative capacities of the internet: the traditional,
vertical flows of power and communication have been replaced by a horizontal
network of digital communication technologies. By its very nature, he argues, the
web is biased towards freedom of communication - entry barriers are lower than to
traditional media industries, what counts is big ideas, rather than capital, which
he argues is evidenced by the global success stories of ventures like Facebook and
Twitter. Castells does not deny the continued influence of corporate capital on
the communications infrastructure, but insists that the decentralised structure of
the web and the rapid growth of user numbers is making it increasingly difficult
for corporations and governments to control the free exchange of information be-
tween, as he argues, increasingly autonomous users. The Chinese government for
instance has a history of ‘surveilling content, blocking unwanted messages, and
punishing the messengers accordingly’. But, he argues,
how can the government exercise control over such a gigantic, decen-
tralized network of communication, connected to global networks, in
which Chinese users spend over two billion hours a week? (Castells,
2013 [2009], p. 282)
The internet, for Castells, is a “free public space” (Castells, 2012, p. 2) and in
its very technological makeup opposed to monopolies of power: that the network
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in itself favours neither one group nor the other, rather, its decentralised nature
works against the concentration of power in the hands of one group. From his
point of view, technology itself is neutral to the extent that “whoever has enough
money, including political leaders, will have a better chance of operating the
switch in its favor” (Castells, 2013 [2009], p. 52). Technology becomes an actor
for positive or negative ends respectively only in combination with the interests
of a particular social group.
The point is that precisely because we find the idea of technology as a means
to an end confirmed everywhere, the deeper underlying essence of technology
remains hidden from view. It is the immaterial qualities of ICTs that lend them-
selves uniquely to being perceived as neutral: after all, it isn’t the hardware that
matters, our devices are only gateways into an immaterial, constantly chang-
ing and expanding network of global informational flows. ICTs thus are able
to ‘withdraw’ into their uses and applications, a ‘withdrawal’ that prevents us
from realising the full complexity of their ontological structure and masking their
essence: a far more fundamental technicality or instrumentality than the super-
ficial uses we put these technologies to might suggest. So as long as we concern
ourselves with ICTs from the perspective of their uses and applications, we are
closing ourselves off from a fuller understanding of these technologies in terms of
their essence, which is “by no means anything technological” (Heidegger, 1977,
p. 5).
A notion that encapsulates the preoccupation with the realm of what Heideg-
ger calls the “merely technological” in mainstream accounts of ICTs is that of the
fetish. Interactivity and convergence have been lauded as paving the way towards
a more politically engaged and equal society, but I would argue that the hype
surrounding ‘new media’ represents precisely the kind of fetishistic glorification
of an in itself rather banal object and its imbuing with magical qualities that Hei-
degger’s distinction between the correct and the true seeks to warn against. Thus
the fetish emerges as the precise opposite of Heidegger’s essence of technology.
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3.3 The Fetishisation of ICTs
In common parlance the fetish refers to the imbuing of an inanimate object with
special qualities that it does not have. Next to its adoption in psychoanalysis by
Sigmund Freud, the term was made valuable as a critical concept by Karl Marx in
his critique of capitalism. He spoke of commodity fetishism to argue that despite
how goods produced as commodities in fact embody the social relations of their
production, they are taken as things with intrinsic value:
instead of seeing a set of relationships between people, we see a set
of relationships between things. One ton of iron and two ounces of
gold appear to be “naturally” equal in value, just as one ton of each
substance is equal in weight. The social relationship that creates their
equal value [the amount of labour they embody] disappears from our
consciousness. (Marx, 1990, p. 438)
More recently the notion of the fetish has been revisited and updated for the
contemporary mediascape by Zˇizˇek, who argues that in fact today, we know very
well that money, for instance, has no intrinsic value, the point is that we still
behave as though it did.
The difference between the ways in which the notion of the fetish is utilised
by Marx and Zˇizˇek lies in the distance held to the belief regarding the fetishised
object. For Marx, the belief in the intrinsic value of the commodity is actually
held. Zˇizˇek on the other hand argues that enlightened modern society will state
that it is very well aware of the fact that the object has no magical qualities - it will
claim a cynical distance towards the belief. Zˇizˇek however insists this distance
is an illusion: if anything modern, rational societies are even more enthralled
to ideology. To illustrate this, Zˇizˇek uses the example of so-called ‘primitive’
tribes, who have been labelled as such by Western, ‘enlightened’ society based on
their supposedly nave belief in the powers of inanimate objects like totem poles.
Anthropological studies showed, however, that these beliefs were acknowledged to
be “held by some”, but that generally the tribes exhibited a healthy scepticism
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towards them. The totem poles were treated as symbols, rather than magical
objects in themselves. For Zˇizˇek the cynical distance of our own enlightened
mindset on the other hand is a pretence: we only pretend to pretend to believe.
The true relationship between the enlightened and the primitive is in fact the
reverse.
The glorification of new media in the context of the recent uprisings in var-
ious countries around the world is an example of how Zˇizˇek’s theoretical point
illustrates the ideologisation of ICTs. Arguments that summarise the uprisings
in Arab countries, the Occupy movement or the 2010 student protests in the UK
as “Social Media Revolutions” (Sullivan and Ghonim cited in Fuchs, 2012, p.
385) all concentrate our attention on the supposedly liberating, democratising
and equalising powers of new media. They fetishise a virtual space of protest
that distracts from the human struggle and resolve that concentrated people in
overwhelming numbers on the actual streets and squares in Cairo, New York and
London, and more recently in Kiev. However, even where mainstream commen-
tary recognises the importance of the people in the streets, this can be seen as a
mock-recognition that technologies alone cannot bring about a revolution, which
is neutralized by the extent to which the global connectivity of ICTs is hyped.
This Zˇizˇekian account of the fetish can be seen as a more recent and updated
account of Heidegger’s notion of the correct: both the fetish and the correct ar-
ticulate a situation where we are blinded to our own psychological investment in
an idea. The distinction between correctness and truth is precisely not a distinc-
tion between a falsehood and the truth: as Heidegger reminds us, “the correct
always fixes upon something pertinent in whatever is under consideration” (Hei-
degger, 1977, p. 6), but it is in the nature of the correct itself that it often blinds
us to a deeper underlying truth. In the case of the alleged ‘Social Media Rev-
olutions’, social media may indeed have facilitated the protest movements in all
the above cases, but talk of a ‘Social Media Revolution’ and similar discourses
lead to these technologies assuming these qualities in a quasi-natural way. As a
result it becomes more difficult to recognise the ways in which the old structures
of power and capital are remaining unchanged. As Andrejevic for instance puts
it, we need to ask ourselves
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what are we to make of the fact that the advent of ‘bottom-up’ media
production amidst celebratory claims about the democratizing power
of interactivity have coincided, arguably, with increasing economic
and political inequality. (2009, p. 35, emphasis in the original)
Heidegger’s distinction between the correct and the true thus uncovers the
ontological complexities of the fetish: it allows us to see that beyond the fetishi-
sation of new media there lies a more complex reality that needs to be uncovered.
It needs to be emphasised however that the glorification of new media in the
examples given here represents only one possibility of their fetishisation. Assign-
ing them a negative role in the creation of a ‘surveillance state’ equally suffers
from a displacement of the truth by correctness, as it misses out the totalising,
systemic nature of digital networked technologies and the calculating, rational-
izing properties inherent in these technologies whether they are put to positive
or negative ’uses’. The need to reconcile the growing availability of information
and communication technology - supposedly empowering individual and group
action - with the growing social disbenefits such as state surveillance and the
commercial exploitation of our online activities calls for a theorisation of ICTs
that accounts for the inherently complex and contradictory role played by these
in our capitalist societies. Where this need is recognised by some contemporary
Critical Theory approaches (see for instance Fuchs, 2012), these approaches still
fall short of capturing the ontological complexity of our informational system,
a multi-layered digital matrix where our benign online activities form only one
level, and the governmental and corporate use of this data another. An emphasis
on the commodification of our online activities does not exhaust the complexity
of this system because it is characterised by a much more fundamental rationality
than the logic of commodification. Heidegger’s differentiation between the correct
and the true is a first step in this direction as it alerts us to what is yet to be
uncovered, and in the subsequent chapters we will delve deeper into his thinking
to show how his ontological approach sheds light on the complexity and depth of
our technological environment.
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The fetishisation of new media in mainstream accounts is predominantly of a
positive kind, such as that of Castells who hails the internet as the powerhouse
of global protest and social networks as “spaces of autonomy, largely beyond the
control of governments and corporations” (Castells, 2012, p. 2). The growing
body of literature on government surveillance and the corporate exploitation of
user data however is frequently characterised by a similar privileging of correct-
ness over truth. Both types of fetishisation ensue from the urge to judge the
long-term impact of technological change and to attach to it a definitive label.
The next section addresses some of the problems inherent in this binary response
to technological change, and the reasons why those who label Heidegger a Luddite
are fundamentally mistaken, as we see that his approach takes us far beyond the
categories of optimism and pessimism.
3.4 The Pitfalls of Techno-optimism, -pessimism1,
and Trying to get Technology under Control
What is dangerous is not technology. There is no demonry of technology,
but rather there is the mystery of its essence.
Heidegger, 1977, p. 28
Heidegger’s warning that we should not see technology as neutral is frequently
confused with a pessimistic stance towards everything technological. This misun-
derstanding is exacerbated by Heidegger’s frequent reference to pastoral themes
and his use of poetry to make an argument, as we saw in the previous chapter.
Combined with his penchant for archaic examples like silver chalices in making
points about technology, these tendencies have caused him to be construed by
many as
1Technophilia derives from Greek techne¯ (art, skill, craft) and philos (beloved, dear, friend)
and means optimism about the impact of technology on culture and society (equivalent ex-
pressions are techno-enthusiasm and techno-optimism); technophobia on the other hand (from
Greek techne¯ and phobos (fear) denotes a negative view about these impacts (also, Luddism or
techno-pessimism).
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a Luddite who would like to return from the exploitation of the earth,
consumerism, and mass media to the world of the pre-Socratic Greeks
or the good old Schwartzwald peasants. (Dreyfus, 2009, p. 26)
It is true that Heidegger often seems to be expressing a romantic longing for a
simpler life more connected to nature. For instance when he laments that
[h]ourly and daily they are chained to radio and television ... All that
with which modern techniques of communication stimulate, assail,
and drive man - all that is already much closer to man today than
his fields around his farmstead, closer than the sky over the earth,
closer than the change from night to day, closer than the conventions
and customs of his village, than the tradition of his native world.
(Heidegger, 1966, p. 48)
The explicit mention of communication technologies here suggests that a Heideg-
gerian critique of ICTs would be led by a profound pessimism, a rejection of all
forms of mediated communication. In what might seem the most clear-cut exam-
ple of Heidegger’s apparent techno-dystopianism, he appears to be likening mod-
ern industrialised agriculture to the horrific extermination of Jews by the Nazis
(Heidegger, 2012 [1994], pg.27). Where this argument has caused widespread
outrage and anti-Heideggerian sentiment in academic circles and beyond, it is
urgent for our purposes that we recognise it as an enumeration of some of the
most extreme manifestations of the essence of modern technology.
It is in the nature of the essence of modern technology that it is systemic
and totalising, and it is for these very reasons that “pessimism and optimism
are positions that fall too short of the realm we are attempting to reflect upon”
(Heidegger, 1993 [1966]). Heidegger made this final comment in his interview
with the German weekly Der Spiegel in 1966, but what he is saying hits precisely
upon the underlying technicality of our global information-technological network.
For Heidegger, any attempt to deal with the impact of technology on our lives in
terms of decline and loss, as a problem in need of a solution, is precisely the kind
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of instrumental thinking that is the very essence of technology itself, the thinking
which Heidegger is trying to make visible.
Hence a key aim of this thesis is to prove why reading Heidegger’s account
of technology as pessimistic or Luddite2 is premised on a fundamental misunder-
standing. This is important because this misunderstanding runs through other-
wise highly authoritative work on Heidegger, e.g. (Feenberg, 1999) seems to view
technological thinking as emerging from the growing technologisation of human
life. Heidegger’s concept of the essence of technology is premised precisely on a
prior logic of rationality that precedes all technological instruments or devices.
Our technological devices and applications are the result, and not the origin,
of this underlying logic of technicality, which is why both enthusiastic and pes-
simistic visions of our technological future that focus only on the realm of the
technological are barking up the wrong metaphorical tree.
Here we encounter McLuhan’s “watchdog of the mind”, distracted by the
media’s overwhelming ubiquity as though it were a “juicy piece of meat” (2001).
Mainstream accounts of the media occupy precisely the role of the distracted
watchdog: they either laud new media as engines of democratisation, or see
them as propelling us fast towards the surveillance state, but from Heidegger’s
perspective if we ask whether ICTs are an instrument of democracy or a tool for
oppression we are posing the wrong “question concerning technology”. We are
still adhering to the instrumental dimension of technology, approaching it as a
means to an end and only asking whether this end will be good or bad. In other
words, we are privileging the correct over the true.
The reason is that from this perspective, our technological fate seems to hinge
on our ability to get technology under control : “Everything depends on our ma-
2Iain Thompson points out that it is of political and not just hermeneutic importance
not to misread Heidegger as advocating a return to pretechnological times. He refers to Don
Ihde’s argument that “Retreat to a pretechnological time, or a pristine form of technology,
are essentially regressive and conservative agendas that are as pernicious as those that seek to
eliminate the use of all technology” (Thompson, 2005, p. 73, emphasis added). Especially in
view of the controversial issue of Heidegger’s politics it is important not to charge him with
technological conservativism. I address this issue in more detail in chapter 8.
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nipulating technology in the proper manner” Heidegger writes, and of course “the
will to mastery becomes all the more urgent the more technology threatens to
slip from human control” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 5). For example, in the debates
about the increasing vulnerability of our privacy through our use of ICTs, main-
taining a sufficient level of privacy appears to be a matter of being ‘in control’
of our data. The need to regain control is becoming ever more urgent in view of
what is referred to as ‘big data’, the vast amounts of data that no longer have
space on our own devices and are stored and processed in the ‘cloud’, huge data
centres operated by Google and Amazon, amongst others. 3 This is illustrated
in an article written for CNN by journalist and campaigner Rebecca MacKinnon,
entitled “Citizens are losing control of their digital privacy”:
People have good reason to be unhappy about losing control over who
and what services know what about them. But that is far from the
only way in which we are losing control. Under two successive [US] ad-
ministrations, new laws, policies and corporate practices have made it
much easier for government agencies to track and access citizens’ pri-
vate digital communications from their storage “in the cloud” than it
is for agents to search or monitor our physical homes, offices, vehicles,
and mail.(MacKinnon, 2012, emphasis added)
When the mass surveillance programme PRISM was uncovered, one of the
principle critiques raised was the fact that it had “circumvent[ed] our right to
personal data control” (Rintel, 2013): it constituted a violation of our right to
what is known as ‘informational self-determination’4. By phrasing the critique of
government and corporate surveillance in these terms, it is implied that regaining
control over our data would reinstate an ethical use of ICTs. But here Heidegger
3In his upcoming book To the Cloud: Big Data in a Turbulent World (2014 (in press)),
the Canadian critical theorist Vincent Mosco traces the origins of the cloud and questions its
meaning in the light of the current optimism.
4The ‘right to informational self-determination’ originates from a ruling by the German
Federal Constitutional Court as a right that should be guaranteed as part of the protection
of an individual granted to him/her by the Constitution. Germany is widely recognised to be
leading in data protection legislation.
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alerts us to another paradox that characterises modern technology, and ICTs in
particular: our attempt to “get a grip” on technology is the very thing that that
makes it slip through our grasp. It is our continued approach to technology as a
means to an end - whether this end is positive or negative in itself is beside the
point - that prevents us from acknowledging the deeper underlying truths about
technology that relate to our being-in-the-world.
3.5 Summary
To conclude this chapter where we have explored some of the pitfalls in main-
stream ways of thinking about technology, two important points stand out. Firstly,
these accounts suffer from an overemphasis on what Heidegger calls the ‘merely
technological’, a criticism that we owe to his distinction between truth and cor-
rectness. Secondly, the urge to attach to our information-technological condition
a label, whether this is positive or negative in outlook, misses the for Heidegger
fundamental point that our technologies are only a manifestation of a deeper
underlying technicality - what he calls the ‘essence’ of technology. Heidegger’s
questioning of technology offers an approach to ICTs that is more subtle, but
at the same time runs much deeper than the examples of mainstream accounts
mentioned here because it concerns the very simple question of the way human
beings, and other beings in the world, ‘are’. For Heidegger, this is the most fun-
damental question of philosophy but one that Western philosophy has strangely
ignored - arguably because of its efforts to gain a conceptual hold over the world
around us: another case of something slipping through our grasp as a result of our
attempt to do so. In the following chapter we will examine in more detail some
of the implications of mainstream conceptualisations of technology, specifically
the idea that technology constitutes a neutral means to an end, which Heidegger
clearly states is the most dangerous. We will see how the ‘instrumental ideology
of technology’ that pervades our general understanding of it can be harnessed by
governments and corporations to argue that technologies are deployed for social
benefits even where they have tangible negative effects on our civil liberties. I will
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show how the ‘Surveillance Ideology’ for instance, defined as the promise of se-
curity through surveillance, utilises the neutrality thesis to justify the increasing
infringement of our privacy.
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Chapter 4
ICTs and the Ideology of
Technological Neutrality5
4.1 Introduction
...everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we
passionately affirm or deny it. But we are delivered over to it in the worst
possible way when we regard it as something neutral.
Heidegger, 1977, p. 4
Language is the house of Being.
Heidegger, 1978, p. 147
This chapter sheds light on the pervasiveness of the instrumental ideology of
5This chapter was published as an article in the open access journal Triple C: Commu-
nication, Crisis & Critique, edited by Christian Fuchs, in 2013 as “Ideology, Critique and
Surveillance”. Some of the theoretical concepts discussed (e.g. the ideological packaging of
ICTs) have been further developed for a chapter, co-authored with Pinelopi Troullinou and Dr.




technology, meaning that technology is understood as a neutral means to an end
outside itself, and its consequences. Heidegger’s argument that we are ‘delivered
over to [technology] in the worst possible way when we regard it as something
neutral’, as quoted above, is based on the fact that where an instrumental under-
standing of technology dominates we are blinded to the deeper underlying essence
of technology which, according to Heidegger, is the real danger that we must ad-
dress - rather than the ubiquity of technological devices and machinery that is the
subject of much so much current debate about information and communication
technology. The distinction between technology and its essence is at the heart
of Heidegger’s thinking on technology and will be dealt with in depth in this
thesis. To begin with, however, I aim to show how the ideology of technological
neutrality is indeed pervasive in our everyday dealings with technology.
I argue that a perception of information and communications technologies as
neutral means to beneficial ends has blinded, or in the very least numbed us,
to the consequences the use of these technologies brings about. For instance,
the Oyster smart card has made travelling through London more efficient and
convenient, giving customers a cash-free way of using different transport systems
(including the Tube, buses, the Docklands Light Railway and river boats). At the
same time, however, Oyster collects a wealth of information about its customers
(a passenger’s full name, address, telephone number, email address and password,
and encrypted bank details of those who purchase Oyster products using a debit
or credit card), which can then be collated with data from other sources to form
an increasingly comprehensive ‘digital footprint’. Whilst by agreeing to the terms
& conditions of Transport for London (TfL) passengers are giving TfL permission
to ‘share Oyster information with their subsidiaries and service providers’ (Trans-
port for London, n.d.), it is not clear precisely how this data will be used. For
instance, Oyster information may be made available to law enforcement agencies,
which arguably goes against the principle of ‘purpose limitation’ laid down by the
European data protection legislation. Section I, Article 6 of the EU Data Protec-
tion Directive states that “personal data must be collected for specified, explicit
and legitimate purposes - and not be further processed in a way incompatible
with those purposes” (European Commission, 1995).
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The example of the Oyster smart card is just one of many where a user’s ev-
eryday information-technological activities are subject to surveillance by private
and public entities, and, as I have repeatedly argued, the immaterial and systemic
nature of our digital informational infrastructure means commercial and law en-
forcement interests are increasingly difficult to separate. As I will argue through-
out this thesis, the operating principle of digital technologies (the processing of
binary signals) is what makes these technologies inherently open to the surveil-
lance and exploitation of user data. Indeed, the Snowden revelations have shown
that these processes are a persistent feature of our information-technological land-
scape, and as such they are a central matter of concern for a critical investigation
of the social significance of ICTs. In other words, the surveillant capacities of
ICTs are not only an issue from the explicit perspective of surveillance studies,
rather, they should come into focus for any critical analysis of ICTs.
This chapter will first address how the ideology of technological neutrality,
which defends the viewpoint that technologies are neutral means to beneficial
ends, is utilised by both state and private entities to create a smokescreen around
the use of ICTs for surveillance purposes. In this context I will discuss the so-
called ‘surveillance ideology’, which refers to the promise of security by means of
surveillance, as a particularly topical and perturbing example of the ideology of
technological neutrality. I will examine in some detail specific instances of the
surveillance ideology, focusing on the rhetoric of CCTV camera warning signs.
This is in keeping with my argument that we are dealing with an informational
system, rather than an accumulation of technologies and devices: on- and offline
activities of users are processed by digital technologies as strings of binary code,
which flows seamlessly through an infrastructure of computers and databases
where physical, institutional or national boundaries are of only nominal signifi-
cance. Physical technological devices are only significant in so far as they act as
portals to this underlying informational matrix. CCTV cameras, then, are part
of this informational system as much as smart phones, social networking sites
and Oyster cards, all of which are sites for the creation and transmission of data
and thus contribute to a user’s ‘digital footprint’.
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We then turn to Heidegger to see how the surveillance ideology is made ef-
fective by convincing users of an existing threat to their safety and security that
legitimises the use of surveillance technology. The work of Martin Heidegger has
so far been largely outside the remit of critical studies of ICTs (for reasons al-
ready mentioned in the Introduction and that will be explored in more detail in
chapter 8), but I aim to demonstrate why it is uniquely relevant to a critique of
the kind of ideological language constituted by the surveillance ideology. In this
sense his work can also make an invaluable contribution to existing theories of
ideology and language, where so far it has been of little significance (the same
goes for the branch of philosophy dedicated explicitly to the study of language,
which developed in the second half of the 20th century based on the work of John
Searle). I will offer a brief discussion of these existing theories, before moving
on to show how Heidegger’s theory of language offers a valuable insight into the
relationship between language and social reality, which is key to understanding
how ideology works.
4.2 The Surveillance Ideology: an Ideology of
Technological Neutrality
In 2013 Edward Snowden, a former employee of the American intelligence ser-
vices CIA and NSA, leaked details of the US electronic surveillance programme
‘PRISM’ to a number of newspapers. The leaks revealed the full extent of US
surveillance operations, and triggered the exposure of similar programmes in the
United Kingdom (Tempora) used to spy on the electronic communications of
ordinary citizens. Critical approaches to ICTs have drawn attention to the fact
that these programmes are not an anomalous event, a singular storm in otherwise
calm waters (Fuchs 2013), as some of the vehement reactions in the media and
amongst public figures might suggest. The truth is that they form part of a more
general trend towards ‘ubiquitous surveillance’ (Murakami Wood 2011) that has
been going on for some time.
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However, a number of critical voices in the academy, the media and amongst
privacy watchdogs have begun to call into question the arguments that have been
used to justify this increasingly global and ubiquitous surveillance, namely that
programmes such as PRISM and Tempora are “absolutely essential for effective
fighting of terrorism” (Former Home Secretary John Reid cited in Watson 2013).
As Fuchs (2013) has argued,
[s]ince 9/11 there has been an intensification and extension of surveil-
lance that is based on the na¨ıve technological-deterministic surveil-
lance ideology that monitoring technologies, big data analysis and
predictive algorithms can prevent terrorism.
Studies exist that cast doubt over whether these forms of surveillance are in fact
effective at combatting terrorism and lowering crime;6 so we are right to ask how
the surveillance ideology, which we can define broadly as the promise of security
through surveillance, maintains itself.
The argument I wish to make is that the large-scale surveillance programmes
revealed in 2013, as well as the justifications offered by policy-makers and law
enforcement agencies, are taking place in a wider ‘ideological atmosphere’7 that
is already receptive to such policies. By ideological atmosphere I mean an atmo-
sphere where a certain idea has become naturalised, meaning neither its origins,
nor its validity, are any longer questioned. The naturalisation of an idea with
the purpose of distracting from a deeper underlying truth was problematized by
McLuhan (2001) with specific reference to the media when he argued that the
6 Fuchs (2013) for instance argues that “[high-tech surveillance will never be able to stop
terrorism because most terrorists are smart enough not to announce their intentions on the
Internet”.
7A number of scholars have remarked on the emergence of a “culture of fear” in Western
societies (Furedi 2002 and 2006, Mythen and Walklate 2006, Linke and Smith 2009, Glassner
1999), built upon the increasing profitability of mitigating risk and to legitimise political action
in the name of national security and democratic values. As a concept, however, it is not specific
to surveillance but includes a range of wider cultural factors, hence I prefer to speak of an
ideological atmosphere or the surveillance ideology specifically.
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content of the media is like a ‘juicy piece of meat’ carried by the burglar to dis-
tract the ‘watchdog of the mind’. One of Zˇizˇek’s favourite anecdotes forces the
same point: a workman is suspected of stealing something in the wheelbarrows he
pushes before him as he leaves every night - only much later do they realise it is
the wheelbarrows the workman has been stealing. These are useful metaphors for
thinking about how the naturalisation of certain ideas regularly has us missing
the real point, which, as we will see throughout this thesis, is precisely Heideg-
ger’s point. The idea that seems to have become naturalised in the case of the
surveillance ideology is the existence of a threat to our way of life that requires
the policing through surveillance mechanisms. The visible proliferation of these
mechanisms then continues to reinforce the idea of a threat, the very idea that was
originally used to justify their introduction. From there ensues a vicious circle in
which ideology and technology are closely interlinked, constantly reinforcing each
other. So the first task of this chapter is to shed light on some of the factors that
would contribute to such an ideological atmosphere, namely the ways in which
surveillance technology such as CCTV is marketed to the public by corporations
and justified by the state. The next section will address more specific examples
of the surveillance ideology.
4.3 The Language of the Surveillance Ideology
This section explores some of the mechanisms that might be contributing to an
ideological atmosphere that sustains the surveillance ideology by looking at some
examples of CCTV (Closed Circuit Television) camera warning signs. The ubiq-
uity of CCTV in the United Kingdom means the mandatory warning signs are
a particularly prevalent example of how the promise of security through surveil-
lance manifests itself. As we will see from two specific examples, the signs utilize
the rhetoric of ‘safety and security’ to reinforce the idea of a threat, thus justi-
fying the use of surveillance. Just how this idea is reinforced is a process that
Heidegger’s theory of language can help us understand conceptually.
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The use of CCTV in the UK has expanded dramatically over the last two
decades: in 1991 no more than ten British cities operated CCTV surveillance
equipment in public spaces, and these systems were small-scale and locally funded
cooperations between private entities and local police (Norris et al. 2004).8 To-
day, whole areas of cities are under surveillance and it is estimated that there
are now 5.9 million cameras in operation, one for every eleven citizens (Barrett
2013). It is argued that ‘[e]ffective CCTV schemes are an invaluable source of
crime detection and evidence for the police’ (ibid.). The actual effectiveness of
CCTV for these purposes has been questioned9, but according to Norris et al.
it is beside the point: they argue that for politicians, it is crucial ‘to be seen
to be doing something’, and that faced with the complexity of problems such as
terrorism, ‘technological fixes which promise the appearance, if not the reality of
security are highly appealing’ (2004, 126).
The technological equipment itself gives an appearance of security and thus
acts as a signifier of the surveillance ideology, but as the cameras are becom-
ing less obvious and easy to spot (Murakami Wood 2011), the legally required
warning signs act as effective mediators of the surveillance ideology in lieu of the
cameras themselves. They employ discursive mechanisms that indeed promise the
appearance of security, but as I aim to show, they do so by sustaining a climate of
threat by their very reference to our ‘safety’ and ‘security’. The images in figures
4.1 and 4.2 are typical examples of a CCTV warning sign, fluorescent yellow and
black to attract attention, and featuring a stylised CCTV camera icon. In the
the first image, the sign alerts the passerby to the fact that ‘This organisation
operates 24hr CCTV surveillance’ and that ‘[i]mages are being recorded for the
purpose of crime prevention and public safety’.
8Norris et al. (2004) trace the rise of CCTV in Britain in comparison with the global rise
in CCTV surveillance.
9Krahmann (2011) for instance argues that due to the poor quality, complexity and sheer
amount of recorded material CCTV is effectively useless as a deterrence mechanism. A
European-wide review commissioned by the European Union?s Directorate General for Internal
Policies urges to treat arguments promoting the use of CCTV for crime-prevention with caution
(Statewatch 2009).
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Figure 4.1: CCTV warning sign outside London Zoo. The sign reads in full:
‘This organisation operates 24hr CCTV surveillance. Images are being recorded
for the purpose of crime prevention and public safety. Please contact 020 7449
6570 for further information about the scheme. This scheme is controlled by the
Zoological Society of London, London Zoo, Regent’s Park, London NW1 4RY.’
Image courtesy of Chris Campbell.
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Figure 4.2: CCTV warning sign in Bexley, London. The sign reads in full:
“CCTV in operation. Images are being monitored and recorded for the purposes
of crime prevention, public and road safety. The contact number for information
is: 020 8303 7777”. Image courtesy of Chris Campbell.
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The sign in the second image contains the warning: “CCTV in Operation.
Images are being monitored and recorded for the purposes of crime prevention,
public and road safety”. Other typical notifications are “24hr CCTV - Images
are being recorded and monitored for your safety and to help prevent crime” or,
more frequently in semi-public or privately owned spaces such as shops, “Warn-
ing. CCTV security in operation on these premises”. In train stations or airports
announcements are frequently made via load speakers, emphasising that surveil-
lance is taking place for the purposes of “safety and security”.
Figure 4.3 is a preliminary attempt to model the discursive mechanisms em-
ployed by the surveillance ideology, specifically the relationship between the
rhetoric used to justify the surveillance and the surveillance process itself. At
the centre of the model is the surveillance process itself. The surrounding circles
contain examples of the rhetoric used by industry and governmental actors in
their justifications of surveillance, such as “security”, “crime prevention” or “ef-
ficiency”. This rhetoric works similarly to the light-reflective strips on a cyclist’s
clothing, deflecting from the surveillance process itself towards the prospective
benefits of “security” or “crime prevention”. Thus the rhetoric of the surveillance
ideology forms a kind of ‘ideological packaging’10 around the technologies and the
surveillance process itself.
Arguably, however, the mechanisms of this ideological packaging by which
words such as ‘security’ and ‘convenience’ are attached to the surveillance process
are not yet fully understood. I would argue that this process is far more complex
and significant than existing definitions of ideology would permit, as it is rooted
in the ontological relationship between language and being. Where McLuhan’s
burglar and Zˇizˇek’s workman tell us that we need to look more closely for obvious
truths, Heidegger can give us an understanding of how our minds are distracted
from recognising these obviousnesses in the first place. Heidegger’s account of
language is ontological and uncovers that which has been obscured by the history
of Western thinking which has presented language to us as a neutral means for
10The concept of the “ideological packaging” was first presented in a joint paper “The Ideo-
logical Packaging of ICTs” given at the 4th ICTs & Society Conference in Uppsala, Sweden, in
May 2012.
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Figure 4.3: The Ideological Packaging of ICTs. Copyright Heidi Herzogenrath-
Amelung
communication. This, as I hope to show, has significant implications for ideology:
the effectiveness of the surveillance ideology is largely indebted to an instrumental
understanding of language whereby words transparently envelop a piece of reality,
thus making it communicable. The consequence of this is that we take the rhetoric
of ‘safety’ or ‘crime prevention’ to be statements of actual fact rather than realities
‘called into being’ by their verbalisation. This, for Heidegger, is the essence of
language which its instrumental everyday use has obscured.
In order to highlight the unique suitability of Heidegger’s philosophy of lan-
guage for understanding the surveillance ideology, it will be necessary to first
provide a discussion of ideology in conceptual terms, not least because it consti-
tutes “one of those philosophical terms that has entered into everyday speech with
an impoverished meaning” (Kotsko 2012). As ideology critique has traditionally
been faced with the problem of how to critique ideological language when it must
rely on language itself, it will also be necessary to briefly outline how previous
thinkers have approached the connection between ideology and language.
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4.4 Ideology, Language and the Possibility of
Critique
Ideology has never been so much in evidence as a fact and so little un-
derstood as a concept as it is today... For some, the concept now seems too
ubiquitous to be meaningful; for others, too cohesive for a world of infinite
difference.
Eagleton 1991, back cover
Ideology-critique needs to know how ideology works if it wants to be effective.
Various definitions of ideology exist but our common understanding of it is rooted
in Karl Marx’s critique of capitalism. It is important to situate this understanding
of ideology within its historical context to understand the form ideology-critique
has since taken. For Marx, ideology was a means of maintaining the capitalist
social order by blinding the proletariat to the true conditions of their existence.
The basis for this materialist account of ideology lies in The German Ideology,
where Marx and Engels argued that ‘the ideas of the ruling class are in every
epoch the ruling ideas’, and the ruling ideas in turn ‘nothing more than the ideal
expression of the dominant relationships, the dominant material relationships
grasped as ideas’ ([1846] 1947, 64). For Marx, the consciousness of the individual
was determined by his place in the capitalist hierarchy of production. Ideology
was thus not a matter of individual consciousness, of the human being as subject.
It addressed itself to the consciousness of an entire social class, into which the
human being as subject was dissolved. It was here that “false consciousness”11,
the “distance” or “divergence between so-called social reality and our distorted
representation [...] of it” (Zˇizˇek 1989, 28) was located.
However, because this theory of ideology is one of class and not individual
consciousness, it does not really answer the question how ‘the ruling ideas actually
get into the heads of individuals and, once there, how effective they might be in
11As Eagleton argues, there is no evidence that Marx himself used the term “false conscious-
ness” so frequently attributed to him but we find it in a letter written by Engels (Eagleton
1991, 89)
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securing their acceptance’ (Scannell 2007, 203). Various 20th century thinkers
have attempted to develop a more nuanced theory of consciousness and ideology
than the one Marx provided, these include Georg Lukcs and Antonio Gramsci,
but it was Louis Althusser who emphasised the specific role of language in shaping
individual consciousness.
Althusser was interested in how precisely the social conditions of production
reproduce themselves, the question Marx and orthodox Marxism had “uniquely
ignored” (Althusser 1971, 123). How was it that the ‘tenacious obviousnesses’
of these conditions had become so ingrained in our consciousness that it was
difficult even to trace their origin (ibid.). Althusser sought to address this blind
spot in orthodox Marxism with his concept of the ‘Ideological State Apparatuses’
(ISA), institutions such as the family, the education system, political parties and
the media, which operate not through coercion but through ideology. Althusser
argued that his concept of the ISA has merely spelled out what Marx had already
implied, but the important conclusion he drew was that ideology works not on
the consciousness of a class but on that of the individual. For an understanding
of how the surveillance ideology works this step is already of great significance, as
it provides the grounds for exploring how exactly an individual’s encounter with
surveillance equipment can be ideological.
However, the real significance of Althusser in terms of understanding the
surveillance ideology lies in the fact that Althusser shifted the attention onto
the ideological function of language. This shift took place via Althusser’s reading
of Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalytical theory of language, and this is ultimately
where Althusser’s real break with Marxist approaches to ideology occurred. Un-
der this influence, ideology is no longer understood as a misconstrued under-
standing of reality in the Marxist sense, but as the reality we construct around
ourselves through our entry into what Lacan calls the ‘symbolic order’, the order
of language. From Althusser’s perspective, the consciousness of the individual
is secured through his “interpellation”, the addressing of the individual, as in-
dividual, through language. Althusser’s example is of a policeman calling “Hey,
you there!” to a person on the street. The point is that by turning around (as
they unfailingly will), they are ‘recruited’ as subject and reproduce the ideology
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in question. This simultaneity for Althusser is crucial, it is not that there is
ideology and then the interpellation of the subject: they are ‘one and the same
thing’. Again drawing on Lacanian psychoanalysis which argues that there ex-
ists no subjectivity outside of language, Althusser’s conclusion is that there is no
outside of ideology for “ideology has always/already interpellated individuals as
subjects” (Althusser 1971,164).
If Althusser is right in claiming that wherever we are in language, we are in
ideology, this has some quite serious consequences for the possibility of critique
where critique itself must rely on language to express itself, and it prompts the
question whether Heidegger offers an exit from this apparent ideological impasse.
Critique itself depends on the very notion of an outside, a “separate space from
which critical reflection can be launched” (Lash 2002, vii), premised, as Eagleton
argues, on the Enlightenment belief in the rational human being capable of ex-
erting powers of objectivity from an elevated perspective (1991, xiv). In section
4.2 I gave some examples of the rhetoric that is part of the surveillance ideology,
such as the claim by the former Home Secretary John Reid that the surveillance
of all electronic communication is “absolutely essential for effective fighting of
terrorism” (Watson2013). I will consider the rhetoric of the surveillance ideology
in more detail in the next section, but the problem we are faced with seems to
be how to mount a critique of ideology that relies on language, if we need to
utilise these very same tools in order to mount our critique? If we agree that
ideology-critique needs an external, transcendental vantage point from which to
launch itself, surely we need a different set of tools at our disposal, tools that
have not already been co-opted by ideology. But in very practical terms ideology
that uses language makes it difficult to occupy this external viewpoint, as it is
difficult to critique the rhetoric of the “war on terror”, for instance, without using
the very expression that we are seeking to dismantle. It seems to be the paradox
of ideology that with every attempt to critique it, the object of our critique is
reasserted and reinforced by our very utterance of it.
The problem of an outside to ideology has been raised by various critical
approaches to language and ideology. Thus Laclau and Mouffe argue that there
is no outside to discourse (Laclau and Mouffe 1987) and that the idea of an
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outside to ideology is the ideological product itself (Laclau 1997). Zˇizˇek issues a
similar warning, saying that we are never more entrenched in ideology than when
we believe ourselves to be outside of it. He argues that
the minimum necessary structuring ingredient of every ideology is to
distance itself from another ideology, to denounce its other as ideology.
Every ideology does this. (Zˇizˇek and Dillworth 2004).
Thus the question what Heidegger can offer in terms of an understanding of ide-
ology and the possibilities for mounting a critique of ideological language that
is not already exhausted by these approaches seems justified. Even Heidegger’s
ontology does not occupy a space outside of language - Adorno’s critique of Hei-
degger’s “jargon of authenticity” suggests that Heidegger’s language might draw
us even deeper into ‘language games’ and away from objective truth.
It has been argued that in the face of the general informational immanence of
the Information Age critique has no other option but to be “radically empiricist”
(Lash 2002, xii). I would argue, however, that this position is not critique but
the surrender of critique and that faced with no obvious transcendental vantage
point from which to objectively critique ideology, we need to make this very lack
the focus of our critique. What I mean is that we need a better understanding
of the processes whereby we are put ‘in ideology’ by language, the process of
interpellation itself, and that here Heidegger’s philosophy can help us. It allows
us to see is how it is our understanding of language as a neutral tool for commu-
nication that makes it so amenable to ideology. Language, for us, is something
we take for granted, rather than an object of critical reflection. Ideology fully
exploits this takenforgrantedness, but on the other hand a Heideggerian analysis
will show how it is that language itself ‘interpellates’ us before this exploitation
can take place. While there might be no outside of language from a Heideggerian
perspective a sense of empowerment emerges from critical reflection on this lack
of an outside. Having looked at examples of the surveillance ideology, and in this
last section, given an overview of existing approaches to theorising the connection
between ideology and language, the discussion now turns to the specific value of a
Heideggerian approach to understanding and critiquing the surveillance ideology.
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4.5.1 The Instrumental Ideology of language
This section addresses the key theoretical contribution Heidegger can make for an
understanding of the linguistic mechanisms employed by the surveillance ideology.
The first point concerns the instrumental ideology of language, meaning the belief
that language constitutes a neutral tool for communicating an external, factual
reality, upon which, as I aim to show, the effectiveness of the surveillance ideology
as a whole relies. The first sub-section will thus give an overview of how Heidegger
thinks we ended up with the instrumental view of language, contrasting it with
Heidegger’s insistence that we need to get to the ‘essence’ of language.
Critical and psychoanalytically inspired approaches to language emphasise
how language provides the grounds for experience, but don’t explain the onto-
logical relationship that language has to being itself. For Heidegger the “essence
of language” is how the addressing of a thing through language brings the thing
itself into being, but he argues that our everyday use of it has obscured this
essential property of language. In our everyday use of language, language has a
transparent quality and only serves to communicate a factual, external reality.
Hence the “security” rhetoric that pervades the surveillance ideology is accepted
as the herald of an actual threat, as we are about to see.
Western philosophy, Heidegger acknowledges, has a long-standing and natural
preoccupation with language. After all, language has historically defined what
it is to be human, it is “as one who speaks that man is - man” (Heidegger
1971, 187). But from his perspective, scientific interest in language has not
sufficiently challenged our everyday, instrumental use of it. At worst, it has even
served to reinforce the instrumental ideology. Logical positivism, drawing on
both Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s work on logic and language,
takes a view of language that is “descriptive of a reality that is outside, external
to language” (Scannell 2007, 172). The main question was whether a sentence
could be said to be true, or not. For Heidegger, this conception of truth as
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correspondence however, was one of the original errors of Western philosophy.
Truth, for Heidegger, is not the correspondence of one state of affairs with another
but the bringing of things into the open from hiddenness, to show something
as it really is, what he refers to as unconcealment. What we take as truth is
merely correctness. Truth, however, is precisely the function of language. Hence,
the Western philosophical tradition has led us to the wrong conclusions about
language, this most natural of phenomena, for they
ignore completely the oldest natural cast [Wesenspra¨gung] of language
[...] despite their antiquity and despite their comprehensibility, they
never bring us to language as language. (Heidegger 1971a, 191)
Put simply, being brought to “language as language” means forgetting what West-
ern philosophy has taught us about language and instead experiencing it. The
essence of language, as Heidegger argues, lies in its primordial experience, which
centuries of talking about and textusing language have obscured. Language, for
Heidegger, is not a tool at our disposal, but something that is infinitely more pow-
erful, something that discloses or unlocks being itself. His project is to challenge
the instrumental ideology of language, as it is this understanding of language as
a neutral carrier for meaning that blinds us to its essence. As a first step the
following paragraphs trace this instrumental ideology of language and show how
within the current surveillance ideology it is responsible for words such as “secu-
rity” being taken as neutral envoys of a reality outside of language. The second
step will be to examine the essence of language obscured by its instrumental use,
that is, the ontological relationship between the word and the thing. From Hei-
degger’s perspective this is the key to the surveillance ideology as the essence of
the word “security’ lies in the calling into being of the threat that is needed to
justify surveillance measures such as those recently revealed by Edward Snowden.
The instrumental ideology of language is rooted first and foremost in its ev-
erydayness:
Man speaks. We speak when we are awake and we speak in our
dreams. We are always speaking, even when we do not utter a single
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word aloud, but merely listen or read, and even when we are not
particularly listening or speaking but are attending to some work or
taking a rest. We are continually speaking in one way or another.
(Heidegger 1971a, 187)
Conventionally, language is thus defined as either “the activation of the organs for
sounding and hearing” or the “audible expression and communication of human
feelings [and] [...] thoughts” (Heidegger 1971a, 190). From every angle these
definitions will strike us as correct: if we observe someone speaking, we see him
opening his mouth to shape the words, our ears can hear the sound his words
make, and our brains enable us to process information, hence we are able to
translate the sound our ears absorb into meaning, allowing us to respond. We
assume that what we hear are the thoughts and feelings the person speaking
intended to communicate.
Heidegger doesn’t deny this is how we commonly experience language, but
he challenges us to question the assumptions that underlie this commonsensi-
cal understanding. It asserts that speaking is an act of expression. “The idea
of speech as an utterance is the most common” (Heidegger 1971a, 190, empha-
sis added). But Heidegger points out that this assertion “already presupposes
the idea of something internal that utters or externalizes itself” (ibid, emphasis
added)12. Secondly, it asserts without doubt that speech is an “activity of man.
Accordingly we have to say that man speaks”. By insisting on this order we are
already negating the possibility that “[i]t is language that first brings man about”
(Heidegger 1971a, 190) - the argument of psychoanalysis. Finally we have the
assertion that “human expression is always a presentation and representation of
the real and the unreal” (ibid.). This too is correct, since we can talk about an
actual object, such as a painting at a gallery, but at the same time we can talk
about a dream we have had about this very painting.
12‘Expression’ and ‘utterance’ already contain within themselves a movement from within
to the outer ? ‘expression’ containing the Latin prefix ‘ex’, meaning ‘out of’ or ‘from within’,
and ‘utterance’ deriving from the Middle Low German ‘utern’, meaning ‘to turn out’, ‘to show’
and ‘ut’ meaning ‘out’.
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Speech stands in a relationship to the world, both to that of actually existing
objects and our imagination - this relationship is what my earlier model (the
‘ideological packaging of ICTs’) attempted to capture: the relationship between
the surveillance process and the positive signifiers such as “security” and “crime
prevention”. Heidegger does not deny this relationship. He says the view of lan-
guage put forward by its definition as an utterance, an activity of man and a
representation of an external/internal reality is indeed correct, “for it conforms
to what an investigation of linguistic phenomena can make out in them at any
time” (ibid.). The problem for Heidegger is that we never questioned the “singu-
lar role” played by these “correct ideas” about language. What is it that makes
its way through language into the world? Whence do we confidently undertake
this separation between inner, outer and language? Does this not somehow pre-
suppose that language acts as a neutral vehicle or mode of transportation, with
the sole purpose of conveying something that exists independently of its ver-
balisation, in the most accurate possible way, without interference and without
adding something that wasn’t there in the first place? Language, our common-
place understanding suggests, dresses an external or internal reality in words.
This “instrumental ideology of language” is the reason we take words such as
“safety” and “security” for granted as transmitting a factual reality that exists
independently of its expression through language.
So from Heidegger’s perspective the view of language as fundamentally “fact-
stating” and “descriptive” (Scannell 2007, 172) is not just to be found in the
logical positivist approaches to language based on Russell and Wittgenstein, it
determines our everyday understanding and use of it. The speech act theory that
developed in the 1960s through the work of J.L. Austin is often said to have
challenged this approach and set philosophy of language on a new course by em-
phasising the constructivist power of the spoken word. But outside the power
the “speech act” or utterance had to shape a social situation (e.g. the act of a
priest of pronouncing a couple “husband and wife”) it still posited the existence
of an external, objective realm of language where truth was not determined by
the situation but transcended it. This is an idea psychoanalytical approaches to
language such as that of Althusser would negate, and Heidegger too would deny
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the existence of such an outside, transcendental realm of language. Talking about
language still involves language, hence there is a circularity that is inevitable, and
Heidegger doesn’t exempt himself from it. But being aware of this circularity is
the first step towards a non-instrumental understanding of language and ulti-
mately brings us a step closer to what Heidegger claims is its essence. As we will
see, in the case of the surveillance ideology such a non-instrumental approach can
lead to the rhetoric of “safety” and “security” becoming conspicuous, which is a
first step towards questioning.
4.5.2 Truth and the Essence of Language
The approaches to language discussed here, whether they were concerned with
language as ideology (Althusser), or the philosophy of language (whether logical
positivist or constructivist), relate language with truth. Truth seems to be some-
thing that is obscured by ideology and needs to be recovered. The truth masked
by the surveillance ideology for instance relates to the complex political and com-
mercial interests served by widespread surveillance. For Heidegger, the essence of
language is indeed a matter of truth, but he doesn’t equate truth with an exter-
nal, objective meaning that language must strive to convey, nor is it something
that is forever outside of language and unreachable. Truth, for Heidegger, is the
essence of language itself, the relationship between the word and the thing, but
not in the way this relationship has conventionally been understood, where the
word is a correct representation of the thing. As he puts it, it is
language alone [that] brings what is, as something that is, into the
Open for the first time [...] Language, by naming beings for the first
time, first brings beings to word and to appearance. Only this naming
nominates beings to their being from out of their being. (Heidegger
1971c, 71, emphasis in the original)
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What Heidegger is trying to explain is that language is not merely a talking about
beings, but that we call beings into being by addressing them through language.13
For Heidegger, the idea of truth as the correspondence of a representation with
the “true state of affairs”, or a verifiable attribute of something such as what we
can “make out” about language by observing speech, is one of the original errors
of Western philosophy. Ever since Plato, he argues, philosophy has taught us to
think of truth in terms of correspondence (Gunkel & Taylor, 2014), but we have
confused truth with correctness. Instead, he argues, “[i]f we translate α´λη´θεια
[aletheia] as ‘unconcealment ’, this translation is not merely more literal; it con-
tains the directive to rethink the ordinary concept of truth in the sense of the
correctness of statements and to think it back to that still uncomprehended dis-
closedness and disclosure of beings” (Heidegger 2008, 125, emphasis added). The
implications of this distinction Heidegger draws between truth and correctness
are profound. Firstly, our obsession with the “correspondence theory of truth”
(what he calls “correctness”) means we have a tendency to fetishise the “accurate
representation” of facts over any underlying deeper meaning. This ties in with
the general instrumentality of thought that for Heidegger is the culmination of
Western metaphysics in the rationality of technological modernity, a rationality
of which the ubiquity and pervasiveness of ICT systems is perhaps the most acute
manifestation.
13It should be noted here that Heidegger’s thoughts on language found within these pages
are not intended as a summary, or representative of, Heidegger’s overall views on language. The
concern with language is a persistent one in Heidegger’s writings, beginning most overtly in
Being and Time but continuing into his latest works. In the period of this engagement Heidegger
does not work towards a single and consistent account of language, rather, his concern moves
from language in its metaphysical sense (i.e., as the language spoken by beings) towards a view
of language that speaks Being itself, within which the metaphysical resides. The account given
here forms a milestone within this trajectory (discussed at length in Powell 2013) from the time
when Heidegger began to move towards a view of language as the “house of Being”. What
I wish to emphasise however is that it would be wrong to reduce the ideas discussed here to
a social constructivist view of language, for even where Heidegger is concerned with language
spoken by beings, the fundamental connection between language and Being is already present
in the ‘calling into Being’ that the naming of things represents.
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By way of illustration we might consider the example of the body scanners
implemented at a number of airports worldwide ? as technologies collecting and
processing data in digital form they too form part of the move towards ubiqui-
tous surveillance. In the UK Manchester Airport came under severe scrutiny by
privacy advocates during their trial of body scanners that used x-ray technology
to scan through passenger clothing. When the European Commission failed to
approve continued use of the scanners after the trial period had ended, Manch-
ester announced it would begin using “privacy-friendly”, “non-invasive” scanning
equipment that would merely produce cartoon images of the passenger?s body
(BBC News 2012). While the new technology might indeed produce a less accu-
rate image of the body (this far the argument for greater privacy may be correct),
the use of terminology such as “privacy-friendly” or “non-intrusive” ignores the
fact that the scanning process as such represents an invasive procedure as the
human is subjected to surveillance by a machine, with no knowledge about what
happens with the images once collected. So while we adhere to our conventional
understanding of the connection between language and truth, we might assemble
everything that is correct, but fail to realise the full significance of what is being
said.
There is another, potentially even more significant implication of the distinc-
tion between truth and correctness. More specifically this is an implication of
interpreting truth “correctly” (pardon the pun) as “unconcealment”. If we ac-
cept Heidegger’s argument that truth is not a statement corresponding to a state
of affairs but a state of disclosedness, a state where things are revealed as what
they really are, then the essence of language is to reveal the true nature of the
thing it addresses. Put more simply, language is not a talking about things that
already exist independently by themselves, but it is through language that things
approach us. The spatial dimension of approaching is crucial, because what Hei-
degger is trying to explain in necessarily abstract terms is that language doesn’t
merely ‘put into words’ (though we often use this expression), it calls into being
from a distance and thus brings what is being called closer to us. Elsewhere Hei-
degger comments on the apparent capacity of media for eliminating spatial and
temporal distance (an argument that pre-empts McLuhan’s ‘global village’ and all
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current rhetoric of how media create global communities) - but Heidegger’s point
about the calling into being from a distance that language effects suggests our
views of distance are very superficial. Distance, for Heidegger, is an ontological
quality not so easily disposed of. It denotes the ontological relationship between
the thing and the word that lies at the heart of the essence of language, and it
can help us understand how it is possible that talk of “safety” and “security”
maintains the need for surveillance it is through these concepts that the reality of
a threat approaches us. In order to fully understand how language calls into being
we need to follow Heidegger on a slightly odd track, one that takes us through
poetry, which he sees as the domain that most heeds the insight that language is
not simply a tool for making communicable an objective external reality (Gunkel
and Taylor 2014).
4.5.3 Calling a “Threat” into Being
...and what are poets for in a destitute time?
Ho¨lderlin quoted in Heidegger 1971e, 89
Like for Marcuse, poetry for Heidegger has a special place amongst all other
forms of language and for both thinkers it is poetry that is most intimately con-
nected with truth. Marcuse looks to poetry for its refusal of the actual historical
situation and its ability to imagine an alternative reality. He sees in it a medium
for critique after critical potential has been neutralised in close to all other do-
mains of social life. Heidegger has often been branded as a Luddite and his
preoccupation with poetry might suggest that he too sees the only possibility for
truth and redemption from the onslaughts of modern technology in the realms
that transcend mortal existence, in faith or in art. I think this is a misreading
of Heidegger, but one which unfortunately the space constraints of this chapter
won’t allow us to go into. But in Marcuse’s hope of poetry as a critical medium
an element of instrumentality seems to remain, where for Heidegger the point of
poetry is its very non-instrumentality, its very “surface-level materiality” (Gunkel
and Taylor 2014). Heidegger is not so much concerned with the issue of “human
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solitude” in Georg Trakl’s poem “A Winter Evening”, but with how the language
of poem calls this solitude into being.
So there is no need to reproduce the lines of “A Winter Evening” in full, the
point is that the window against which the snow is falling, and the tolling of
the vesper bell that both feature in Trakl’s poem, do not address or “cloak” an
existing window or tolling bell with words, but both are brought before us by their
very naming as the “[w]indow with falling snow arrayed,” and the “vesper bell”
that “[l]ong tolls”. In Heidegger’s own words:
Does [...] [naming] deck out the imaginable familiar objects and events
- snow, bell, window, falling, ringing - with words of a language? No.
This naming does not hand out titles, it does not apply terms, but it
calls into the word. (Heidegger 1971a, 196)
What Heidegger means is that our naming of things is not merely an attaching of
an array of letters and sounds to a thing, whether that thing is concrete like a bell
or abstract like the sound of its ringing. Rather, our naming of these things brings
them towards us from a distance, it is a naming that “calls”, and as Heidegger
reminds us, calling always “brings closer what it calls” (ibid.).
The misunderstanding that we must avoid, however, is to think that by call-
ing something we might be bringing this thing into our presence. Heidegger is
emphatic that this is not the case: what we have called, or summoned, into
closeness from a distance at the same time remains in this distance. Distance
and closeness interact in everything that we call and thus retain the true being
of the thing we have called. The difference between closeness and presence is
not easily retained in the English translation: things presence in their call, but
they do not become a presence. In the original German “sie wesen an” (they
presence), “wesen” has the same etymological root as “das Wesen”, the essence
of things. The English translation “presence”/“essence” however misses this ref-
erence which conveys that our calling of things into presence lets us experience
them in their essence. It is crucial that we understand this correctly because in
the context of the surveillance ideology and ICTs the rhetoric of “security” and
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“crime prevention” does not actually cause the threat to our security to become a
presence. The point is that the “calling from a distance” of the threat is enough
to legitimise the surveillance process. The ideological atmosphere within which
surveillance has become near-ubiquitous is in fact the “calling from a distance”
of a threat that emanates from the language of “safety and security”.
Psychoanalytic theory argues that desire lives from the distance between its
actualisation and its symbolisation (Zˇizˇek 1989). Heidegger’s inquiry into the
essence of language suggests that the threat around which the surveillance ide-
ology is based functions in the same way. It taps into the distance that exists
between the thing and the word that calls it into being, the symbolisation of
the threat in a CCTV warning sign and the actual terror or criminal event. As
mentioned earlier, the proliferation of CCTV and other surveillance mechanisms
then only reinforces the existence of this threat, leading to a situation where
ideology and technology mutually reinforce each other. Of course the individual
is never confronted with the full technological infrastructure, nor the actual ter-
ror/criminal event itself, but the surveillance ideology turns him from a citizen
with rights and liberties into a prospective victim in need of protection and more
likely to accept surveillance as part of these protective measures.
4.6 Summary
In the context of the move towards “ubiquitous surveillance” (Murakami Wood
2011) that the recent revelations of global surveillance programmes have again
manifested, this chapter has emphasised the need for critical approaches to ICTs
to question the extent and nature of these surveillance processes. This chapter of
the present thesis has aimed to contribute to this process of questioning by focus-
ing on what Fuchs (2013) has termed the “surveillance ideology”, the promise of
security through surveillance that seeks to legitimise the infringement of our civil
liberties that result from increasingly comprehensive surveillance. The aim was
firstly to cast some light onto the workings of the surveillance ideology itself, and
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secondly, to show how Heidegger’s philosophy of language can contribute some
key theoretical groundwork for a critique of the surveillance ideology.
In order to locate the gap in existing critical approaches to language and
ideology that Heidegger can fill I began by examining the concept of ideology
and the connection between ideology and language. Althusser corrected the blind
spot of orthodox Marxism by identifying language as the process whereby the
individual, as opposed to the social class, becomes an ideological subject, but
seemed to offer no account of how language operates at the most basic, ontological
level. Heidegger’s ontological grounding of language in Being itself offers an
explanation of how ideological language works on the mind of the individual, for
instance by calling into existence a threat to his or her way of life. This threat is
manifest everywhere in the language of the surveillance ideology, but also in the
growing presence of surveillance equipment, leading to a situation where ideology
and technology mutually reinforce each other.
In order to gain an understanding of how the surveillance ideology works I
have examined some of the ways in which surveillance technology such as CCTV is
marketed to the public by corporations and justified by the state. My discussion of
examples of this rhetoric, such as the arguments made by political actors and the
ubiquitous CCTV camera warning signs has shown that the surveillance ideology
rests on the continued emphasis on “safety and security”. Approached through
Heidegger’s philosophy of language, this rhetoric ceases to justify the need for
protective measures but becomes its source. Heidegger’s analysis highlights how
the history of Western philosophy has fostered an everyday use of language that is
instrumental, and it is this instrumentality that inclines us to accept the rhetoric
of “safety and security” as a neutral envoy of a threat that exists beyond and
outside of language itself. For Heidegger, however, language in its very essence
is non-instrumental, it is not the neutral communication of an external reality,
but the calling into being of reality itself. Through a Heideggerian analysis of
the ontological relationship between the security rhetoric and the actual criminal




The second aim of this chapter was to help mount a critique of this surveillance
ideology. The possibility of mounting a critique of ideological language, as we
have seen, is complicated by the fact that critique must rely on language itself.
The question is whether Heidegger’s philosophy offers a route out of this ‘vicious
circle’ where other thinkers have argued that an outside perspective from which to
engage in ideology-critique doesn’t exist, or that only “radical empiricism” will do.
Heidegger doesn’t offer a solution to the problem of an outside to language, indeed
his argument only confirms Althusser’s claim that wherever we are in language,
we are in ideology. From Heidegger’s perspective too language interpellates us
even before ideological institutions have the chance to co-opt it and use it for
their purposes.
However, this perspective should not be confused with resignation. This is
particularly important in the current context, where we are dealing with the ide-
ological representation of ICTs. Here resignation might be taken as an outright
condemnation of information and communications technologies. I deal with both
the positions of techno-enthusiasm, which is widespread in mainstream commen-
tary on ICTs, and techno-pessimism in the next chapter, as from Heidegger’s
perspective both fall far short of grasping the realities of our technological sit-
uation. As he emphasises in his essay “The Question Concerning Technology”,
the aim is not to abandon technology but to enter into a free relationship with
it. For our purposes, this means not finding a way to extricate ourselves from
our information-technological environment, but to enter into a process of deep
and rigorous questioning, and Heidegger’s ontological approach, which consists
of important yet simple questions about the nature of technology and how we
engage with technological objects, can help us with this. This is also true for the
critique of ideology and specifically ideological language. Critique must draw on
thought itself, on the reflection on the constraints that language imposes upon
us. Thus Heidegger is not preoccupied with poetry for its promise of an alterna-
tive social reality but because it challenges the instrumentality of language that
ideology exploits. In poetry we find in its clearest form the conspicuousness of
language that Heidegger insists it possessed from the beginning, but that through
more than two millennia of instrumental thinking we have lost. What this means
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in terms of the surveillance ideology is that the rhetoric of “safety and security”
needs to become conspicuous. This is first and foremost a matter of awareness,
of critical thinking. As Zˇizˇek recently commented on Marx’s famous criticism
that philosophy only ever interprets the world (Thesis 11 on Feuerbach, Marx
and Engels [1846] 1947, 123),
in the 20th century, we maybe tried to change the world too quickly,
the time is to interpret it again, to start thinking (Zˇizˇek 2012, empha-
sis added).
This argument will be an ongoing reference point in this thesis, as we move
through our discussion of various points in Heidegger’s philosophy, specifically
those that deal with the question of technology, and how it can illuminate some





The Being of Technological
Structures
Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really mean
by the word ‘being’? Not at all. So it is fitting that we should arise anew
the question of the meaning of Being. But are we nowadays even perplexed
at our inability to understand the expression ‘Being’? Not at all.
Heidegger, 2008, p. 1
The less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold
of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and
the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is - as equipment. The
kind of Being which equipment possesses - in which it manifests itself in its
own right - we call ‘readiness-to-hand’.




Heidegger’s arguably most radical claim is that despite more than 2000 years
of philosophical thought and scientific progress, we still do not have an under-
standing of that “most universal and emptiest of concepts” (Heidegger, 2008,
p. 2), Being. Rather, as he notes in the above quotation, this universality and
emptiness has become taken for granted: we are no longer even perplexed by the
question. The critique of common-place assumptions and understandings we take
for granted, we have already seen, runs deep through Heidegger’s thinking. In
this chapter, we will see how Western philosophy’s failure to give an appropriate
account of Being has profound consequences for our understanding of technology,
and in particular our current information-technological landscape. From a Hei-
deggerian perspective, our failure to provide an appropriate understanding of the
Being of these technologies is a dangerous paradox in light of their ubiquity and
pervasiveness.
Heidegger’s argument, as we know, is that our dominant understanding of
technology is that it is a means to an end, an understanding that, in the case of
ICTs, is constantly reinforced by marketing rhetoric. One of the examples given
in the preceding chapter was the Nokia advertising slogan “It’s not technology,
it’s what you do with it” (Youtube, 2010), but the internet service provider
Google is another fitting example. Next to its search-engine, it provides email
services (Gmail), a browser (Google Chrome), Cloud computing services (Google
Cloud) and office software (Google docs). All of these services are fast, free
and efficient to use, and - combined with Google’s colourful and friendly logo
- seem to reinforce its corporate philosophy of ‘Don’t be Evil’. However, what
presents itself to its users as a benign service provider - which we might say is
marketing slang for neutral means to an end - is also one of the world’s most
efficient and productive tracking companies.14 In 2012 Google made extensive
14Google has almost 90% global search engine market share (Statista, 2014), moreover more
than 425 million users (as of 2013) of its gmail service, 4 billion videos played daily on YouTube,
the video-sharing site owned by Google, half the global smartphone market from which it can
collect location information, a fifth of all internet browsers and an almost 50% share in all
online advertising. (Bullas, 2014)
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changes to its privacy policy, which in the media were represented as making its
services ‘simpler’ and more ‘user-friendly’, but they also made it much easier for
Google to correlate information collected across its products and services. Users
can thus be targeted with advertising based on their online activities, for instance
[a] YouTube history consisting of karaoke singalongs may be used to
inform recommendations of nearby bars on your smartphone. An
email to a friend saying “I’m pregnant!” could conceivably lead to
some maternity-wear ads elsewhere. (Ball, 2012)
A substantial amount of Google’s revenue comes from targeted advertising, but
the point is not simply the commodification of users’ online activities. From
Heidegger’s perspective, the instrumentalisation of our information, whether by
governments or corporations, is only one aspect of a much more fundamental com-
modification of human Being that characterises our current Being-in-the world.
This is the essence of technology that Heidegger argues is ‘by no means anything
technological’ which, in the way that the correct eclipses the true, is obscured by
our instrumental understanding of technology.
This section draws on the ontology developed by Heidegger in response to
Western philosophy’s “forgotteness of Being”, to explore the specific features of
information-technological objects. A cornerstone of this ontological framework is
his distinction between presence-at-hand [Vorhandenheit] and readiness-to-hand
[Zuhandenheit]: the former denotes the reduction of things to pure presence,
or simply being there, that is characteristic of Western philosophy’s failure to
properly examine Being. Based on Heidegger’s argument that human experience
needs to form the basis for an understanding of Being rather than its abstract
conceptualisation, he introduces the concept of readiness-to-hand to emphasise
that we do not engage with objects as mere lumps of physical mass, but in terms
of their purpose. Here lies the crucial relevance for technology: our instrumental
understanding of technology is not just ideological, rather, it emerges from the
particular structural qualities these objects exhibit and which to a significant part
determine our interaction with them.
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Digital ICTs, as argued throughout this thesis, are characterised by a unique
combination of material and immaterial features: our gadgets and devices are
merely access points to the underlying, immaterial matrix of informational flows.
This renders their status as objects somewhat oxymoronic, but it is precisely
these im/material qualities that allow digital ICTs to take full advantage of their
readiness-to-hand. Google’s ubiquitous digital services are a case in point - they
are everywhere and freely available, and not tied to any single physical device.
By withdrawing into what Gunkel (2009) refers to as ‘instrumental transparency’,
these technologies are uniquely successful in obscuring the much more fundamen-
tal instrumentality that lies at the depths of their ontological complexity - what
Heidegger calls their essence.
Where previous ontological approaches have either dealt with Being purely in
terms of existing entities, and frequently not dealt with objects at all, Heidegger’s
approach unearths their previously unseen ontological complexities. His focus
on human experience as the basis for his phenomenological approach reveals an
intricate network of connections between human beings and objects: a “network
ontology”, wherein it becomes possible to analyse the complex ways in which
human and technological beings interact. Heidegger himself did not utilise the
trope of the ‘network’; doing so however allows us to highlight the ways in which
current approaches to ICTs that fetishise the concept of the network fall far short
of the ontological depth of Heidegger’s analysis.
This chapter will be structured as follows: before we can highlight the dis-
tinctness of Heidegger’s approach we need to explain what Heidegger means by
the ‘forgotteness of Being’ and give a brief account of the philosophical positions
that led to Being being conceived of in terms of pure presence. We will then show
how Heidegger’s alternative ontological framework and in particular, his notion
of readiness-to-hand, can usefully be applied to the problem of an over-reliance
on ICTs that is blind to their wider significance for human being-in-the-world.
Finally we will focus on the special ontological significance Heidegger retains for
Dasein, which is frequently underestimated but is of crucial significance for the
question of technology.
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5.2 The Forgotteness of Being and Why it Needs
to be Questioned Again
So if it is said that ‘Being’ is the most universal concept, this cannot mean
that it is the one which is clearest or that it needs no further discussion. It
is rather the darkest of all.
Heidegger, 2008, p. 3
Heidegger was not the first thinker to point out the peculiar nature of the
concept of Being as one that is everywhere in use but at the same time seems
to eschew definition. The quote with which Heidegger opens his magnum opus,
Being and Time, stems from Plato’s dialogue The Sophist, where the philosopher
Socrates tells his audience:
manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use
the expression ‘being’. We, however, who used to think we understood
it, have now become perplexed. (cited in Heidegger, 2008, p. 1)
Both Ancient philosophers Plato and Aristotle launched an inquiry into this most
urgent and fundamental of matters and I will briefly summarise their positions
below. The main point however is that for Heidegger, 2000 years after Plato and
Aristotle, the question of Being is still not resolved. Rather than continuing the
investigation begun by the Ancients, Western philosophy has relapsed into its
original state of amnesia:
On the basis of the Greeks’ initial contributions towards an Interpre-
tation of Being, a dogma has been developed which not only declares
the question about the meaning of Being to be superfluous, but sanc-
tions its complete neglect. It is said that ‘Being’ is the most universal
and the emptiest of concepts. As such it resists every attempt at def-
inition. Nor does this most universal and hence indefinable concept
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require any definition, for everyone uses it constantly and already un-
derstands what he means by it. In this way, that which the ancient
philosophers found continually disturbing as something obscure and
hidden has taken on a clarity and self-evidence such that if anyone
continues to ask about it he is charged with an error of method. (Hei-
degger, 2008, p. 2)
It is worth looking in a little more detail at the reasons Heidegger gives for
this ‘forgetfulness’, because it confirms once again Heidegger’s main criticism of
Western thinking - its failure to examine its own basic assumptions, which we see
at work right through to our own everyday understanding of technology.
The question of Being is for Heidegger the one that underlies all other ques-
tions: what does it mean for something to ‘be’? We clearly ‘are’, a tree out in
the garden ‘is’, birds flying in the sky ‘are’ and a man-made object like a table
‘is’ also. It seems clear that ‘being’ is always the being of an entity, and that
every entity has a way in which it is. The question then arises of
whether this way-of-being has the same character in every being - or
whether individual ways of being are mutually distinct. Which are
the basic ways of being? Is there a multiplicity? How is the variety
of ways-of-being possible and how is it at all intelligible? (Heidegger,
1988 [1975], p. 18)
An inquiry into Being might thus begin by asking whether different entities (in-
cluding human beings) have different ways of being, or whether they are all
manifestations of one kind of being. This is the view Plato took, and we will see
in a moment why Heidegger disagrees with it.
If all things are manifestations of one kind of being the question that emerges
is: what is this being, or we might say, what is being as such? Here we run into
the problem that sticks to the question of Being like a shadow to its owner: the
tendency of Being to “‘withdraw’ in the face of questioning” (Sadler, 1996, p.
2). For how can we get to the bottom of something when the very thing to be
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interrogated already forms the premise of the interrogation? In other words -
when we ask what being is, we are already relying on an understanding of what
it means to ‘be’ - we can’t formulate the question without it. Even the natural
sciences that are meant to investigate the primary nature of things already move
within an understanding of Being (Heidegger, 2008, p. 11), for instance when they
say that an atom is the most basic unit of matter. The reason Western philosophy
has stopped thinking about the meaning of Being, Heidegger concludes, is that
‘being’ is the most universal, indefinable and self-evident of concepts. However
- and this is Heidegger’s recurring point - just because something seems obvious
doesn’t mean we have understood it. In the case of ICTs, it is precisely their self-
evident nature and quasi-scientific objectivity that seems to place them beyond
the realm of questioning. As Heidegger states in the quote at the beginning of
this section, just because a concept is universal in its use “this cannot mean that
it is the one which is clearest or that it needs no further discussion”. Being, for
Heidegger, is “rather the darkest of all”. So the task Heidegger set himself in
Being and Time is to explore the question of what it means for something to
‘be’. Human beings, birds, trees and banal objects like tables - all these things
‘are’, but the question is whether they all ‘are’ in the same way, or whether the
Being of a table is different from our own being? Moreover, when we say ‘the
table is on the floor’ or ‘the table is red’, to what extent does this really tell us
something about the existence of the table as such? Both ‘being on the floor’ or
‘being red’ can be understood as properties of the table, but do these properties
exhaust its Being?
We can see how Heidegger forces open a series of questions, and it is the pro-
cess of questioning, rather than finding answers, that for Heidegger is the most
important. As he remarks at the end of his essay on technology, “questioning
is the piety of thought” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 35). It is not the failure to find
answers about the meaning of Being that Heidegger is so deeply critical of, it is
the fact that the process of questioning has stopped. Where Being is no longer
conceived as something mystical and worth exploring, this can have catastrophic
consequences: the rule of the essence of modern technology is precisely the conse-
quence of turning Being into something merely present-at-hand, because through
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this process it has become objectifiable and within the scope of human control.
This point is nowhere illustrated more clearly than in this passage from Heideg-
ger’s lecture “The Danger”, where he comments upon the war crimes committed
by the Nazis:
Hundreds of thousands die in masses. Do they die? They perish. They
are put down. Do they die? They become pieces of inventory of a
standing reserve for the fabrication of corpses. Do they die? They are
unobtrusively liquidated in extermination camps. ... To die, however,
means to endure death in its essence. To be able to die means to be
capable of this endurance. ... But in the midst of these innumerable
dead, the essence of death remains disguised. (Heidegger, 2012 [1994],
p. 53, translation modified, emphasis added)
It is one of the comments that has been vilified as a great ‘insensitivity’, and
Rockmore (1992, p. 242) for instance sees it as evidence of Heidegger’s ‘incapacity’
to “comprehend’ the Holocaust through his theory of technology”. However, the
point of this passage is precisely a technological account of the Holocaust.
Death, for Heidegger, has a special significance that goes beyond our common
understanding of it, and is closely related to his account of temporality (see chap-
ter six). The ability to die is the unique capacity of Dasein, and his point is that
the extermination of the Jews in the gas chambers rid them of their ability to die
a human death. Heidegger is explicitly commenting on the forgotteness of Being
manifested by modern technological ways of killing - which is why an accurate
translation of Heidegger’s original German sentence “Sie werden Bestandstuecke
eines Bestandes der Fabrikation von Leichen” is important. Rockmore’s “[T]they
become mere quanta, items in an inventory in the business of manufacturing
corpses” ignores the strength of the technological terminology used by Heidegger:
the German term “Fabrikation” is related to the term “Fabrik” - meaning factory.
Then Heidegger’s use of the term “Bestand” is crucial - it denotes the effects the
essence of technology has on what it encounters - objects no longer even have
the status of objects, and human beings are rid of their capacity to be as human
beings.
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Heidegger’s technological account of the Holocaust has been widely misinter-
preted and made the subject of much ill-informed polemic against him - which
we will address separately in chapter 8. The point here is that it shows why
the forgotteness of Being, for Heidegger, is not simply a methodological omis-
sion. The reduction of Being to mere presence is what defines the essence of
modern technology, something that is covered up by our failure to question tech-
nology appropriately. This failure is rife in mainstream approaches to our cur-
rent information-technological environment, as both optimistic and pessimistic
accounts move within an understanding of technology that is limited to pure
presence. Our everyday experience of technology tells us that technological ob-
jects aren’t mere presences or self-sufficient objects - but rather than questioning
these hidden dimensions, the instrumental ideology that they are neutral means
to ends outside the objects themselves is reinforced. To this end, Western philos-
ophy’s amnesic stance toward the question of Being has been incredibly useful.
It is grounded in the original questions raised by Ancient Greek philosophy.
5.3 Plato and Aristotle on the Being of ICTs
5.3.1 Plato and Aristotle on Being
Heidegger states at the beginning of Being and Time that it is “[o]n the basis
of the Greeks’ initial contributions towards an Interpretation of Being [that] a
dogma has developed which ... declares the question about the meaning of Being
to be superfluous” (Heidegger, 2008, p. 2). In this section we will inquire briefly
into these ‘initial contributions’ made by the Greeks into the question of Being,
specifically those of Plato and Aristotle15. Heidegger’s overarching criticism of
Western ontology is its failure to recognise what he calls the ‘ontological differ-
ence’, the difference between beings (entities) like tables, birds, trees and human
15I am focusing on these two thinkers as it is generally recognised that Heidegger’s critique
of the Western philosophical tradition sets in with Plato. As Wheeler argues for Heidegger the
forgotteness of Being began with Plato who was Aristotle’s teacher (Wheeler, 2013).
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beings, and Being as such16, something that all these entities have in common.
Being, Heidegger argues,
is essentially different from a being, from beings. We must be able
to bring out clearly the difference between being and beings in order
to make something like being the theme of inquiry. This distinction
is not arbitrary; rather, it is the one by which the theme of ontology
and thus of philosophy itself is first of all attained. It is a distinction
which is first and foremost constitutive for ontology. (Heidegger, 1988
[1975], p. 17)
Though Heidegger argues that Aristotle certainly recognised this difference, nei-
ther he nor any other thinker before him or subsequently investigated this other,
more general mode of Being in the way Heidegger thought it should be investi-
gated. Rather, he argues, Being itself was treated as just another kind of being -
although it was given different names, like ‘idea’ (Plato), ‘substance’ (Aristotle),
‘monad’ (Leibniz) or ‘will to power’ (Nietzsche) (Wheeler, 2013).
Western thought, Heidegger argues, has levelled the ontological difference into
a single dimension of presence where all beings are ‘self-sufficient’ entities (Drey-
fus, 1995, p. 61), locked into their own Being and isolated from each other.
Heidegger develops an alternative ontological structure where the ‘membranes’ of
things that keep them within their self-sufficiency are substituted with multiple
connections to other things and importantly, to us as human beings. Together
these connections form a network-like structure, a referential totality that we ex-
perience as the world. We will see how it makes far more sense to explore our
16In the original German the being of entities is ‘das Seiende’, where Being as such is ‘Sein’.
But as Wheeler (2013) points out, there is a problem that we need to stay aware of when we
read ‘Being’ in English: “Unfortunately the capitalization of ‘Being’ also has the disadvantage
of suggesting that Being is, as Sheehan (2001) puts it, an ethereal metaphysical something that
lies beyond entities, what he calls ‘Big Being’. But to think of Being in this way would be to
commit the very mistake that the capitalization is supposed to help us avoid. For while Being
is always the Being of some entity, Being is not itself some kind of higher-order being waiting
to be discovered.”
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relationship with technological objects not in terms of a subject/object relation-
ship, but in terms of this network of referentialities: in particular our relationship
with our digital environment, since the fundamentally im/material nature of ICTs
challenges the ways in which traditional ontology has thought of the object.
Plato’s ontology hinges on a difference between what visibly exists in the
world and a higher, ideal sphere of being. If we apply this to our earlier examples
this means the table, the bird and the tree are ‘imperfect’ manifestations of their
ideal beings, or ‘forms’. As Clarke explains, Plato’s ontology is based on the idea
that our
material world of flux and movement... and everything in it is a
reflection or imitation of a stable ideal world beyond this in which are
found the unchanging ideal forms or eternal essences of all physical
objects. As such, all tables are imperfect approximations of the ideal
table, they embody, in an imperfect way, the essence of ‘tableness’.
(Clarke, n.d.)
The ideal forms of things like tables, trees and birds are thus permanent essences
that do not change, as opposed to the everyday material world that is imperfect
and ever-changing. An important point for Plato is that real knowledge, truth,
cannot be accessed through our sensory experience of the material world.
Aristotle on the other hand argued against such a separation between ideal
forms and their particular manifestations in the physical world. He recognised
that a table, the birds in the sky, the trees outside and human beings all share in a
more general, universal category of Being; however, this was not an abstract form,
but a ‘substance’. For Aristotle there was no logical explanation why abstract
forms could bring about actual, physical substances: rather we should look for
factual, causal explanations for how things come into being that are open to
human perception. For Aristotle, the coming into being of every entity is a result
of four causes: the material cause, the formal cause, the efficient cause and the
final cause. Taking our earlier example of the table, the material cause of its
being is what it is made of (usually wood), its formal cause is its shape (four
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legs and a flat surface), the efficient cause would be the person who made it (the
carpenter), and the final cause is its purpose (serving as a surface to eat and drink
from). So where for Plato the table we see before us is the physical manifestation
of the ideal table, for Aristotle it is the tangible and logical result of the interplay
between these four elements.
Aristotle’s doctrine of the 4 causes in itself shows quite clearly why it is
Aristotle and not Plato who is known as the father of empiricism. Aristotle’s
conviction that the answer to the question of what exists lies firmly in the realm
of what humans can perceive led to his developing a system of categories for
classifying entities such as tables, birds, etc. According to this system, all entities
(i.e., the beings at which one arrives as a result of the four causes) can be wholly
described by their substance and their attributes, such as size, shape, weight, etc.
Where for Plato being was a universal, an abstraction beyond human experience,
for Aristotle it is to be found in the particulars, the substances and their attributes
that are accessible to human perception and understanding. Now that the main
difference between Plato’s and Aristotle’s ontologies should be clear, how does
Heidegger follow on from there and why is this third approach (if we believe
Heidegger’s assertion that between the Ancients and his own investigations the
question lay dormant for nearly 2000 years) the right one in the present context?
how we engage with the ubiquity of information and communication technologies
around us? First, what, if anything, does Heidegger take from Plato? We know
that Heidegger too is concerned with the essence of things. In “The Question
Concerning Technology” he writes:
Technology is not equivalent to the essence of technology. When we
are seeking the essence of “tree,” we have to become aware that That
which pervades every tree, as tree, is not itself a tree that can be
encountered among all the other trees. (Heidegger, 1977, p. 4)
In stating that a tree is not the same thing as that which pervades it as ‘tree’
he seems to come quite close to Plato. Nevertheless, Heidegger’s essence is not
the same as Plato’s essence. For Heidegger, the essence of a thing does not lie
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in a remote location like Plato’s realm of forms - a realm that is, in principle,
inaccessible to human beings. Rather, the essence of a thing lies precisely in how
it allows us to relate to the world around us, and it is this concept of essence that
is the more helpful one for thinking about technology.
5.3.2 The Platonic and Aristotelian Smart Phone
Taking Plato’s approach, every smart phone would be the imperfect manifestation
of that ideal smart phone that endures, inaccessible to us, in the realm of ideal
forms - like a techno-evangelist vision of the eternal iPhone. Neither looking at the
actual physical phone-object (with all its scratches and other imperfections) nor
considering the ‘ideal phone’ that exists in the realm of forms, tells us anything
about the meaning of this technological object for ourselves, how we engage with it
in everyday life. However, it is precisely this latter category that, from Heidegger’s
perspective, is the most crucial one. In everyday life, we use a mobile phone to
connect to friends, to access our social networks, to manage our diaries etc. It is
the readiness of the phone-object to meet these needs that determines its Being to
a far greater extent than its material properties. This readiness (which Heidegger
calls readiness-to-hand) does not exhaust the Being of the object in question -
in fact it is the very thing that prevents us from realising the deeper underlying
essence of the mobile phone as a technological object - but it is why we can engage
with the phone as an object in the first place.
Having examined the grounds on which Heidegger’s ontology departs from
Plato, we need to investigate what his grounds were for criticising the under-
standing of Being developed by that other great Ancient philosopher, Aristotle.
In fact Heidegger’s ontology is influenced by a far greater degree by Aristotle than
by Plato: contrary to what his critics claim, Heidegger gives absolute priority to
human experience, or the facticity of human life, over abstract, theoretical ideas.
Heidegger saw Aristotle as having placed the question of Being on “a new basis”
(Heidegger, 2008, p. 3), precisely by looking at actual phenomena, rather than
abstract ideas. He was, in Heidegger’s own words, “the last of the great philoso-
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phers who had eyes to see and ... the energy and tenacity to continue to force
inquiry back to the phenomena” (cited in Dreyfus, 1995, p. 8).
Nevertheless, Heidegger says, “even Aristotle failed to clear away the darkness
of these categorical interconnections” (Heidegger, 2008, p. 3) - looking at digital
ICTs, we might say that the deeper significance of digital interconnectedness
eluded him. In terms of the ontological makeup of a smart phone, for instance,
Aristotle’s metaphysics tells us that it is a physical object with a ‘substance’
(matter) and numerous properties such as its size or shape, even the property of
‘being in my pocket’ or ‘being broken’. However, it tells us nothing about how
we as human beings relate to it, or how it relates to other objects also existing in
the world (beyond sharing the quality of having a substance). By conceiving of
beings as composites of form and matter, Aristotle’s ontology locks them into the
kind of self-sufficient existence that precludes any connections to other beings.
Unless entities merge physically in the real world to form a new composite, there
is no connection between them.
5.3.3 Limitations for an Ontology of ICTs
How limited Aristotle’s approach is for understanding media technologies becomes
clear when looking at the work of the German medium theorist Friedrich Kittler,
one of the few scholars in the field to draw on philosophy to analyse modern
media systems. Kittler argues that it has been impossible for Western thought to
develop an ontology of media because it has reduced being to a question of pure
presence, of things simply being there. He goes as far as stating that Aristotle’s
metaphysics, dealing as it does “only with things, their matter and form, but not
with relations between things in time and space” actually prevents an ontology
of media because the fundamental characteristic of media is to bridge time and
space:
Being, whether natural or technical, has been thought of for 2500 years
... in the metaphysical terms of hereness and presence, entele´cheia and
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ous´ıa, not in their many opposites such as past and future, storage
and transmission. (Kittler, 2009, p. 25)
We think of storage and transmission as technical properties of media technolo-
gies, but if we reduce them to their most basic function we find that they are
means of overcoming the boundaries of time and space.17 However, as Heideg-
ger points out in Being and Time, by reducing the question of being to one of
presence, of being there, traditional ontology had also reduced it to the present,
being here and now. This is what Heidegger refers to as ‘the problematic of Greek
ontology’:
Entities are grasped in their Being as ‘presence’; this means that they
are understood with regard to a definite mode of time - the ‘Present’.
(Heidegger, 2008, p. 25)
This shows quite clearly why traditional ontology cannot supply us with a full
understanding of objects the purpose of which is precisely to overcome the limi-
tations of the here and now.
This is why Kittler concludes that Heidegger was in fact the first philosopher
to make an ontology of media possible, and it is for the same reason that Heideg-
ger’s approach is uniquely suited to understanding our ubiquitous information-
technological environment. Heidegger’s ontology doesn’t limit entities to their
object-like characteristics that keep them firmly in the here and now. Instead, it
considers the relations of beings with other beings across time and space, which
will help us understand not only the technological objects themselves but also
how we engage with them. In fact, the instrumental nature of our engaging with
technologies already always involves a temporal dimension as it points to a future
17This was essentially the point made by Harold Innis in Empire and Communications where
he distinguished between media with a time-bias and media with a space-bias: the former are
suited to storing information in a particularly durable way, such as clay or stone, the latter
are lightweight media such as paper scrolls, making it easier to transport messages across large
distances (Innis, 2007).
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purpose. Technologies are means to ends that point outside the present existence
of the technological object.
By now it should be clear why Heidegger decided to launch his own inquiry
into the question of Being, but more importantly for our purposes, we should
understand the relevance of this step for the question concerning technology: as
a result of how the question of Being has traditionally been posed, the existence
of a technological object like a mobile phone (in terms of its properties like shape,
size, etc.) has taken precedence over the question of how we human beings engage
with it. The world, for traditional ontology, is an accumulation of self-contained
objects, objects that can be analysed and broken down endlessly only to reveal
further self-contained entities (this is where modern mathematical science has
taken over from philosophy). Neither philosophy nor science consider the being of
a technological object as fundamentally different from that of a non-technological
object. This is precisely the reason, however, why neither offer an adequate
conception of technology, which brings us to the advantages of the ontological
framework developed by Heidegger. His concept of readiness-to-hand addresses
the limitations of approaches based on pure presence and is particularly suited
to theorising the complex relationship between the material and immaterial that
characterises digital technologies.
5.4 The Readiness-to-hand of ICTs
5.4.1 Phenomenology vs the Ubiquity of ICTs
Heidegger argues that contrary to the worldview fostered by Western philosophy,
we are not subjects encountering the world as an accumulation of bundles of
physical matter, but engage with it by way of a set of reciprocal relationships
existing between ourselves and the things around us. In order to capture the fun-
damentally relational nature of our experience of the world, Heidegger introduces
the concept of ‘readiness-to-hand’. The original German Zuhandenheit literally
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means the quality of “being to hand”. The fact that it contains the word “hand”
emphasises precisely the handiness of the beings it is meant to describe.
Readiness-to-hand describes the Being of things that we encounter in our ev-
eryday environment: it is a Being that is a facing-towards-us-to-be-engaged-with,
rather than the closed-off nature of Being assumed by traditional ontology, which
Heidegger calls ‘presence-at-hand’ [Vorhandenheit ]. Readiness-to-hand does not
only apply to technology, but it is technology that most clearly highlights the
‘availability for use’ that characterises this kind of being: it denotes how we en-
counter an object like a laptop not as physical object (e.g. a pile of plastic, metal,
screws and wires) but as a tool, or as Heidegger calls it, as equipment. In this
section we will examine in more detail how Heidegger’s concept of readiness-to-
hand contrasts with the traditional ontology of presence and why this concept is
particularly useful in the current context of our relationship with our information-
technological environment.
Heidegger’s concept of ‘readiness-to-hand’ is easier to understand if we remind
ourselves of what determines Heidegger’s basic approach to philosophy. His ontol-
ogy is not aimed at producing a complex theoretical construct, but at providing
a framework by means of which we can talk about how we experience the world.
So in terms of understanding the Being of the things around us - whether they
are tables, birds, trees or computers - it is not a theoretical concept that counts,
but the non-conscious way in which we engage with them:
The Being of those entities which we encounter ... can be exhibited
phenomenologically if we take as our clue our everyday Being-in-the-
world, which we also call our ‘dealings’ in the world and with entities
within-the-world... Such entities are not thereby objects for knowing
the ‘world’ theoretically ; they are simply what gets used, what gets
produced, and so forth. (Heidegger, 2008, pp. 66-67, emphasis added).
The familiarity of the realm of things Heidegger is talking about here, “simply
what gets used” and so forth... is precisely the realm of our everyday, information-
technological environment. Traditional ontological approaches fall short by their
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attempts to theoretically grasp these objects, even in such simple terms as form
and matter - they are, paradoxically, the very thing that has so far prevented
us from understanding them. What counts is our experience of them, which is
pre-theoretical:
The achieving of phenomenological access to the entities which we
encounter, consists rather in thrusting aside our interpretative ten-
dencies, which keep thrusting themselves upon us and running along
with us, and which conceal ... those entities themselves as encountered
of their own accord... .(ibid., p. 67, emphasis added)
Phenomenology18 means encountering entities ‘of their own accord’, how they
show themselves to us in our experience of them. The world19, for Heidegger, is
not an object for scientific investigation to be understood, theorised and thereby
appropriated by a subject, but a phenomenon of which we human beings are a
fundamental and original part and which we need to try and understand from
the perspective of this involvedness.
In terms of what we are trying to achieve, which is a critical understanding
of our information-technological environment, this involvedness seems to pose a
18Heidegger argues that ‘phenomenology’ is frequently misunderstood as mere appearance,
Heidegger however argues that phenomenology is about how things show themselves to us
in their true being. Phenomenology is Heidegger’s ontological methodology, it means letting
“that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself”
(Heidegger, 2008, p. 34).
19It is important not to misunderstand what Heidegger means when he talks about the
‘world’. The world, for Heidegger, is not simply an ontical concept, i.e. the sum of things we
find in the world, nor is it merely an ontological term that refers to the type of Being of those
entities. The problem with either of these interpretations is that both already operate from
within an understanding of “world as a phenomenon” (2008, p.64 ) - a problem that arises
from our own being part of what we are trying to understand conceptually. As always, there
are limitations to understanding that of which one is oneself a part. But it is for this very
reason that ‘world’ for Heidegger, signifies the very ‘wherein’ that forms part of the kind of
being that is specific to human beings, which he calls DASEIN. The concept of Dasein will be
of importance later in this investigation, for now however it is important to understand that
Heidegger’s ontology takes its starting point from this very ‘wherein’ or ‘involvedness’.
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problem: it has been argued that a critical perspective requires some distance
to the object of critique. The overwhelming immediacy of our information-
technological environment appears to make this distance impossible: even when
we not embracing the opportunities of Web 2.0 and frantically producing con-
tent ourselves it is almost impossible to shut ourselves off from all media-input.
Ever more sophisticated advertising strategies, such as “whispering windows”, a
technology that delivers audio advertising messages via hidden speakers in shop
windows, are forcing the attention of an increasingly distracted audience. From a
surveillance perspective, posts and pictures uploaded onto social media sites are
stored and processed in a way that might affect our future life chances (Lyon,
2010). On the website TheFacebookFired.com for instance employees share ac-
counts of how their social networking activity was scrutinised by their employers
and led to their employment being terminated.
From Heidegger’s radical perspective, attempts to disinvolve ourselves from
this ubiquity with the aim of gaining an objective, critical perspective are intrin-
sically flawed. The understanding that Heidegger wants to bring us closer to is
not one of a thinking subject reflecting upon his environment from an elevated
position. Such attempts are premised on a subject/object dichotomy that is the
result of reducing Being to mere presence. Heidegger’s profoundly paradoxical
point is that the pervasiveness of our informational infrastructure is the result of
precisely our attempts at an objective, detached understanding of our environ-
ment. The phenomenological premise of Heidegger’s approach is a full awareness
and acceptance of the ways in which we are entangled in the referential total-
ity that is constituted by our interactions with other beings - both animate and
inanimate. His concept of readiness-to-hand is a concept for understanding ICTs
from within this totality.
5.4.2 Readiness-to-hand: the Being of Equipment
Heidegger’s approach to the question of Being begins with the simple question of
how we encounter the things that are closest to us in our immediate environment.
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As we have seen, characterising them as ‘objects’ leads towards a theoretical un-
derstanding of them that places them within the realm of our control. This is
why in standard accounts of technology, “[e]verything depends on our manipu-
lating [it] in the proper manner”. In English we are inclined to take this word
as almost synonymous with tools, which seems to make it eminently suitable for
talking about technology. Despite technology being our theme, it is worth noting
that the original German term used by Heidegger - which is “Zeug” - is not quite
as unambiguous. This is important in so far as the Being of what Heidegger
calls “equipment” (readiness-to-hand) is not limited to technology alone. The
fact that we encounter things not as physical mass but through using them is all
the more obvious with immaterial structures like language: as noted in chapter
4, our everyday engagement with language is not with a system of words and
grammatical rules, rather, we use it as a means of communicating. ICTs will
emerge in our analysis as a prime example of how ‘equipmentality’ increases with
immateriality. Heidegger uses the example of the hammer, a very simple techno-
logical implement, to denote how, rather than being “grasped thematically as an
occurring Thing” it is in the process of hammering that we, as human beings or
Dasein, meet with the Being of the hammer-thing:
the less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize
hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it
become and the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is
- as equipment. (Heidegger, 2008, p. 69)
The Being of the hammer is best described not in terms of its presence, of its
merely being there in some way, or its object-like properties, but in terms of its
usefulness for doing something. From this perspective, understanding the hammer
in a theoretical way as an object would actually prevent our recognising it for
what it is, as equipment. Heidegger’s reference to hammers and similar simple
objects has been taken by some of evidence of the fact that his analysis cannot
be pushed beyond the bounds of the archaic - but the point is that we engage
with far more advanced technological structures like ICTs in a similarly non-
conscious way: this is why the content of the media is always phenomenologically
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closer to us than the physical media technologies themselves (Heidegger, 1971, p.
163), which is another way of putting McLuhan’s argument that “the medium
is the message” (2001). To denote how in our engagement with them the actual
physical objects seem to withdraw, as it were, into their usage, and to distinguish
this Being conceptually from the mere presence or “occurrentness” with which
ontology has traditionally approached the question of Being, Heidegger introduces
the term readiness-to-hand :
The kind of Being which equipment possesses - in which it manifests
itself in its own right - we call “readiness-to-hand”. Only because
equipment has this ‘Being-in-itself’ and does not merely occur, is it
manipulable in the broadest sense and at our disposal. (Heidegger,
2008, p. 69)
To be precise, readiness-to-hand is not a way in which we encounter things at all -
it is the manner in which things approach us from within their Being. This places
us, as human beings, in the centre of Heidegger’s phenomenological account of
the world - this central position is however very different than the central position
granted to the human as subject by traditional ontology: a distinction that should
be kept in mind.
It is important, however, that we do not translate the fact that technology
approaches us in its readiness-to-hand, rather than the other way around, into
a situation where we are the passive victims of technological agency. This is
particularly crucial where technological encounters have demonstrable negative
consequences, for instance where ICTs are used for surveillance. It is widely
emphasised that we are the victims of governmental and corporate surveillance
when we pass through airport bodyscanners or when we are caught on CCTV
camera, for instance. These are technological encounters that we do not engage in
as active agents, but where we are subjected to collection of data about ourselves
as our failure to cooperate would have negative consequences (we might be denied
the right to travel). Readiness-to-hand is an ontological condition that applies to
all technological structures - whether we engage with them out of choice or not.
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5.4.3 The ‘In-order-to’ of Surveillance Equipment
There is another aspect to the Being of equipment that bring us even closer to an
understanding of our everyday ICT environment: what Heidegger calls its “in-
order-to”. The point of any piece of equipment is that it is equipment for doing
something. All equipment has a specific purpose for which it is ready-to-hand,
and this purpose connects it with a larger totality of equipment. As Heidegger
says:
Taken strictly, there ‘is’ no such thing as an equipment. To the Being
of any equipment there always belongs a totality of equipment, in
which it can be this equipment that it is. Equipment is essentially
‘something in-order-to’... [‘etwas um-zu’]. A totality of equipment is
constituted by various ways of the ‘in-order-to’, such as serviceability,
conduciveness, usability, manipulability. (2008, p. 68)
To first understand in conceptual terms what Heidegger is saying here it is eas-
iest to stick with our earlier basic example of the hammer, before we consider
the significance of these terms for understanding our information-technological
environment.
First of all, a hammer is a piece of equipment that fulfils a specific purpose.
It is an object we use in order to drive a nail into a plank of wood, for instance.
In its very design and appearance it is geared towards fulfilling this purpose and
our appreciation of its value wholly depends on how well it meets this specified
purpose. A piece of equipment and its purpose belong together, as Heidegger says
“Equipment can genuinely show itself only in dealings cut to its own measure”,
the purpose of the hammer (hammering) is “constitutive for the equipment we
are employing at the time” (Heidegger, 2008, p. 69). It is worth bearing in mind
that even though Heidegger is referring to the more general notion equipment20
20What has to be noted is that the English term ‘equipment’ already bears much stronger
connotations to technology than the German original, ‘Zeug’, which as Macquarrie and Robin-
son point out is more of a “collective noun ... analogous to our relatively specific ‘gear’ (as in
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here, rather than technology, the purpose, or ‘in-order-to’, that is characteristic of
equipment is equivalent to the instrumental definition of technology: technology
as a means to an end. The significance of the ‘in-order-to’ for our understanding of
technology becomes even more apparent when we consider Heidegger’s insistence
that “In the ‘in-order-to’ as a structure there lies an assignment or reference of
something to something” (Heidegger, 2008, p. 68). Any piece of equipment by
way of its in-order-to points us away from itself towards its specified purpose.
The hammer, for instance, point away from itself towards its purpose of driving
a nail into a plank of wood.
The significance of this re-direction that occurs as a result of the in-order-
to is something that becomes very real when we consider our earlier examples
of CCTV cameras. They might often be referred to as a piece of ‘surveillance
equipment’ but Heidegger allows us to appreciate the full extent to which they
really are ‘equipment’ for the purposes of surveillance and how the emphasis on
‘equipmentality’ affects how we perceive these technologies. Consider once more
the example of a CCTV camera warning sign (figure 5.1), which informs us that
CCTV images are being recorded “for the purposes of crime prevention and public
safety”:
Seen from Heidegger’s perspective, CCTV cameras are in fact equipment that
has a specified purpose or ‘in-order-to’ - recording images. Ontologically therefore
the ‘in-order-to’ already directs us away from the equipment itself (the cameras)
towards their purpose. When this equipmentality is strategically foregrounded
however, as is the case in the above example, this is likely to have a significant
impact on how we respond to these types of surveillance because our attention is
distracted away from the technologies themselves towards their beneficial purpose
(crime prevention and public safety). Thus we see how the instrumental ideology
‘gear for fishing’) or the more elaborate ‘paraphernalia” ’. Heidegger never explicitly equates
‘equipment’ or ‘Zeug’ with technology but the examples he lists, such as “equipment for writ-
ing, sewing, working, transportation, measurement” (2008, p. 68), suggest that there is an
almost-equivalence. Even if we don’t insist on the equivalence however what is characteristic
of ‘equipment’ is that it has an ‘in-order-to’ which is a fundamental part of the instrumental
definition of technology.
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Figure 5.1: (as Figure 1): CCTV warning sign outside London Zoo.
of technology is sustained ontologically by the particular Being that technology
exhibits: equipmentality, which always already directs us towards the purpose of
the equipment.
This instrumentality is reinforced by that other characteristic of equipment:
beyond the immediate ‘in-order-to’ that belongs to a particular piece of equip-
ment, any piece of equipment always belongs to a larger totality of equipment
“in which it can be this piece of equipment that it is” (Heidegger, 2008, p. 68).
Taking again the example of the hammer, the referentiality that is implied in the
hammer’s own ‘in-order-to’ (driving a nail into a plank of wood) already situates
it within a wider system of ‘in-order-to’s or referentialities: every nail driven into
the plank of wood by the hammer has its own purpose or ‘in-order-to’ (securing
one plank of wood to another, for instance), and each plank of wood thus secured
serves its own purpose, for instance that of forming a table, thus the hammer, the
nail and the planks of wood all come together in-order-to form this final piece of
furniture. This connection to a wider system of references determines the very
Being of equipment, and it is important to note that it is not only objects like
hammers and nails that form part of this system. Rather, even the workman
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doing the hammering, and the family that eventually will be sitting around the
table are already implicated in this network of references. In a similar way, if the
hammer and the nail come together in a shoe, its wearer is already there as a
reference even as the cobbler is hammering on the sole. As Heidegger says,
we encounter not only entities ready-to-hand but also entities with
Dasein’s [human] kind of Being, entities for which... the product
becomes ready-to-hand; and together with these we encounter the
world in which wearers and users live. (2008, p. 71)
The point is that through their readiness-to-hand things are connected with us,
and together we inhabit the referential totality, or network of meaningful rela-
tionships, that is the world.
A consequence of the fact that any piece of equipment forms part of a wider
referential totality, is that this referential totality becomes far more important in
our experience than the individual piece of equipment itself. In other words, the
wider network of equipmentality only reinforces the instrumentality of the single
piece of equipment. This is true for the hammer - the larger system of references
that it is part of that come together in the making of the table foreground the
making of the table, where the hammer itself, the piece of equipment, becomes
somewhat insignificant. However, the heightened complexity of the digital infor-
mational system constitutes a far more intricate network of referential totalities,
where the referentiality is foregrounded by the particular im/material qualities
these technologies exhibit. A single CCTV camera, for instance, becomes less
significant in itself as it becomes part of a larger instrumentum of surveillance
equipment. The increasingly rhizomatic nature of what Fuchs (2013) calls the
“surveillance-industrial complex” where state and private sector surveillance in-
tertwine means the ‘in-order-to’ of any single piece of surveillance equipment
within this system is subordinate to the ‘in-order-to’ of the system as a whole:
the guarantee of our safety and security. Heidegger’s concept of the ‘in-order-to’
of equipment (the purpose for which it is ready-to-hand) highlights how our tech-
nological encounters are determined not by technological objects themselves and
their properties, but by the ends to which they are assigned. As Heidegger says,
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That with which our everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the
tools themselves... On the contrary, that with which we concern our-
selves primarily is the work - that which is to be produced at the time;
(Heidegger, 2008, p. 69)
This is precisely the effect of the surveillance ideology: the single piece of surveil-
lance equipment receives its legitimacy through belonging to this larger ‘in-order-
to’. The most important feature of technological encounters that Heidegger’s
account of the Being of equipment draws our attention to is how the actual phys-
ical objects recede further and further into the background: they become what
Gunkel (2009) “instrumentally transparent”.
5.4.4 Instrumental Transparency: the Withdrawal of ICTs
The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its
readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw [zurckziehen] in order to
be ready-to-hand quite authentically.
Heidegger, 2008, p. 69
The opacity of the mechanism that tracks, sorts and mines all the data
that you provide is very high. People just aren’t aware it’s going on. You can
tell them so they know intellectually, but it’s just not there in the process
when you’re online and doing things. It seems to fade into the background.
Andrejevic cited in PBS.org, 2014, emphasis added
The peculiarity that Heidegger mentions almost as an aside in this quotation
- the fact that in order to be ready-to-hand, things need to withdraw from us -
is in fact one of the most useful ways for thinking about the digital matrix. In
the first instance, we need to draw out Heidegger’s emphasis on the proximity of
the ready-to-hand. This refers to the ways in which phenomenologically, nothing
could be further from our awareness than the technological devices themselves:
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we are distracted by their content like McLuhan’s watchdog by a juicy piece
of meat. The theme of distraction brings us to the second point implicit in
Heidegger’s comment: it points to the existence of a hidden depth that lies beyond
the immediate readiness to hand of the technology in question which its very
readiness-to-hand is preventing us from perceiving. This depth refers to the
essence of technology.
It should thus be clear that Heidegger’s use of the expression “proximally” is
crucial: it is an example of how Heidegger’s phenomenology is organised along
spatial relationships. His point is that what in conventional ontological terms
should be closest to us, is not what is phenomenologically closest. Where tra-
ditional ontology would measure actual physical distance, Heidegger argues this
reduces categories that are fundamental to human experience to mere presence-
at-hand:
When, for instance, a man wears a pair of spectacles which are so
close to him distantially that they are ‘sitting on his nose’, they are
environmentally more remote from him than the picture on the op-
posite wall. Such equipment has so little closeness that often it is
proximally quite impossible to find. Equipment for seeing - and like-
wise for hearing, such as the telephone receiver - has what we have
designated as the inconspicuousness of the proximally ready-to-hand.
(Heidegger, 2008, p. 107)
Heidegger refers to the Being of technologies like glasses and telephones as “in-
conspicuous” in that phenomenologically, they bring us closer to something by
themselves withdrawing from us. The result of this withdrawal is that the things
themselves acquire an almost transparent property as they recede behind their
use. Transparency can refer at the same time to something that goes unnoticed,
letting the gaze pass straight through it without drawing attention to itself, like
a clear plane of glass, and to something that is clear to see, of which the inner
workings are in plain sight and easy to grasp. Both meanings are arguably at
work in equipment: we can quite literally see through Heidegger’s example of
93
5.4 The Readiness-to-hand of ICTs
the glasses, but it is the second meaning of the term that underlines the ob-
viousness and self-evidential nature of the technologies that are ‘instrumentally
transparent’: precisely the ‘hidden in plain sight’ qualities of our modern media
environment which are not a consequence of how we use these technologies but,
as Heidegger points out in the quotation at the beginning of this section which is
repeated here - are the very condition of our being able to use them:
The ready-to-hand is not grasped theoretically at all..... The pecu-
liarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, it must, as it were,
withdraw [zuru¨ckziehen] in order to be ready-to-hand quite authenti-
cally. (2008, pp. 69-70)
Heidegger is right: in a practical sense, we could not concentrate on watching the
evening news if we were constantly aware of the flatness of the TV screen, and
our enjoyment of a film would be similarly hampered if the frame of the TV set
did not itself withdraw.
Media technologies are a prime example of the necessary unreflexivity that
characterises equipment in order for it to be ‘ready-to-hand’, an unreflexivity
that has also been noted by critical media commentators like McLuhan, but also
much earlier by Walter Benjamin and Siegfried Kracauer: McLuhan’s watchdog
of the mind, distracted by the piece of meat that is media content is an illustra-
tion of how Heidegger’s ontological concept of withdrawal plays out in the mass
media. Benjamin (2008 [1936]) commented explicitly on how film necessitates a
“distracted” frame of mind that is far removed from the contemplative mindset
that characterises our experience of traditional works of art. Commenting on
what he saw as the vacuousness of the emerging newspaper culture, Kracauer
spoke of a “demon of absent-mindedness” (Kracauer, 1995 [1963], p. 43) liv-
ing between the pages, all information and no knowledge. For both Kracauer
and Benjamin distraction is the mode of perception demanded by modern media
technologies - and for both it has political implications: Benjamin saw in it a
possibility for the masses to be liberated from the authoritarian rule of bourgeois
art, Kracauer on the other hand saw it as a vehicle of their enslavement. Heideg-
ger’s analysis avoids both optimistic and pessimistic assessments as they situate
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technology within the realm of the correct: instead he draws attention to the way
in which distraction is the result of the ontological structure of the technologies
themselves.
When applied to our contemporary, digital environment, the tendency towards
withdrawal can have critical consequences. Here the ontological tendency of tools
or pieces of equipment to withdraw behind their functionality is exacerbated by
the im/material qualities of the digital, with the result that the ideology of tech-
nological neutrality is reinforced, blinding us to the ‘interruptive’ (Gunkel, 2009)
capacities of computerised communication. David Gunkel’s notion of ‘instrumen-
tal transparency’ clearly illustrates the consequences of the ontological tendency
toward withdrawal asserted by Heidegger for computer technology. Gunkel argues
that the dominant paradigm within media and communications studies in the sec-
ond half of the 20th century has been that the computer constitutes a neutral
channel in the communication process, a model which he argues derives a great
deal of its validity from its initial formalization as the sender/message/receiver
model in Shannon and Weaver’s The Mathematical Theory of Communication:
Figure 5.2: Shannon and Weaver’s model of communication.
As the diagram shows, information emanates from a source (sender) and is
transmitted as a signal via a transmitter, which is then decoded on the receiver
side. As Gunkel argues, this model has two significant advantages that have
helped maintain its dominance: firstly, the computer is located “at an identifiable
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position within the process model of communication” (2009, p. 9) and secondly,
that it fits in with our understanding of the “proper role and function of the
technological apparatus” (ibid.): the ideology of technological neutrality. As
Feenberg argues
the instrumentalist theory offers the most widely accepted view of
technology. It is based on the common sense idea that technologies
are ”tools” standing ready to serve the purposes of users. (Feenberg,
1991, p. 5)
This is precisely the starting point for Heidegger’s own examination of the “Ques-
tion Concerning Technology”.
The crucial point as Gunkel rightly points out, is that where a tool is seen as
neutral it is evaluated “not in and for itself, but on the basis of the particular
employments that have been decided by a human user” (Gunkel, 2009, pp. 10-
11). This adherence to an understanding of ICTs as in themselves value-neutral
means that research in media and communications and related fields has for the
greater part focused on
either the quantity and quality of the messages that can be dis-
tributed by the system, or the kinds of relationships established be-
tween the senders and receivers through its particular form of media-
tion. (Gunkel, 2009, p. 12)
This tendency can be seen quite clearly in current research on social media, as
mentioned in the previous chapters. Social media are seen either from the per-
spective of human political emancipation, such as those arguments that try and
link these technological applications with the Arab Spring and other political
movements (Sullivan, 2009) or from the perspective of surveillance and the ex-
ploitation of digital labour (Fuchs, 2013). In both cases however it is how these
technologies are put to use by human agents that determines their overall value.
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Gunkel’s concept of ‘instrumental transparency’ is useful when applying Hei-
degger’s neutrality thesis to our current information-technological environment.
It denotes how, as a result of the dominant paradigm of technological neutral-
ity, the “computer recedes from view and becomes a more or less transparent
medium of message exchange” (Gunkel, 2009, p. 14). However, though Gunkel
does invoke Heidegger in his analysis, he doesn’t take him far enough. Gunkel
only refers to Heidegger for his critique of the dominance of the instrumental
ideology of technology. What he doesn’t engage with is Heidegger’s ontology of
equipment, and this is what provides the experiential explanation for his concept
of ‘instrumental transparency’. Heidegger’s ontology of equipment as Being that
withdraws into its ‘in-order-to’ explains at a very phenomenological level why it
is possible for digital computing technology to acquire this level of transparency.
Nevertheless, Gunkel’s main point, and the one that is important for this
thesis, is that this instrumental transparency belies what is actually happening
at the level of the technology itself:
This form of instrumental transparency, however useful and conve-
nient, is necessarily interrupted and even resisted by the mechanisms
and machinery of computing. ... Instead of functioning as a virtually
immaterial and transparent channel through which human agents ex-
change messages, the computer participates in and contaminates the
process. It acts on the messages, significantly alters them, and deliv-
ers information that was not necessarily selected, composed, or even
controlled by human participants. (Gunkel, 2009, pp. 15-16)
One of the examples Gunkel lists are spam messages sent out by computers on an
automated basis, informing users “of everything from herbal supplements, which
enhance the size and operation of various parts of the body, to bogus stock and
investment opportunities” (ibid). Email, Gunkel argues,
is no longer an exclusive instrument of human communication but
shows signs of increasing involvement by machines in the communica-
tive process. (ibid.)
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Actions of this kind carried out by computing machines for Gunkel are evi-
dence of the fact that computers do not fit easily within the dominant paradigm
of technological neutrality. The computer, he argues
substantively resists being exclusively defined as a medium and in-
strument through which human users exchange messages. Instead, it
actively participates in communicative exchanges as a kind of addi-
tional agent and/or (inter)active co-conspirator. (ibid.)
As Kittler (2006 and 2009) argues, when we abandoned the Roman alphabet and
Arabic numbers for digital code, we ultimately ceded control over the processing
of meaning to machines. This is exacerbated by a complex system of privileges
built into a computer’s central processing unit, the highest of which decides how
much memory space is allocated to programmes running parallel to each other.
This so-called Protected Mode is an area on the computer motherboard that
cannot be accessed or influenced by its user - who on the other hand is under
the impression that the computer is at his/her personal disposal (Kittler 1995
and 1997). This is precisely the effect of the graphical user interface, or GUI: it
gives the user the impression that he is in control, an impression reinforced by
the “ready-to-hand” nature of icon and button design perfected by Apple and
the friendly, participatory rhetoric of Web 2.0 companies:
Users are allowed much control over the surface of Web 2.0; they
are the ones who fill in the ghostly frames, make connections, remix
content, and process digital artifacts. However, all too often in Web
2.0, the depth - the code (both computer and legal) and the material
behind the ghostly frames - is controlled by new media capitalists,
who deny users the ability to determine how their content is used.
(Gehl, 2009, p. 25)
The online retailer Amazon’s book retail business is a current example of how a
‘user-friendly’ graphical user interface gives the customer the illusion of being free
to choose, whilst behind the scenes this choice is determined by the company’s
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corporate monopolistic strategies. In order to make up for the losses incurred
through selling books below their recommended retail price to stay competitive,
Amazon charges publishing houses fees to have their books listed. Thus, as
the author Amanda Foreman has argued in an article published by The Sunday
Times, “it is the fees, not consumer choice, that drive nearly every aspect of how
a book is displayed and recommended”. Where publishers resist these practices
their authors are simply not represented on the site, as Foreman relates, as is the
case with the publishing company Hachette, who have had 5000 books and their
authors removed from the site “in an attempt to force Hachette into giving larger
discounts on its books”. The practice of ‘disappearing’ certain authors goes on
without the consumer’s awareness - he or she doesn’t know their choice has been
restricted (Foreman, 2014). This is a clear example where from the perspective of
the user, he is engaging instrumentally with a tool - for him, the Amazon website
is a means towards an end (purchasing a book) - but where the tool is in fact far
from ‘instrumentally transparent’ but interferes with the original purpose of the
user’s interaction with the technological object.
5.4.5 Broken Tools
A point we have not addressed is what happens when technologies have a fault
that stops them functioning properly. For Heidegger, this marks the return of
objects into pure presence, but I would argue that where readiness-to-hand is
interrupted, this provides a possible entry point into their ontological depth. In
other words, when ICTs are no longer instrumentally transparent or inconspic-
uous but become opaque and conspicuous, a space opens up for some of the
dimensions that are otherwise obscured to reveal themselves - such as the ways
in which our benign online social networking activities are mined for corporate
profit.
The readiness-to-hand of technological structures (whether hammers or com-
puters) that allows them to withdraw into instrumental transparency relies on
their functioning in the proper way, their ability to carry out the purpose (or
‘in-order-to’) for which they are intended. However, if a technology malfunctions
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and cannot carry out its specified purpose, is it still ‘ready-to-hand’. From per-
sonal experience we can assume that this is not the case. If our personal laptop
stops functioning, if we can no longer turn it on, for instance, our attention is
drawn to the technological object and it becomes something that is preventing us
from sending an important email. The object has become, as Heidegger argues,
‘obtrusive’. Readiness-to-hand, Heidegger argues, is the standard mode of Being
of equipment, but where equipment ceases to function properly or is in some
other way unsuitable for the task, it acquires elements of the ‘present-at-hand’:
When we concern ourselves with something, the entities which are
most closely ready-to-hand may be met as something unusable, not
properly adapted for the use we have decided upon. The tool turns
out to be damaged, or the material unsuitable... When its unusabil-
ity is thus discovered, equipment becomes conspicuous. This con-
spicuousness presents the ready-to-hand equipment as in a certain
un-readiness-to-hand. But this implies that what cannot be used just
lies there... Pure presence-at-hand announces itself in such equip-
ment... . (Heidegger, 2008, p. 73, emphasis in the original)
It is important, however, not to assume that the presence-at-hand that broken
equipment acquires means it has been reduced to pure presence in the traditional
ontological sense - to a heap of dead matter. In this respect Heidegger is very
clear that
equipment which is present-at-hand in this way is still not just a Thing
which occurs somewhere. The damage to the equipment is still not
a mere alteration of a Thing - not a change of properties which just
occurs in something present-at-hand. (ibid.)
Rather, the object’s presence-at-hand emerges only on the basis of its usual
readiness-to-hand, to which it strives to return.
The conditions under which equipment can go from being ready-to-hand to
unready-to-hand are worth examining a little more closely. Unreadiness-to-hand
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can be the result of the equipment being damaged or made of ‘unsuitable’ mate-
rial - in which case, Heidegger argues, we experience it as ‘conspicuous’. However,
if it is missing, that is not ‘to hand’ at all, then it is also ‘unready-to-hand’; in
the meanwhile however everything else that functions becomes ‘obtrusive’ - its
readiness-to-hand almost becomes an annoyance: in fact, “[t]he more urgently ...
we need what is missing, ... all the more obtrusive [and therefore all the more
present-at-hand]... does that which is ready-to-hand become” (2008, p.73) - be-
cause it cannot be “budged without the thing that is missing”. An example would
be a communications application like Skype - without an internet connection the
former becomes quite useless even though there might be nothing wrong with it.
There is a third possibility, however: in some cases equipment can ‘stand in the
way’ of our concern, that is of how we would usually engage with it, as a result of
which we need to get it out of the way before we can return to business as usual.
The three modes of unreadiness-to-hand, conspicuousness, obtrusiveness and
obstinacy, provide a framework for exploring ruptures in what, under normal
circumstances, is a seamlessly functioning informational matrix. All of them in-
terrupt the readiness-to-hand that makes our information-technological objects
withdraw and bring them to our attention - which, I would argue, brings with
it potential for critical awareness. Specifically events like hacks, the intentional,
unauthorized accessing of data flows and repositories, and the leaking of confi-
dential documents, cause an interruption to the readiness-to-hand of our informa-
tional system that constitutes a hindrance for those operating the system - but
has significant critical momentum for wider society. An example is the exposure
of the PRISM surveillance programme by Edward Snowden in 2013. As we have
seen, the readiness-to-hand of individual technological objects like CCTV cam-
eras or store loyalty cards is augmented by their being subordinate to the larger
system of governmental and corporate surveillance that they form part of. The
smooth running of the system as a whole depends on its readiness-to-hand as this
is what foregrounds its positive uses (convenience, security etc.) and prevents us
from considering the negative implications (e.g. the infringement on our privacy).
In this sense, it is possible to view the PRISM revelations as a breakdown in the
instrumental transparency of the system: Previously Snowden had worked as a
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contractor for the US National Security Agency (NSA), facilitating the running
of the surveillance operations. When he leaked the PRISM files to the media,
he arguably created an error in the system as a result of which the system as a
whole became conspicuous. In Heideggerian terms he had created an ‘obstinacy’,
an obstruction that was too large to just be cleared out of the way. Instead it de-
veloped the critical potential of the breakdown of readiness-to-hand in shedding
light, globally, on the extent of global surveillance operations facilitated by digital
ICTs. In the following section we will explore the role of humans in technological
systems in more detail.
5.5 Humans and Things in Heidegger’s Network
Ontology
5.5.1 Where Humans Stand in Heidegger’s Referential
Network and why this Matters for the Question
Concerning Information and Communication Tech-
nology
The attempts at gaining an ontological understanding of technology that have
taken up the majority of this chapter are part of the wider project of gaining an
understanding of how we engage with technology and what this mode of engage-
ment (which we have discovered is mainly instrumental) means for our being-in-
the world more generally, we might say our quality of life. This question is not as
simple as it might at first seem: in order to judge how any form of technology, and
information technology in particular, is impacting on the way we live, and in or-
der to judge whether this impact is positive or otherwise, requires an idea of what
human life should be like. A normative perspective on the place of technology in
human life has traditionally been the domain of Critical Theory, for instance as in
the work of Herbert Marcuse. Heidegger’s technological account of modernity is
widely contrasted with such approaches - and his supposedly anti-Semitic tenden-
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cies proclaimed as incomparable with a humanist perspective. This section seeks
to counter such criticisms by exposing the deeply normative dimension of Hei-
degger’s ontological account of technology, which is grounded in the fundamental
distinction he draws between human and non-human Being.
Asking about the impact of technology requires an idea of what it means to be
human. One of the ways in which society has addressed this question is by laying
down ‘fundamental human rights’ such as liberty, privacy and dignity. These
were laid down by the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948) and
the European Convention on Human Rights (1950). As stated by the civil liberties
watchdog Liberty they apply to all people “regardless of sex, race, nationality,
socio-economic group, political opinion, sexual orientation or any other status”,
in other words they are universal, applying “to all people simply on the basis of
being human” (Liberty, n.d., emphasis added). The protection of human rights,
then, is based on the principle that where these rights are infringed upon, a human
being loses part of what it means to be human: there is something specific about
being human that is not shared by other entities. A hammer, to use Heidegger’s
earlier example, is not something that has privacy or dignity, and would not
suffer if these are violated. A human being, however, experiences suffering (at
least psychological). The UK phone hacking scandal involving News of the World
journalists for instance involved the violation of the privacy of victims of the 7/7
bombings, the parents of a murdered schoolgirl and members of the British Royal
family. Put bluntly, the point is that the suffering was experienced by the human
owners of the mobile phones that were hacked into, not the technological devices.
So even though we as human beings inhabit the same world and are connected
with our technological objects through the network of referential totalities, there
is something that makes our Being different from the Being of inanimate objects.
This brings us back to the very beginning of our investigation into Heideg-
ger’s ontology, where we established that what distinguishes Heidegger’s approach
from previous ontologies is that he puts the question of ‘Being’ back on the map:
where previously all kinds of beings had been reduced to their properties (what
Heidegger calls ‘presence’), Heidegger starts from the fact that there is a funda-
mental difference between the ways in which humans, birds and objects like tables
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are. We made a choice at that stage, in that from this list of objects we chose
to investigate the being of inanimate things, in order to see how this could help
us understand technological objects. Hence we followed Heidegger in his analy-
sis of simple tools like hammers to see what could be applied to more complex
technologies like ICTs. We learnt that equipment has a specific kind of being
that Heidegger calls ‘readiness-to-hand’, which means that objects like hammers
present themselves to us as things to be used. A key finding was that this utility
makes the object itself recede into the background which means that we see even
complex tools like computers as neutral means to an end, what David Gunkel
calls ‘instrumental transparency’. To relate this finding back to earlier chapters,
the fact that we engage with even complex technologies as means to ends results
in surveillance technologies being easier to market to us by emphasising these
positive ends - safety and security.
Where ICTs are used for the purposes of corporate or governmental surveil-
lance, they can have a significant impact on our lives in terms of the rights we
listed earlier as being fundamental to human life - dignity, privacy and freedom.
Another example is the process of ‘social sorting’, a practice with a long history
the effects of which however have been exacerbated by the internet:
The Internet gives us an amazing amount of information about one
another. Every time you check up on a new acquaintance or job
applicant through social media, you are conducting surveillance of a
sort. We associate ourselves with some people, but not with others,
and thus sort ourselves in very powerful ways. But when our self-
sorting is exploited through the algorithms and in the databases of
huge organizations, the sorting machine thus created affects us in ways
we are not aware of.... How data are sorted and categorized have very
real implications as people are socially sorted in profiles and groups.
This is done on you without your knowledge, and without any way to
change it. (Cochrane, 2013)
Medical data for instance can have far-reaching consequences that affect the per-
son in question at a future point in their lives. Unless the patient has chosen
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to opt out, his or her medical data in Britain is collated by the NHS and stored
in a central database, from where access can be bought by research bodies but
also by pharmaceutical companies and health insurance providers. Where the
NHS claims to anonymise data, a representative of the patient pressure group
medConfidential points out how
the care.data scheme is deliberately designed so that ‘pseudonymised’
data - information that can be re-identified by anyone who already
holds information about you - can be passed on to ‘customers’ of the
information centre, with no independent scrutiny and without even
notifying patients. (cited in Ramesh, 2014)
Someone tested positively for one of the genetic mutations responsible for certain
types of breast cancer or with a different diagnosed medical condition might thus
find themselves refused certain types of treatment or insurance policies. It is
clear, then, that these technologies have a demonstrable effect on how we live
our lives. Heidegger’s network ontology seems to locate human and non-human
entities on the same ontological plane, so we need to take this investigation further
to understand what is distinctive about the Being of human beings. After all it
is this distinctiveness that makes the impact of technological beings on human
beings a matter of concern.
Human beings, we have seen, are part of Heidegger’s referential totality. The
carpenter using the table is as much part of the network of referentialities, as
the family that will eventually be sitting around the table the carpenter has
built with the use of his hammer, the nails etc. However, does our being part
of the same referential totality that forms the world mean that in our Being we
are also essentially the same? In fact, Heidegger couldn’t be clearer about the
fact that human being is essentially different from all other kinds of being - so
different that it has its own category, which Heidegger calls ‘Dasein’, or ‘being
there’. It is important not to misunderstand Heidegger in this crucial point:
firstly, because some of the most influential current philosophy exploring the links
between technology and the social, the actor-network theory pioneered by Bruno
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Latour, argues precisely that ontologically, there is no difference between human
and non-human entities. Secondly, because some of the most recent work seeking
to update Heidegger’s philosophy of technology for the 21st century curiously
suggests that Heidegger is making the same argument as Latour - that between
the being of humans and the being of things like hammers etc. there exists
no ontological difference. Fortunately for our purposes, Heidegger is very clear
about this distinction, for if human Being were in no way different to the Being
of a hammer or a more advanced piece of technology like a string of code, how
would it be possible to judge the impact of technology on human life from a
critical, normative perspective? It is nevertheless worth considering both the
above positions as this will allow us to see the relevance of what Heidegger is
saying more clearly, as the following sections shows.
5.5.2 Dasein: the Privilege and Responsibility of Being
Human
Dasein encounters the objective world as a world of meaning oriented
toward existence. It does not encounter it as a rigid res extensae, as inde-
pendent, abstract physical things. Rather they are related to an Existenz
that uses them, orients itself towards them, and deals with them; thus as-
cribing to them meaning, time, and place.
Marcuse, 1969, p. 13
The above quote, from the critical theorist Herbert Marcuse’s engagement
with his one-time teacher Heidegger, reminds us of two things: firstly that human
beings don’t encounter the world as a set of objects but as a world of meaning
- which is key in the context of technology, as we have seen in this chapter.
It also reminds us of the mutuality of these meaningful relationships: Marcuse
emphasises that in being encountered, the ‘objective world’ is “oriented toward”
existence. Again, we find in Heidegger the relationship between beings defined as
a reciprocal relationship that expresses itself in spatial terms: as an approaching
and encountering. Crucially, it is not Dasein that is the only active kind of being
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that approaches, it is at the same time approached by other beings. Noting that
the relationship between human and non-human beings is essentially reciprocal
is important if we are to understand how human being, what Heidegger calls
Dasein, is at the same time fundamentally different to other entities.
When it comes to Heidegger’s argument that human Being has a privileged
position over other kinds of Being we need to clarify a point that might otherwise
lead to some confusion. This point relates to what might seem like a contradiction
between Heidegger’s insistence, on the one hand, that human and non-human
beings co-inhabit the world, which seems to involve an element of parity, and the
argument that there is something specific to human life that differentiates it from
non-human existence on the other (dignity, liberty, privacy etc.). This problem
persists as long as we treat the ontological and moral/ethical dimension as two
separate categories. Traditional ontology, we have seen, is mainly concerned with
beings as unities of form and matter. So despite the apparent difference between
a human being and an inanimate object like a hammer or a mobile phone, for
instance, both can be understood in terms of substance.
Figure 5.3 is an - intentionally simplified - illustration of what happens when
beings are reduced to their substance: the human being emerges as merely a more
complex arrangement than an inanimate being.
The figure resembles a comparison between two different arrangement of cells,
one simply more complex than the other. This is no coincidence, as the view that
humans are a more complex composition of the same elements as non-human enti-
ties is of course the view that Heidegger argues modern science has taken. For in-
stance, it compares human and non-human beings in terms of their water to body
mass ratio: the human body consists of approximately 70% water (H2O) (NASA,
2007), and a fruit like a tomato is made up of 94% water (Bowes & Church, 1993).
Thought in terms of basic chemistry, human beings even share elements with mo-
bile phones. The point is that where humans and mobile phones are seen in terms
of these basic structural categories it is clear that no moral/ethical dimensions
arise, hence the traditional separation between science and ethics. However, this
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Non-human being Human being
Figure 5.3: A mere difference in complexity copyright Heidi Herzogenrath-
Amelung
dimension is arguably of great importance in the context of the impact of infor-
mation and communication technology on human life. For Heidegger these two
dimensions are inseparable because his ontology is grounded in experience, and
it is because it is human experience that is at the centre of his ontology that
humans have privileged position in relation to other beings.
It is because Heidegger wanted to be clear about the particular nature of the
‘privilege’ that human Being enjoys in relation to other kinds of being that Hei-
degger developed the notion of ‘Dasein’ for specifically human being. The exact
nature of Dasein is the subject of much discussion in Heidegger’s Being and Time,
and this thesis cannot render the full complexity of the concept. What is impor-
tant is that the term, which is usually left untranslated in English, translated
would mean ‘being there’. What Heidegger is trying to emphasise is that human
being is a being there in the world - it is a being-with, not a being before, over or
ahead of other things. In fact, Dasein is characterised by ‘being-in-the-world’ in
the sense that this mode of being belongs to Dasein alone and no other kind of
being: it is Dasein’s fundamental and ‘authentic’ way of Being. Heidegger thus
argues against the stance mainstream Western philosophy has taken in positing
the human being as subject and thus ontologically prior to everything else that
exists in the world. The problem with this view is that it has led to humans
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assuming an elevated stance, conceiving of themselves as subject with the right
to act upon the world around them. Our thoroughly technological environment
is the ultimate consequence of this particular view of the world, or, as Heidegger
put it, the setting up of the world as a ‘world picture’.
Despite Heidegger’s argument that human being-in-the-world is a Being that
is simultaneous with other beings and in no way prior or superior to them, human
Being still occupies a position of privilege in that it has an awareness of its own
Being. Dasein, he argues, is the Being for whom its own Being is “an issue” (Hei-
degger, 2008, p. 42). This understanding, and not some intrinsic kind of priority,
is the nature of the privileged being that humans enjoy - inanimate objects do not
have this gift to reflect on their own situation. But from this privilege emerges
also a responsibility: the capacity to reflect on one’s own situation also calls for
the exercise of such critical reflection. One could argue that this precisely is what
Heidegger is trying to help us achieve. This capacity that is specific to Dasein
is the reason why Dasein must never be reduced to mere presence, as Heidegger
clearly states:
Dasein does not have the kind of being which belongs to something
merely present-at-hand within the world, nor does it ever have it.
(Heidegger, 2008, p. 43, emphasis added)
Given Heidegger’s unequivocal insistence on the difference between Dasein
and other kinds of Being it is especially surprising that Graham Harman insists
that Heidegger’s contribution to modern philosophy is a metaphysics that has
‘no need for any special human entity’ (2002, p. 41). Harman’s argument is that
the main achievement of Heidegger in Being and Time is his liberation of objects
from pure presence by developing an ontology specifically devoted to objects that
Harman calls ‘tool being’. Harman is right in stating that Heidegger’s distinction
between presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand has so far been undervalued,
and its significance for understanding technological objects in particular. In this
chapter I have tried to show how valuable this approach is for understanding
how we encounter our modern information-technological environment. However,
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Harman’s argument that the complex internal life of objects, oscillating as they
do between readiness-to and presence-at-hand, proves that there is no need for
a specific role to be allocated to humans, seems extremely difficult to reconcile
with the important role Heidegger allocates to Dasein. Harman argues that
if we read Heidegger’s tool analysis in the right way, the lingering
priority of Dasein in his philosophy is vaporized, and we encounter
a strange new world filled with shocking possibilities for twenty-first-
century philosophy. (2002, p. 2)
He argues that Heidegger’s liberation of Western philosophy from the “long dic-
tatorship of human beings” makes way for
a ghostly cosmos in which humans, dogs, oak trees, and tobacco are
on precisely the same footing as glass bottles, pitchforks, windmills,
comets, ice cubes, magnets and atoms. (Harman, 2002, p. 2)
This reading of Heidegger is not only extremely difficult to reconcile with Hei-
degger’s persistent emphasis on Dasein’s special kind of Being. It also seems
to be an attempt to merge Heidegger’s ontology of objects with the ‘network
metaphysics’ of Bruno Latour. While it is worth exploring the points where Hei-
degger’s and Latour’s approaches come close to one another especially with regard
to understanding technological objects, Latour’s complete levelling of human and
non-human beings in their role as ‘actors’ is a reduction of the complexity of
Heidegger’s thinking: here human Being is given no kind of privileged status over
a piece of technology like a mobile phone. As such, it is a philosophy that doesn’t
seem to allow much space for a normative evaluation.
Arguably however, the normative component is a crucial one in the analysis of
our information-technological environment, precisely because of the demonstra-
ble ways in which a lack of understanding of the full rationalising dimensions of
these technologies affects human life: for instance, the right to privacy. These
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consequences are being regularly obscured by the marketing rhetoric of the cor-
porations owning the technological infrastructure. For instance, the social net-
working site Facebook has recently announced a new feature to its mobile app
that enables it to “listen” to conversations and background noises via the mobile
phone’s microphone:
Billed as improving on “feelings and activities” in the Facebook milieu,
the snooping feature is very high tech. It employs noise cancellation
and the ability to function even when sound is on at a low volume.
It takes the sound pattern of what it “hears” and compares it to a
library of information to find the right tune or TV show. Facebook
makes clear that this is an “opt in” feature. But “opt in” often means
always “on” because people don’t know or don’t take action to turn
on various privacy features. But even assuming that Facebook is
good on its word and the feature must be activated, it does not mean
that it can’t be activated by a hacker or intruder. ...Facebook does
not make any promises about protection against hackers, nor should
Facebook make such a promise, because it is one that cannot be kept.
(Abrahams, 2014)
The point is that if we do not grant that Dasein (human being) has any special
kind of status amongst other beings - if we do not accept that when all is said
and done, human experience is still the reference point for evaluating our relation-
ship with technology, then it’s not clear why the above examples of Facebook’s
intrusion upon our privacy matters at all.
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5.6 Comparing Heidegger’s Network Ontology
with the Network Metaphysics of Bruno La-
tour: a Human Being is not a Mobile Phone
5.6.1 Network Ontologies
Man ... is possessed by technology, and it is a complete illusion to believe
that we can master it. We are, on the contrary, framed by this Gestell, which
is one way in which Being is unveiled. Is technology inferior to science and
pure knowledge? No, because, for Heidegger, far from serving as applied
science, technology dominates all, even the purely theoretical sciences. By
rationalizing and stockpiling nature, science plays into the hands of tech-
nology, whose sole end is to rationalize and stockpile nature... Technology
is unique, insuperable, omnipresent, superior, a monster born in our midst
which has already devoured its unwitting midwives.
Latour, 1999, p. 176
A comparison between the ontological approaches of Heidegger and Bruno
Latour suggests itself as both are based on a network structure that connects
human and non-human entities - although in Heidegger’s ontology this is far
more implicit. Latour on the other hand fully exploits the network metaphor -
he speaks of human and non-human beings as actors in networks, which seems
to make him the obvious choice for a philosophical approach to digital networks.
However, a contrast between both approaches exposes important incongruences
and suggests that Heidegger’s approach contains far more potential for an analysis
of the complex structures of digital ICTs.
It is concerning that some of these fundamental differences that emerge be-
tween the two approaches have at times been conflated (see for instance Harman,
2002), which is another important motivation for undertaking this comparison.
This conflation is curious in so far as Latour himself is deeply critical of Heideg-
ger’s views on technology, as the above quote demonstrates. Latour has claimed
himself to be “baffled” that anyone would take Heidegger seriously in matters
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of technology (Latour, 2007, p. 140). For Latour, Heidegger is a “thoroughly
pessimistic technological determinist” (Kochan, 2010, p. 584) but apart from
Heidegger’s own very clear statement to the contrary (see Heidegger, 1977, p.
25) this interpretation doesn’t make much sense in view of the distinction that
is at the heart of Heidegger’s approach, the distinction between technologies and
their underlying essence: technologies are only a visible manifestation of a much
more fundamental, underlying technicality that has its origins in Western philos-
ophy.
In fact both Latour and Heidegger start from a similar criticism of Western
philosophy: the rule of the subject and the reduction of objects to mere substance.
The ontology developed by Heidegger opposes the ‘ontotheology’ practiced by
Western metaphysics, “the notion that any particular kind of being can explain
being itself” (Latour, et al., 2011, p. 27) . This is also Latour’s criticism of
the way philosophy has traditionally thought about objects - the basis of his
actor-network-theory (ANT) is the “irreducibility” of objects to something else
(Latour, 1988). Both Latour and Heidegger developed a metaphysics of objects
that denies that objects can be explained by breaking them down to their finite
components. For instance, analysing a physical object like a hammer in terms
of its physical properties (the materials, e.g. wood and iron, its size and weight
etc.) doesn’t tell us much about the object or how it interacts with the realm of
the social.
The question concerning technology is however very much the question of the
relationship between the technological object and the social, and in this context
we are interested in how we engage with the ubiquity of current information and
communication technologies. Heidegger’s concept of readiness-to-hand, we have
seen, explains this engagement in terms of our reliance on technological objects to
fulfil a certain purpose, as a result of which the technological object itself recedes
into the background. A debit card we use at an ATM to make a cash withdrawal
in our experience is not a thin piece of plastic containing a microchip, it is a
means of accessing the funds in our bank account in a quick and easy way.
A simple illustration is the advert the UK Halifax bank ran when the first
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debit cards were introduced in the 1980s, using the Commodores’ song ‘Easy Like
Sunday Morning’ (YouTube, n.d.). The catchy, up-beat melody of the song and
the lyrics encourage us to perceive the card as ready-to-hand, and can thus be seen
as an early example of the ideology of technological neutrality playing out in the
public domain. The technological object itself - the ATM card - is so far from our
minds that we even forget it in the card slot once we have removed our cash from
the machine. The recent introduction of contactless payment systems, it should
be added, maximises our experience of our debit card’s ‘readiness-to-hand’, as we
no longer even have to insert our debit card into a card reader to make a payment,
only to ‘tap’ our card or hold our smart phone against a reader. Visa fittingly
advertises its contactless system with “Tap to pay, quick getaway” (The Grocer,
2013), Barclays and The Co-operative retailer have advertised their contactless
payments as “life in the fast aisle” (The Co-operative Food, n.d.). These latest
payment methods with their accompanying marketing communications lessen our
experience of our bank cards as technological objects even further.
5.6.2 Hidden Surplus: Heidegger’s Fourfold
A crucial point in Heidegger’s notion of the “readiness-to-hand” of equipment is
that it doesn’t fully disclose the equipment to us - there remains what Harman
calls a “hidden surplus” that we cannot access, an ontological depth that remains
hidden from human engagement. In fact, it is necessary for this depth to withdraw
from human engagement, as Heidegger argues, “in order to be ready-to-hand
quite authentically” (Heidegger, 2008, p. 69). The nature of this ‘hidden surplus’
however depends on the nature of the piece of equipment in question. For simple
pieces of equipment like hammers, or water jugs, it is what Heidegger calls the
‘fourfold’, the way in which these objects are connected to the four elements
(earth, sky, mortality, and divinity). The water jug, for instance, unites the earth
and sky in that the jug is made from clay from the earth, and is filled with
rainwater from the sky. It also unites the mortal and the divine in that it is
mortal human beings that will drink from it, and in that the water in the jug
might be ‘blessed’ to be holy water:
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In the gift of the pour there abides at the same time earth and sky,
divinities and mortals. These four, united of themselves, belong to-
gether. Obligingly coming before all that presences, they are folded
into a single fourfold. (Heidegger, 2012 [1994], p. 11)
The ‘fourfold’ is one of Heidegger’s most controversial concepts, as it invokes
rather religious ideas. Its importance in this context is that it is a mode of re-
vealing, a way in which things show themselves to us. It can be understood as
similar to Walter Benjamin’s concept of ‘aura’, which he uses to explain what is
lost in the reception of the technological reproduction of an artwork vis-a`-vis the
original (Benjamin, 2008 [1936]). If we accept that from Benjamin’s perspective,
we could not describe our earlier example of the plastic bank card as ‘auratic’, it
should also be clear why it has little in common with the kind of revealing consti-
tuted by the ‘fourfold’. This is because in our heavily technological environment,
the interplay of the fourfold has been replaced with an entirely different kind of
revealing: one that is driven by wholly instrumental considerations, a logic of
ultimate rationality. This is the essence of technology that is in itself “by no
means anything technological” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 4).
Latour, not surprisingly, is highly critical of Heidegger’s concept of the four-
fold:
To be sure, such tools may be beautifully made, and it is much better
to call on the gods and the mortals, heaven and earth, to account
for their emergence than to dismiss them as the thinnest of “mere”
objects. But look... at the VW Beetle: just four elements, really?
That’s a very small list indeed... there are many more than four
existing deities, or dimensions, or factors, brought simultaneously into
play in order to define what it is for “uranium” to be “nuclear”. Any
technical imbroglio forces us to count way beyond four. But it is true
- and here Heidegger sends the inquiry in the right direction - that any
artifact is a form of assembling, of gathering, of “thinging” entities
together... (2007, p. 140, emphasis in the original)
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Latour’s project is to bring the inner life of objects out into the open. His
objects, whether they are hammers, water jugs, bank cards or nuclear energy,
are not mysterious beings evading human grasp, but actors fully deployed in
their environment that they are shaping, and being shaped by. For Latour, the
difference between a water jug and an ATM card is not that the hand-crafted
production of the former connects it to mortal and divine spheres, and that
the latter is an industrially mass-produced object where all these connections
have been severed. For Latour neither of them are static entities but the result
of different actors coming together to form these new object-actors. The key
difference between them is not whether they are natural, hand-made, or mass-
produced but how powerful they are in terms of the effect they can execute on
other actors.
5.6.3 Black Boxes
For Harman, the complexity of Latour’s ontology seems to consist in the fact that
every actor constitutes a black box. The power of an actor, that is, the effect it
can have on other actors in the network, is determined by what goes on inside
the black box:
Latour’s actors are objects of all sizes; they can be either real or unreal
in physical terms; they are black boxes that you can open to find many
more actors hidden within them; and every actor has effects on other
entities. (Latour, et al., 2011, p. 34)
One problem that emerges from this endless succession of black boxes nestling
inside each other is that there is no determinate, final black box. If on opening
one, another is revealed, and this process goes on endlessly, Marres is right in
arguing that Latour doesn’t ultimately provide an answer to the question of
what things, or Being as such, are:
as soon as we are not going to address the question of what is, but we
are instead going to take as our starting point stuff that is happening,
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as soon as you make that shift, in a sense you suspend ontology. (cited
in Latour, et al., 2011, p. 89)
In this sense then we can already see Latour’s approach is not as ambitious as
Heidegger’s: Heidegger is clear that what he is aiming for is an understanding of
the Being of technology.
However, it is worth investigating the structure of Latour’s black boxes a little
further. Referring to Latour’s actors as ‘black boxes’, which usually denotes a
device or system where only the input and output are known but not its inner
workings, might suggest that they are inanimate structures. The interesting point
about Latour’s approach however is that, like Heidegger, he sees humans and non-
human entities interacting with each other in our environment. His emphasis
on the instability of actors as they change to form new alliances consisting of
human and non-human entities offers, at least in the first instance, some intriguing
possibilities for analyzing the relationship between technology and the social.
As we know, the question of technological neutrality hinges on whether we
think technology acts as an independent force (this is the technologically deter-
minist viewpoint in a simplified form) or whether it is a neutral tool that achieves
whatever impact it has through the hands of a human agent (this, again in a sim-
plified form, is the social constructivist viewpoint). Latour’s ANT offers a third
possibility, which he illustrates using the well-known example of the American
National Rifle Association’s statement that “Guns don’t kill people, people kill
people” (Latour, 1999, p. 176f). Although this is not a new example and not
immediately related to ICTS, it is still useful for outlining the main tenets of his
argument. The above slogan was used by the NRA to challenge the argument
of the anti-gun lobby that “Guns kill people”. The latter, Latour argues, is the
materialist viewpoint according to which it is the gun that turns a law-abiding
citizen into a dangerous criminal. The argument advanced by the NRA on the
other hand is that the gun in itself is only a tool, a “neutral carrier of human will”
(ibid., p.177). What Latour proposes is that where the gun and its holder come
together, they form a new actor, a ‘citizen-gun’ or ‘gun-citizen’. This process
is what Latour refers to as ‘technical mediation’ or more specifically, a form of
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technical mediation that he calls ‘translation’, where both actors are modified by
the encounter:
You are different with a gun in your hand; the gun is different with
you holding it. You are another subject because you hold the gun;
the gun is another object because it has entered into a relationship
with you. (Latour, 1999, p. 179)
The interesting possibility Latour opens up here is that we can conceive of techno-
logical objects as combinations of material components and human agency, which
has implications for how we think about the so-called ‘impact’ of technology on
human life. We can think about how this approach applies to our example of
the surveillance camera, for instance. The German supermarket chain Lidl came
under scrutiny in 2008 when it emerged that it had placed its employees under
covert CCTV surveillance, monitoring for instance the frequency of visits to the
toilets and the length of breaks taken (Stern, 2008). From the perspective of La-
tour’s principle of translation, the criminalising feeling experienced by the store
employees once the surveillance became known was not the result of the techno-
logical camera-object but the result of a combined actor consisting of the camera
and the store-manager. The surveillance was carried out neither by the camera,
nor by the manager but by the camera-manager actor.
The advantages of taking this perspective become even clearer when we con-
sider Latour’s other example: that of the speed bump, which in France is also
referred to as a ‘sleeping policeman’, a modification of the road-surface to regu-
late drivers’ speed without the need for a policeman on site - which would be a
more expensive measure. A website run by the International Rubber Products
Exhibition Centre Malaysia (lobbying for the Malay rubber industry) for instance
advertises the speed bump as
designed to have different sizes and shape [sic] to suit the requirements
and place of services. Some are narrow as to deliver a sharp jolt
to vehicle suspension and to gives discomfort when crossing at high
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speed. The wide humps are mainly for further reducing the vehicle
speed due to longer crossing time. (IRPEC, 2002)
The speed bump is a technology with clearly noticeable negative effects - where
the bump is ignored, the likely damage caused to the car is a very real effect of
what is, on the surface, only an inanimate object. Latour’s concept of mediation,
however, allows us to see the speed bump as an assemblage of material and
immaterial actors: The agency of the speed bump can be understood as a complex
of a number of agents ranging from police officers, engineers, politicians and
construction workers to different sorts of materials taken from various places and
times. The speed bump is a certain kind of ‘black box’ or a ‘technical delegate’
that redistributes the absence and presence of these various agents and interferes
directly with the daily life of urban car-humans. (Riis, 2008, pp. 287-288)
What the example of the speed bump demonstrates is that the more complex a
technological object, usually the greater the number of agents or actors involved.
Any technological object can be taken apart to amount to the equivalent of a
pile of screws, nuts and bolts. However, these material components in themselves
don’t amount to anything that we could construe as an ‘evil’ technology - even
a knife or a gun, at a purely material level, cannot be construed as such. The
study of the effects of such technologies becomes meaningful only when we look
at them as combinations of matter, human actors and their intentionalities.
It seems that Latour’s approach of mediation even offers a path out of the
problem perceived by scholars like Emilio Mordini that some technologies could
be perceived as ‘instrinsically evil’. From this perspective, the question whether
a knife is ‘evil or not’ depends on whether it is held by a diner to cut his steak
or whether it is wielded by a murderer. However, technologies like nuclear fusion
could be perceived as evil as they are a threat to nature or are dangerous to
humans. The example that is particularly interesting in this context is that of
biometrics - the use of personal identifiers in microchips embedded in passports,
for instance.
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Latour’s account of technological mediation can thus be applied to even the
largest, most complex technological systems such as the ubiquitous information-
technological infrastructure that is the subject of this thesis. As I have argued
repeatedly and as the NSA revelations have shown, this ubiquity has resulted
in an increasingly global surveillance system where governmental and corporate
surveillance practices intertwine. Building on the work of Deleuze and Guat-
tari, Haggerty and Ericson (2000) thus argue that contemporary surveillance has
a rhizomatic structure (as opposed to the one-way structure suggested by the
Panopticon), and introduce the concept of the ‘surveillant assemblage’ to denote
that
No single technological development has ushered in the contemporary
era of surveillance. Rather, its expansion has been aided by subtle
variations and intensifications in technological capabilities, and con-
nections with other monitoring and computing devices... Much of this
expansion is driven by the financial imperative to find new markets for
surveillance technologies which were originally designed for military
purposes. (2000, pp. 614-615)
As is characteristic of a rhizomatic structure, the surveillant assemblage is de-
centralised and the surveillance operations emanate from “a host of scattered
centres of calculation” (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000, p. 613). So at a structural
level, the surveillant assemblage is particularly suited to thinking in terms of
Latour’s actor-network-theory. As Haggerty and Ericson argue, the assemblage
consists of a “multiplicity of heterogeneous objects, whose unity comes solely
from the fact that these items function together” (Patton quoted in Haggerty &
Ericson, 2000, p. 608). This multiplicity does not only span real technological
objects such as networked computers, store loyalty cards and CCTV cameras,
but also the processes of data collection that occur between those entities, the
purposes (both overt and covert) for which this data is collected, the human
agents involved in operating the systems (for instance the airport security staff
operating body scanners) and at a higher level the individuals and groups with
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vested interests in expanding the scope of the surveillant assemblage for personal
or other gain.
So where Haggerty and Ericson’s concept of the surveillant assemblage grasps
the ubiquity and complexity of contemporary surveillance technologies and prac-
tices, viewing it from the perspective of Latour’s ANT allows us to see how these
factors combine with more immaterial elements to form an actor that can have the
kinds of demonstrable effects we have discussed in this thesis. These immaterial
elements include national and international security laws and the imperatives of
global corporate finance. The question that arises is where, within this structure
of black boxes within black boxes, we can locate the responsibility for the real
and often disastrous consequences the surveillant assemblage has on individuals
and groups, such as the problem of social sorting, and the infringement on the
privacy of individuals through apparently ‘harmless’ social networking features.
5.6.4 Agency and Responsibility
To this question, I argue, Latour provides only a unsatisfactory answer, which is
that the “[r]esponsbility for action must be shared among the various actants”
(Latour, 1999, p. 180). However it is only the logical consequence of the over-
all democratic principles of actor-network-theory where human and non-human
actors combine to form new actors but where, beyond the possibility that a hu-
man actor might exert a more powerful influence over other actors than a simple
object like a hammer, there seem to exist no special privileges for human ac-
tors. Humans, in Latour’s network metaphysics, after all remain only ‘actors’,
they are not ‘beings’ as they are for Heidegger. Where Heidegger’s ontology is
also grounded in the ongoing interaction between human beings and non-human
beings, this interaction is inseparable from the category of human experience.
Despite Heidegger’s emphasis that human being-in-the-world is fundamentally a
being-with, not a being-before or being-over-and-above other beings, the human
being remains the reference point for it could not be otherwise. Heidegger is
aware of the impossibility of raising himself above a reality that he is part of, but
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insists that critical reflection upon our existence and how we interact with other
beings in the world is nevertheless necessary.
When it comes to assessing the impact of contemporary information technol-
ogy on the social, Latour’s approach on the one hand allows us to escape the
simplistic frameworks of technological determinism to shed light on the fact that
any technology is not merely the inanimate object it appears as, but the result
of the combination of human and non-human, material and immaterial forces
working together to produce it as an ‘effect’. On the other hand however, his
insistence that the ‘responsibility’ for the effect generated by any actor in the
network must be shared by its human and non-human components is inconclu-
sive: if any actor is a black box that consists of an endless amount of other black
boxes, responsibility can never determinately allocated.
Ultimately, as Khong (2003) argues, Latour and Heidegger have different so-
lutions to the question concerning technology. In the networks of human and
non-human entities that form their respective ontologies, Latour’s sympathy lies
with the objects, and Heidegger’s with the humans: Latour’s aim is to “liberate
artefacts from their role as alien objects” (p.700). Latour is adamant that this
does not mean
extend[ing] subjectivity to things, to treat humans like objects, to
take machines for social actors, but to avoid using the subject-object
distinction at all. (Latour, 1999, p. 194)
The subject-object distinction is what Heidegger’s ontology is aimed at replacing,
but his solution is not to flatten the two into a single ontological plane where a
human being is affected by the surveillant assemblage, for instance, purely on
the basis of this assemblage being the more powerful actor. Heidegger’s solution,
as Khong points out, is to “minimise our dependence on technological artifacts





To summarise, both Heidegger and Latour have developed an ontology that takes
the shape of a network. Heidegger’s network is populated by Being that is Dasein
(Daseinsmaessiges Sein - human Being) and Being that is not Dasein (Nicht-
Daseinsmaessiges Sein - non human Being). Latour’s network is constituted by
relationships between what are essentially human/non-human hybrid actors.
The first difference that emerged in our analysis is the contrast in dimension-
ality. Heidegger’s multi-layered network results from the hiddenness of Being,
a complexity that withdraws from our engagement with things but that is nev-
ertheless there. As we have seen, this withdrawal is what allows us to engage
with everyday objects in a way that seamlessly integrates them into our every-
day lives. If we encountered the full complexity of the hidden Being of a water
jug, for example, it would obstruct our practical usage of it. At the same time,
this means that we engage with technological objects in an equally non-conscious
way, which makes us less critically minded when it comes to estimating the full
impact of contemporary surveillance. Latour’s network on the other hand is one-
dimensional:21 this means that every node in the network is constituted by its
relations, it is never more than its relations and is fully deployed in them at any
moment in time. Heidegger’s object is deeper than any possible relations to it,
Latour’s object is reducible to its relations. The images in figure 5.4 model the
difference between the two network ontologies, albeit in a simplified way:
The other point where the models diverge from each other is a far more
political one: Heidegger makes a fundamental distinction between the Being of
humans and non-human Being. Latour on the other hand is strictly democratic:
all actors, whether human or non-human, whether real or unreal, exist on the
same plane. As we have seen, this causes problems where a critical analysis of
21I am referring to the network being one-dimensional not in the mathematical sense but in
order to heighten the contrast with the structure of Heidegger’s ontology. In mathematical terms
it is more accurately described as two-dimensional, where Heidegger’s is three-dimensional, as
the former extends along two, the latter along three coordinates.
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Latour’s two-dimensional network Heidegger’s multi-layered network
Figure 5.4: Network Ontologies copyright Graham Creeth
the impact of current information and communication technologies on human
experience is concerned.
Harman has positioned himself at the crossroads between Harman and Latour
and has highlighted the importance of ‘tool-being’ in Heidegger’s ontology. His
argument, however, that Dasein can claim no special status over things that are
ready-to-hand or present-at-hand in the world, is extremely difficult to reconcile
with Heidegger’s own clear words:
Dasein is never to be taken ontologically as an instance or special
case of some genus of entities as things that are present-at-hand. To
entities such as these, their Being is ’a matter of indifference’; or more
precisely, they ‘are’ such that their Being can be neither a matter of
indifference to them, nor the opposite. (Heidegger, 2008, p. 42)
For Heidegger, awareness and concern for one’s own Being is what characterises
us as human beings and is something that is not shared by inanimate structures.
As Dreyfus and Wrathall (n.d.) argue, “[a] chair can’t be alone, or indifferent to
other chairs” in the way a human being can. In fact, it is the very distinctness of
my own human Being and the Being of other humans, in that we both share that
special quality of Dasein, that enables us to feel such a feeling as ‘indifference’ in
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the first place. This is what ‘being-in-the-world’ means and why it is reserved for
Dasein: Other human beings are
entities which not only are quite distinct from equipment and Things,
but which also - in accordance with their kind of Being as Dasein
themselves - are ‘in’ the world in which they are at the same time
encountered within-the-world, and are ‘in’ it by way of Being-in-the-
world. (Heidegger, 2008, p. 118)
Dreyfus and Wrathall put it more simply when they say:
I am indifferent to another person, my indifference as an attitude is
constituted in part by the fact that it is another person to whom I am
indifferent, if I stand by and indifferently watch as you die, this has
a very different character as an act than if I stand by, unconcerned
that a pen has ceased functioning. (Dreyfus & Wrathall, n.d.)
So where Harman points out that “both hammers and Dasein can be viewed from
the outside” and concludes from this that “[l]ike all other entities, Dasein turns
out to be both present-at-hand and ready-to-hand”, this rests on an underspeci-
fication of what is meant by ‘viewing’. If the ‘viewing’ is done by a human being,
this is inseparable from his or her ‘being-in-the-world’ and opens this viewing
up to being full of sympathy, admiration, contempt, etc, emotions that don’t
characterise the co-existence of inanimate matter like pens and stones.
A final example helps prove that the distinction between human and non-
human being is an important one, and this relates strongly to our relationship
with technology. Let us recall our earlier example of the hammer and the table
that are connected to each other through a network of referentialities. Heidegger
is so clear that the humans involved in this network of referentialities have a
different kind of Being to the Being of the hammer that he uses a different term
to denote their linkage point into the network, which is not an ‘in-order-to’ but a
‘for-the-sake-of-which’. This is because the final purpose of the table is to provide
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a place for the family to come together to enjoy a meal and in this sense the table
serves the end of human existence - human being in the world. Visualising once
again the network of referentialities, the chain of ‘in-order-to’s is finite, and it
ends in the human being, because, as Kant argued, the essence of human dignity
is that a human should never be a means, only an end.
The reason this is crucial for understanding our information-technological en-
vironment in terms of Heidegger’s network of referentialities is because it shows
that these technologies need to be judged in terms of the final link that connects
them to human beings, and whether this final link is an ‘in-order-to’ that is in
danger of turning the human being into a means (as is the case with current
surveillance technology), or whether the technology is serving the purpose of sus-
taining Dasein’s mode of existence being-in-the-world. The difference between
the in-order-to and the ‘for-the-sake-of’ is that the former is an instrumental re-
lationship (belonging to beings that have the Being of equipment), the latter a
human one, as Heidegger clearly states when he says: “the ‘for-the-sake-of’ always
pertains to the Being of Dasein” (2008, p. 84). The fact that Harman “flatly
contest[s] that this Worumwillen [for-the-sake-of] is necessarily human” suggests
again that Harman’s perspective is far more Latourian than it is Heideggerian.
The “strange new world” he argues that ‘tool-being’ opens up, where “humans,
dogs, oak trees and tobacco are on precisely the same footing as glass bottles,
pitchforks, windmills, comets, ice cubes, magnets, and atoms” (Harman 2002,
pg.2) is Latour’s world, not Heidegger’s.
So to conclude this section, where in both Latour’s and Heidegger’s ontolo-
gies humans are connected to their technologies (whether it be a hammer or a
computer) via a network of meaningful relationships there is a fundamental dif-
ference as to the status granted to human being in these networks, with profound
consequences for the question of technology. For if the human ceases to exist as
a central point of reference as he can no longer claim any privileged status over a
smart phone - doesn’t the relationship between society and its technologies cease
to be a matter of concern? Isn’t the human being the only ‘concerned’ entity in
the network, also the only one who can problematise this relationship? Heideg-
ger’s specifically human Being, Dasein, allows for this relationship to continue as
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a matter of concern by having defined the human as the only Being that has a
relationship to its own Being.
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Chapter 6
The Essence of Technology is
Nothing Technological: The Rise
of Technological Thinking
6.1 Introduction
[T]he essence of technology is by no means anything technological.
Heidegger, 1977, p. 4
The limitless domination of modern technology in every corner of this
planet is only the late consequence of a very old technical interpretation of
the world, [this] interpretation is usually called metaphysics.
Heidegger quoted in Zimmerman, 1990, p. 166
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6.2 Introduction: Did Someone say ‘Revolution-
ary Technologies’?
In this chapter, we will unravel what Heidegger means by his famously confus-
ing statement that “the essence of technology is nothing technological”. In the
same way that the true challenges the correct, Heidegger’s concept of essence
challenges common-sensical accounts of technology in that it dispenses with the
idea that technology is a mere means to an end. Instead, it draws attention to a
more fundamental, underlying technicality, the origins of which cannot be found
in technology at all but in a way of thinking that operates in terms of means and
ends that Heidegger traces back to the beginnings of Western thinking, to the
metaphysics that forms its very foundations. Heidegger forces us continuously
to break with our established patterns of thought, and applying a Heideggerian
approach to ICTs means challenging what has become the common sense: it
argues against the “revolutionary” nature of digital information and communi-
cation technologies and ‘new media’ specifically, and instead forces us to view
these technologies as the most recent and acute manifestations of the Western
conception of the world, or the Western ‘world picture’ [Weltbild].
What unites most mainstream approaches to ICTs is an emphasis on their
uniqueness and novelty. The enthusiastic accounts of a “digital” or “social me-
dia revolution” taking place, or those lauding the rise of a ‘participatory culture’
(see for instance Jenkins, 2006), all seek to persuade us that networked digi-
tal communications are fundamentally different to their analogue forerunners,
but this emphasis on the altogether transformative nature ICTs can have pro-
found consequences. For instance, it has been argued that both the Orwellian
Big Brother and Foucault’s Panopticon no longer work as metaphors for con-
temporary surveillance: the latter, based on Samuel Bentham’s prison design,
designates the inspection of activities in the perimeter from one central location.
It is aimed at one-directional, top-down surveillance, where it is argued that the
networked structure of contemporary ICTs means we are dealing with more ver-
tical, peer-to-peer and resistive surveillance practices (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000
and for an overview of the challenges to the panoptic metaphor see for instance
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Boyne, 2000). I would argue however, that amidst this emphasis on change there
is always a risk that we might lose sight of the hierarchical power structures that
have remained in place.
A Heideggerian perspective on ICTs allows us to focus precisely on these
continuities because the essence of modern technology does not lie in its novelty.
It lies in its opposite, in a continuum we can trace back to the very origins of
Western civilization. Modern technology, as Lovitt puts it, is only the “coming
into overt expression of a tendency whose true origin lies decisively if hiddenly
in Greek antiquity” (Lovitt, 1977, p. xxiv). This tendency is what I refer to as
“technological thinking”: the tendency of human beings to seek to master their
surroundings, a fundamental ontological disposition that gave rise to modern
science as well as modern technology.
I argue that digital information and communication technologies are the most
recent and acute manifestation of the kind of rationalist, ‘technological’ thinking
that Heidegger sees as characteristic of the Western ‘worldview’. So to fully
grasp Heidegger’s concept of the ‘essence of technology’ it is necessary to engage
with Heidegger’s critique of the Western philosophical tradition. As this critique
arguably spans Heidegger’s whole oeuvre, we need to be selective and focus on
those points that are most relevant to the question of technology - and we need
to bear with him whilst at times he is wading through very deep philosophical
waters. This runs counter to our current culture, where what is worth saying
must fit within 140 characters, the length of a tweet. ICTs operate in terms of
bits and bytes and have arguably contributed towards a discourse of brevity that
has little time for the profound and at times lengthy ruminations of philosophical
argument. However, this is precisely the kind of ends-oriented thinking that
Heidegger seeks to challenge.
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Metaphysics grounds an age.
Heidegger, 1977a, p. 115.
The key to unlocking the distinctiveness of ICTs does not lie in an idea of
progress - in an improvement of mediated communication, however radical - but in
how they manifest a technical conception of the world, and hence of communica-
tion itself. This technical conception is grounded in our metaphysical orientation
towards the world, which Heidegger explores in his essay “The Age of the World
Picture” (1977a). We might regard metaphysics as the most fundamental branch
of philosophy as it is concerned with the first principles of things, and thus with
abstract entities such as time and space. How these first principles are decided is
fundamental, in that they provide the basis for the entire orientation of an age:
Metaphysics, Heidegger insists, is what
grounds an age, in that through a specific interpretation of what is
and through a specific comprehension of truth it gives to that age the
basis upon which it is essentially formed. (Heidegger, 1977a, p. 115).
Physical science, for instance, relies on an idea of time as something that is linear,
and of space as something that extends along three coordinates. Technology is
usually aimed at overcoming their limitations, something that is nowhere more
evident that in the case of digital ICTs: digital recording is an attempt to store
time, social networking sites by ‘connecting’ people globally are an attempt to
bridge physical distance. From Heidegger’s perspective however this is a very
limited conception of distance - a point we will return to.
Metaphysics’ grounding principles form the basis for all other knowledge,
hence their questioning should be the first and most important task of philos-
ophy. Heidegger’s chief criticism of the Western philosophical tradition, and the
starting point for Being and Time, is that it has failed in this basic but most
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fundamental task. Instead of cultivating a critical self-reflexivity, Western phi-
losophy has developed on the premise that human awareness, as a mental state,
precedes everything else. It is the condition upon which an understanding of
ourselves as human beings, and of our surroundings, can be developed, similar
to the way in which the objects in a dark room only become noticeable once a
light bulb has been switched on. This seems natural and inevitable to us, but
Heidegger challenges precisely this inevitability. He wants us to engage with the
consequences of this arguably most fundamental premise of Western thought: the
world having become an object of human consideration.
We need to keep reminding ourselves that we are talking of Western or occi-
dental thought, as there are other and distinctly different traditions of thought
- with other ‘metaphysical’ orientations. Eastern philosophy (Hinduism, Bud-
dhism, Taoism) is in many ways different and has different ideas about the re-
lationship between humans and nature. Here, it is believed that humans only
organise nature into categories for their own benefit - any regularities perceived
in the workings of the world (e.g. the ‘laws of nature’) are in the human mind only.
In contrast to this, Western thought is characterised by its “strongly rationalistic
tendency - an assumption that everything can be accounted for” (Dalai Lama and
Cutler, 1999), precisely the kind of thinking that Heidegger encapsulates with his
concept of the essence of technology.
One widely held view of technology is that it represents the practical ap-
plication of scientific knowledge (see for instance Bunge, 1966 on technology as
“applied science”). Where technology and science are both seen as definitive
characteristics of modernity, technology is seen as putting into practice the prin-
ciples of rationality and objectivity embodied by modern science as “the theory
of the real” (Heidegger, 1977d). In other words, technology derives its objectivity
from the objectivity of science. The binary operating principle of digital ICTs is
the perfect embodiment of this objectivity: in order for digital ICTs to be able
to process information, this needs to be represented as a code sequence of 0s and
1s. Every bit of code is absolute in its value, it has to be either the one or the
other, there is no room for indecisiveness or ambiguity. As the below illustration
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of a simple digital logic gate shows, for every input there is a defined possible






Table 6.1: Digital logic gate
It is telling that logic gates are also referred to as truth gates - they are a
perfect illustration of what Heidegger argues is not truth, but correctness. Cor-
rectness, we have seen, is determined by whether or not a statement agrees with
its object (recall the example of the picture hanging askew). Here there are only
two possibilities:.this is either the case, or it is not. The choice between two
absolute states and the lack of a ‘half-way-solution’ is precisely the principle of
binary logic, as logic gates have only two possible states: either open or closed.
In this sense digital technologies can be seen as an actualisation of the philo-
sophical conflation of truth with correctness. Digital ICTs can thus be seen as
epitomising the embodiment of objectivity which technology derives from modern
science. However, Heidegger challenges this particular way in which technology
has asserted itself as rational and objective by questioning the objectivity of sci-
entific knowledge itself. For Heidegger, science is as much a manifestation of
our metaphysical orientation towards the world as technology, but it is science’s
stronger and more original claim to objectivity that necessitates the investiga-
tion of its very metaphysical assumptions. So in a sense Heidegger is working
backwards. He begins by asking what defines science in order to work his way
through to the essence of science, the scientific mindset. In his search for the
origins of the scientific mindset Heidegger takes us back to the French philoso-
pher Rene´ Descartes. Descartes is often referred to as “the Father of Modern
Philosophy” (Skirry, n.d.), based on his ‘scientific’, mathematical approach to
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basic philosophical questions. Through Heidegger’s analysis we will see, however,
that the ‘modern’ element in Descartes thinking is not so much the introduction
of the ‘scientific method’ into philosophical thought but the laying down of the
principles of modern metaphysics themselves by positing the human, and human
awareness, as the foundation for human existence and experience.
6.4 Calculation as the Essence of Modern Sci-
ence
Modern science, Heidegger argues, seems defined by research. In fact, “research”
itself has become an indicator of the scientific, and by extension of that which
has been tried & tested and can thus be relied upon to be true (we only have to
think of the use of the phrase “research has shown that...” in the marketing of
beauty products, for instance). What has been ‘proven’ by research belongs in the
realm of objective knowledge. But Heidegger asks us to question what objective
knowledge actually consists of. Because it isn’t the case that objectivity is the
automatic and natural the result of scientific research, rather, scientific research
itself decides what objective knowledge is. It does this by arranging the world
into a set of categories which then form the basis for all further knowledge.
In his famous book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn makes a
similar point, arguing that ‘normal science’ establishes itself by setting down
its own terms and then solving problems based on those terms. We might say
that Heidegger’s approach is similarly anti-positivist, meaning it denies that the
human life-world can be quantified and understood in simple causal terms, but
more radically and originally so: from Heidegger’s perspective science, even before
it sets out its concepts and methods, has already defined what is knowable, the
very contours of the world it seeks knowledge about. Heidegger sees in science
the clearest example of
the way in which modern man as subject represents reality. The mod-
ern scientist does not let things presence as they are in themselves.
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He arrests them, objectifies them, sets them over against himself, pre-
cisely by representing them to himself in a particular way.... But this
does not happen simply because nature intrinsically is of this charac-
ter; rather it happens ... specifically because man himself represents
nature as of this character and then grasps and investigates it ac-
cording to methods that, not surprisingly, fit perfectly the reality so
conceived. (Lovitt, 1977, pp. xxvi-xxvii)
So what science does is to arrange the world into a “fixed ground plan” (Grun-
driss), a matrix into which we can then order the knowledge gained by research.
The quantifying, binary logic on the basis of which digital ICTs operate is only
an instantiation of this original scientific matrix. What Heidegger seeks to alert
us to, however, is how even before this matrix is set up, the scientific mind has
always already represented to itself that which it seeks knowledge about. This
is what makes Heidegger’s argument more fundamental than Kuhn’s: before the
scientist decides on how to categorise nature into entities (the elements, for in-
stance), and the processes he will use to interrogate the characteristics of these
entities, he has already committed a much more fundamental act of objectifica-
tion - he has represented the world in a way that places his human mind at the
centre of this representation and everything else at the disposal of his mind.
Typically of Heidegger, he makes his point by stripping down worn-out words
to their original meaning: to re-present actually means placing something before
the mind’s eye, so that it can be fully grasped. The act of re-presentation,
Heidegger emphasises, means “of oneself to set something before oneself and to
make secure what has been set in place” (Heidegger, 1977a, p. 149), and what
we might not realise but what constitutes a crucial point is that it is through
this process that the thing set before oneself becomes available. Heidegger insists
that a thing or concept’s ability to avail itself to this mental grasping is what
constitutes the very condition of existence itself: only what can be made available
in this way is considered “to be in being”:
Knowing, as research, calls whatever is to account with regard to
the way in which and the extent to which it lets itself be put at the
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disposal of representation. ... Only that which becomes object in this
way is - is considered to be in being. (Heidegger, 1977a, pp. 126-127,
emphasis in the original)
Current AI attempts to model the human brain are a prime example of the
correlation that Heidegger draws between the process of mentally availing oneself
of something, seeking to calculate it and placing it under human control: these
attempts are based on the claim that the calculating powers of computers already
far extend our own calculative abilities. Early in 2014, Japanese researchers thus
claimed to have simulated 1 second of human brain activity. This was achieved
using the fourth most powerful computer in the world, with 705,024 processor
cores and 1.4 million GB of RAM, but despite the enormity of this processing
power the simulation took a total of 40 minutes, and only simulated 1% of the
activity taking place in the human brain at any one point (The Telegraph, 2014).
The very first computers were already hyped as man-made brains (ENIAC, the
first general purpose computer developed for American ballistics research, was
referred to in the press as a “Giant Brain”), but now the aim is no longer to
emulate, rather, the brain is used as a yardstick for measuring computing capacity,
which implies that it can be surpassed. The fact that the Japanese’ project aims
were stated as demonstrating the powers of the supercomputer (ibid.) by means of
showing to what extent it is capable of simulating the human brain, demonstrates
the extent of the fetishisation of ICTs’ calculative powers.
From a Heideggerian perspective the very idea of technologically reconstitut-
ing the human brain is part of the very calculative thinking that AI is seeking
to transcend: the human brain is widely acknowledged to be more than its com-
putational faculties, but the attempts to recreate this excess by means of digital
computing technology shows the extent to which our thinking is already thor-
oughly technologised. As we saw in the previous chapter, Heidegger’s argument
that the Being of humans is fundamentally different to the Being of things is
one of the crucial distinctions in his thinking. It is encapsulated in his concept
of Dasein, it is the excess that AI is seeking to recreate but which must forever
escape it.
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6.5 Correct Calculations: How Digital Technol-
ogy Seeks to Manage the Future
Research has disposal over anything that is when it can either calculate it
in its future course in advance or verify a calculation about it as past.
Heidegger, 1977a, pp. 126-127.
For Heidegger, a significant measure of whether the scientific mind has suc-
cessfully availed itself of an object through re-presenting it to itself, is the extent
to which it can then be subjected to calculations about its past, or its future.
It is in this way that both nature and history have come within the domain of
human control: our representing of the natural world and the linear progression
of history as a series of events is a “count ing on” nature, and a “taking account
of history” (ibid., emphasis added). Heidegger’s wording makes it very clear that
our understanding of both these fields of knowledge is essentially calculative in
nature. Heidegger does not explicitly link the idea of calculating the past and
the future to technology, but it is implicit in that he claims that through these
calculations, both nature and history become “set in place”: the German word
used by Heidegger is [gestellt], which is the verb form of Gestell, which is the very
essence of modern technology. The AI example from the previous section showed
how digital ICTs can be used to replicate existing calculations, but in this section
we will explore some of the ways in which the inherently calculative properties of
ICTs are applied to make predictions about the future.
The first computers were designed for military purposes and constituted part
of the Allied war efforts in WWII: Alan Turing’s designs enabled the breaking of
the German Enigma code, but it was ballistics research that capitalised on the
ability of these machines to not only verify calculations about past aspects of
physical reality, but also to calculate its future course. To win the combat in the
air, machines were needed that would be able to calculate the course of missiles
not retrospectively, but with regard to their future position. As Norbert Wiener,
the founder of cybernetics, put it:
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unlike all previously encountered targets, an airplane has a velocity
which is a very appreciable part of the velocity of the missile used
to bring it down. Accordingly, it is exceedingly important to shoot
the missile, not at the target, but in such a way that missile and
target may come together in space at some time in the future. We
must hence find some method of predicting the future position of the
plane. (Wiener cited in Kittler, 1999, p. 260, emphasis added)
All early, room-filling models of digitally operating computers, Alan Turing’s
ACE, the American ENIAC and John von Neumann?s EDVAC, served this pur-
pose. But Kittler points out how the full significance of the ‘Linear Prediction
Code’ developed by Wiener goes far beyond the victory of the Allies in WWII.
Mathematics, he argues, shows how Heidegger?s argument that by being able to
calculate something, we have brought it under control, applies to time itself:
mathematics changed into an oracle capable of predicting a probable
future even out of chaos - initially for fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft
guidance systems, in between the wars for human mouths and the
computer simulations of their discourses. Blind, unpredictable time
... was finally brought under control. (Kittler, 1999, p. 260, emphasis
added)
What Kittler is arguing here in slightly elusive terms is in fact absolutely
crucial to the way in which our current informational matrix functions. As argued
throughout this thesis, beneath the surface of users? benign digital activities lies
an immaterial but pervasive network where the information from these activities
is aggregated in a way that will make it useful to governments and corporations.
Time is a decisive factor in this process: the Business Times for instance espouses
the virtues of a process called “predictive analytics”, whereby users’
past behaviour and complex algorithms [are used] to anticipate future
behaviour by customer segments in a way that cannot be accurately
performed using human intuition (cited in Andrejevic, 2011, p.281).
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Predictive analytics can thus be seen as a commercial application and update of
Wiener’s Linear Prediction Code: In the same way that Wiener’s code allowed the
Allied Forces to target the future position of an aircraft, the predictive analytics
software of software companies like IBM, SAP and Oracle is aimed at managing
a future that does not yet exist.
Both Wiener’s Linear Prediction Code and predictive analytics software are
examples of the calculative approach towards the dimension of time that Heideg-
ger argues is a fundamental characteristic of the scientific mindset. Both rely on
the linear conception of time that makes it possible to “verify a calculation about
it as past” (Heidegger, 1977a, p. 127). Only on this basis are calculations about
the future possible. Heidegger argues that our understanding of time as a succes-
sion of moments, and its division into past, present and future, signifies a limited
understanding of time. As he argues in Being and Time, temporality is infinitely
more complex and can only really be understood from the perspective of human
Being [Dasein’s] own experience of the finitude of its existence, what Heidegger
calls being-toward-death. It is one of the fundamentals that distinguishes human
Being from other Beings, as only Dasein can experience this finality, and thus
death in itself.
The success of Wiener’s code, and of predictive analytics hinges upon the
extent to which the actual future corresponds with its prediction. This is precisely
the idea of truth as correspondence that Heidegger argues is characteristic of the
modern scientific mindset, but which we have identified as a form of truth that
blinds us to its own limitations, and which Heidegger instead labels correctness :
This objectifying of whatever is, is accomplished in a setting-before,
a representing, that aims at bringing each particular being before it
in such a way that man who calculates can be sure, and that means
be certain, of that being. We first arrive at [modern] science ... when
and only when truth has been transformed into the certainty of repre-
sentation. (Heidegger, 1977a, p. 127).
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Heidegger, we noted earlier, challenges the objectivity of science, from which
technology derives much of its legitimacy. Predictive analytics is an example of
how the calculative logic of digital technologies that encapsulates this objectivity
is in fact based on a fundamental misrecognition of truth as correctness.
The risks of a calculative mindset that eschews truth in favour of correctness
became clear when in 2008 the collapse of the Lehmann Brothers investment
bank brought on a global financial crisis. One of the main causes of the crisis,
the effects of which are still being felt six years on, lies in the way that global
financial markets work. As Curtis argues, our global economic system is premised
on the computerised calculation of financial risk: “computers allowed banks to
create complex mathematical models that could predict the risk of making any
loan or investment” (Curtis, 2011). While risk in itself is something banks seek to
avoid, its computerised prediction means “it can be balanced by hedging against
it” (ibid.): this was the success model of the ‘New Economy’, an economy driven
wholly by the logic of computer systems. The financial crisis of 2008 was the
final one in a series of crises around the world that challenged our reliance on
computerised models. All of these had catastrophic consequences for ordinary
people, while the first duty of governments became the rescue of the financial
sectors whose computers had calculated the models in the first place.
The enduring hold of correctness and the extent to which it eclipses alterna-
tives is evidenced by the fact that these obvious failures of computerised banking
have not led to a fundamental change in the system. As Curtis puts it,
we know that the promise of market stability has failed but we can-
not imagine any alternative, the original promise of the Californian
ideology was that the computers would liberate us from all the old
forms of political control and we would become ... heroes in control
of our own destiny ... instead today, we feel the opposite, that we
are helpless components in global system, a system that is controlled
by a rigid logic that we are powerless to challenge or to change... .
(Curtis, 2011)
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Heidegger points us towards a fundamental logic of calculation that is more far-
reaching than the computers that operate according to its principles. It is in the
very nature of the correct that it obscures the very limitations within which it ap-
plies - but it is the contours of these very limitations that, thanks to Heidegger’s
distinction between truth and correctness, are beginning to become more visible.
Beyond these is the wider truth that the objectivity of science and technology de-
rive from the scientific mindset that re-presents what it encounters, objectifies it
and thereby seeks to gain control over it. These tendencies originate in the West-
ern, subjectivistic metaphysical orientation towards the world, which Heidegger
also refers to as the “world picture”.
6.6 The World Picture: a Blueprint for the Dig-
ital Matrix
‘We get the picture’ concerning something does not mean only that what
is, is set before us, is represented to us, in general, but that what is stands
before us ? in all that belongs to it and all that stands together in it - as a
system.
Heidegger, 1977a, p. 129, emphasis added.
In German the term world picture [Weltbild] is in common usage, denoting a
particular way of looking at the world. Heidegger’s aim is to draw attention to the
way this term has become naturalised and to expose its underlying assumptions.
His point is that where this term is used, this usually happens to denote the
ways of thinking that belong to a different culture or religion: it re-presents, and
thus objectifies, the ways of thinking of an Other. For Heidegger, however, to
speak of a world picture implies a certain way of looking at the world that is
precisely foreign to most other cultures, such as that of Medieval Europe, or of
Eastern Buddhism: having a world picture presupposes a person looking on and
organising what he sees in such a way, that it makes sense. The very idea of a
world picture, as Heidegger argues in the above quotation, is that “what is stands
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before us ... as a system” (ibid., emphasis added). Conceiving of the world as a
system, however, is specific to the Western interpretation of the world, and goes
back to the binary opposition between subject and object that forms its very
basis. The essence of technology that is nothing technological reaches back to
this original opposition, and forward to the binary logic of digital ICTs.
The modern interpretation of human Being is rooted in the metaphysics or
‘world picture’ of the French philosopher Ren Descartes (1596-1650). Schooled in
mathematics, he sought to place philosophy once and for all on a firm, scientific
footing by establishing a groundwork for the possibility of knowledge. These
grounds, Descartes argued, lie in the certainty that the thinking mind can have of
its own existence. Where everything else, including the phenomena in the outside
world, including my own body, may be subject to doubt - my thinking mind is
proof of its own existence. This is the meaning of his famous dictum “Cogito
ergo sum”: I think, therefore I am. 22 This proof derives from the certainty of
the thinking mind, rather than from the more general deduction that whatever
thinks must also exist. Human consciousness thus emerges as the condition for
our ability to reflect on our own Being and that of others, or in other words: as
the condition for knowledge about the world.
The problem, according to Heidegger, is that Descartes’ “cogito” supposes
an “I”, a subject, that is external to the world it is reflecting upon (Heideg-
ger, 2008, p. 363). Dasein, for Heidegger, is always already constituted by its
being-in-the-world. The Being-in-ness that characterises Dasein’s mode of Being
contrasts sharply with the positionality that emerges from the priority given to
human consciousness by Western metaphysics: here we are dealing with a Being-
over-and-against-ness. This positionality was again confirmed by the German
philosopher Immanuel Kant’s emphasis on the human subject as a thinking sub-
22Descartes argued that only the activity of thinking proved one’s own existence, walking
for instance would not prove this in the same way as it could be merely an imagined activity.
Similarly, the thinking being can only be proof of its own existence in the precise moment that
thinking is reflected upon. The argument that “I only existed last week because I remem-
ber myself thinking last week” does not hold as this memory too could be a figment of the
imagination.
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ject. Kant endorses the Cartesian “cogito” but takes the thinking and perceiving
mind (it is perceptive in that it perceives itself) as proof of the existence of its sur-
roundings, and the body it occupies, as much as of its own existence. Descartes
on the other hand had argued that nothing in the phenomenological world could
be certain but the existence of one’s own thinking mind (hence his earlier refu-
tation of Aristotle, whose account of the world is eminently phenomenological).
For Kant, the thinking mind accompanies everything that it encounters. For in-
stance: if I say to someone, “there’s a tower” and the other person says “are you
sure?”, I will say “yes I’m sure”, not because I am certain of myself thinking this
thought, but because I am matching what I see against the images of other towers
encountered in the past.23 This mental process for Kant is what constitutes the
logical subject.
From Heidegger’s perspective we can see two problems. Firstly, the mental
process of matching that constitutes the logical subject is essentially an either/or
decision: something is either the case, or it is not. Here lie precisely the origins
of the grounding of modern, scientific logic in the correspondence theory of truth
that Heidegger argues is not truth but correctness. Secondly, Kant’s “thinking
subject? is still determined by the binary subject/object relationship. Heidegger
sees Kant’s fundamental mistake in the failure to recognise that the thinking
subject is “not just an ‘I think’, but an “I think something ’” (Heidegger, 2008, p.
367, emphasis added). The phenomena encountered by the thinking subject are
for Kant what constantly reaffirms its own existence, but it is through this very
role of reaffirming the subject, that they become objectified: the Being of the
world is reduced to mere “presence-at-hand”, already prepared for the straight
lines and shapes that the scientific mind uses to order all these phenomena into
a coherent system.
It is thus clear why for Heidegger, Descartes and Kant mark crucial moments
in the development of Western thinking. They set up the human as subject and
the world as an object for his consideration:
23This example is taken from Be´atrice Longuenesse’s chapter on the difference between
Descartes’ “I am a thing that thinks” vs. Kant’s “I think” (2008), which has been a great help
in untangling the intricacies of this section.
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Man becomes the being upon which all that is, is grounded... the
relational center of that which is as such. (Heidegger, 1977a, p. 128)
The essence of the modern age, and the essence of technology, are rooted in this
process of the human being setting himself up as a conscious subject that is prior
to, and separate from, the world it inhabits. By representing the world in this
way it became knowable, and eventually, calculable. The mode of revealing that
determines modern technology is grounded in this particular metaphysics, where
“nature presents itself as a calculable complex” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 26): only
set up in this way can it be the subject of the “correct determinations” of science
and technology.
This explains why from Heideggerian perspective, it is a paradox to speak of
contrasting “worldviews”. The very act of ‘viewing the world’ is only possible on
the basis of a human subject forming a mental re-presentation of it, thus ordering
it into a coherent whole: the very process which is constitutive of modern Western
thought specifically. In the Middle Ages Being was a divine matter, never “in
the realm of man’s knowing and of his having disposal” (Heidegger, 1977a, p.
130). Being meant being by the grace of God: the place of the human was firmly
within this divine creation and both humans and things were oriented in their
being towards this higher, divine entity. Ancient Greece, Heidegger points out,
also had a different understanding of Being: here beings didn’t come into their
being through being perceived by a human subject, rather, Being opens itself up
or reveals itself to whoever is open to receive it - this is the original meaning of
ale¯theia [truth]. As Heidegger says:
[t]hat which is does not come into being at all through the fact that
man first looks upon it?. Rather, man is the one who is looked upon
by that which is. (Heidegger, 1977a, p. 131)
Both Ancient Greek and Medieval thought placed the human being in a very
different orientation towards the world than our own, scientifically oriented West-
ern philosophy. These different orientations are easily illustrated in a simple di-
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agram (figure 6.1), with the different coloured arrows representing the different
metaphysical orientations:
• Medieval metaphysics: human is oriented towards the divine (green)
• Ancient Greek metaphysics: Being approaches/reveals itself to the human
being (blue)
• Modern metaphysics: human subject approaches world as object (red)
Figure 6.1: Different metaphysical orientations
The point is that only through the particular relationship between humans
and the world that emerged from Western metaphysics, could the way of thinking
develop that Heidegger argues is the essence of modern technology: the calculative
approach to the world that conceives of it in terms of means and ends. By raising
the human being to the status of subject, the world becomes an object for him
to act upon. This binary relationship continuously reinforces itself:
the more extensively ... the world stands at man’s disposal as con-
quered, and the more objectively the object appears, all the more




Digital ICTs, by means of their binary logic, epitomise the objectivity that defines
our modern metaphysical orientation towards the world and, at the same time,
reinforce our status as subjects by their apparent neutrality. We have seen how
governments and corporations reinforce our understanding of these technologies
as neutral means to beneficial ends - in other words, as instruments that we are
in control of. From Heidegger’s perspective, however, this skewed understanding
of technology is symptomatic of the more widespread misrecognition of the ex-
tent to which our understanding of our own Being-in-the-world is determined by
technological thinking. By tracing the contours of the ‘world picture’, Heidegger
helps us expose the contours of this technological thinking.
6.7 Summary
To go further with our reflections might just mean taking much less for
granted about longheld distinctions ... [such as] the boundary between per-
sons and things. Not only has this boundary been progressively blurred
since Descartes and the ontology of the emergent sciences of the 17th cen-
tury. We have accelerated the process insofar as we take for granted that
an instrumental attitude toward things as such, to all things, is normatively
acceptable. ... [T]he Kantian distinction between persons and things, ends
and means, already concedes too much to this process which cannot but bring
about the thing-like instrumentalisation of human nature.
Kompridis, 2009, p. 25, emphasis added
When Heidegger insists that the essence of technology is “by no means any-
thing technological” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 4) he is referring to a technological
way of thinking that has its origins in the Western philosophical tradition. Hei-
degger argues that it is the particular characteristic of Western thinking that
it has turned the human subject into the centre of the universe, the important
consequence being that everything else has been turned into an object for his
consideration and has ultimately come to be at his disposal.
It is for us to make the link between these metaphysical origins of the essence of
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modern technology laid out by Heidegger and our own information-technological
environment, but the organisation of the world into a coherent system that defines
modern metaphysics, is precisely the logic underlying digital technology: in the
way that the former reduces the complexity of human being-in-the-world to a
subject/object relationship, the latter reduces the complexity of the world and
the inherent continuity of human experience to binary code. What Heidegger
allows us to see is that rather than disparate phenomena, they merely constitute
different points along a single trajectory of objectification: the ‘world picture’
thus forms a blueprint for our digital informational matrix.
In the final consequence, the trajectory of objectification however turns upon
itself: objects lose their status as objects and become reduced to pure utility, or
what Heidegger refers to as “standing reserve”. This is the fundamentally Heideg-
gerian insight implicit in Kompridis above observation that we have normalised
an “instrumental attitude towards things as such” (Kompridis, 2009, p. 25). We
have reduced the world to something that can be calculated, manipulated, stored
and called upon to yield productivity at our convenience. Kompridis argues that
within the reign of instrumentality the “instrumentalisation of human nature” it-
self (ibid.) has become inevitable. In drawing the links between the metaphysical
origins of the essence of modern technology laid out by Heidegger, and our own
information-technological environment, we will see that within the digital matrix
human beings are indeed becoming part of the “standing reserve”.
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Chapter 7




Tracing the rise of ‘technological thinking’ in the previous chapter has highlighted
how the technological mode of revealing the world is never the consequence of our
technologies - it is in every way prior to them. However, it is precisely the extent
to which instrumental thinking has become “normatively acceptable”, as Kom-
pridis (2009, p. 25) suggests, that prevents an appropriate questioning of our own
technological environment and the kind of “collective deeper reflection” on what
is “fundamental to our humanity” (ibid.) that are needed in the face of techno-
logical realities such as mass surveillance. Heidegger’s network ontology, traced
in chapter five, exposed how the instrumental ideology of technology further pre-
vents such reflection by being able to exploit the ontological “readiness-to-hand”
of equipment: technological objects, in carrying out their purpose, acquire what
Gunkel (2009) refers to as an “instrumental transparency” - they withdraw behind
their immediate purpose. Behind the network of referentialities and its mutual
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imbrications between humans and technological structures, the ontological depth
of these structures withdraws, and so does their essence.
In this final section of the analysis, I want to focus on what it is that with-
draws from our everyday engagement with our technological environment, pre-
cisely through our everyday, instrumental way of engaging with it. This is what
Heidegger calls the hidden essence of technology that is “in itself nothing techno-
logical”. The preliminary definition we offered in the preceding chapter was of an
attitude to the world driven by instrumentalist considerations. In this final part
of our analysis of Heidegger’s thinking on technology I will focus on the concept
of essence, which in modern technology emerges as pure instrumentality, stripped
of any of the meaningful relationships that characterise authentic human being-
in-the-world. This essence of instrumentality that turns out to be a deeper, more
expansive instrumentality, is what Heidegger calls the ‘Gestell ’.
Heidegger’s concept of the Gestell is key to his understanding of modern
technology, but it has been criticised for being vacuous and fatalistic - like much
of this thinking on technology, which I have tried to disprove. Heim for instance
refers to it an “ominous and threatening” speculation, “an abstraction looming
like a metaphysical sphinx, terrorizing thought with a puzzling lack of specificity”
(1993, p. 57). I will argue, however, that it is precisely the abstract qualities
of the concept of the Gestell that lend themselves so well to a critique of our
current information-technological environment, situated as it is at the crossroads
between the material and the immaterial, between tangible technological objects
like smart phones and smart cards, and the data that flows invisibly between
them. I will first discuss where the concept of the Gestell fits in with Heidegger’s
overall account of technology, then we will turn our attention to the particular
features of ICTs that it helps to illuminate.
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7.2 The Gestell: the Revealing of Modern Tech-
nology
What is modern technology? It too is a revealing. Only when we allow
our attention to rest on this fundamental characteristic does that which is
new in modern technology show itself to us.
Heidegger, 1977, p. 14
Heidegger’s concept of the Gestell is usually translated as ‘enframement’, I
would argue however that this is an example of where the English translation
evokes associations that are not present in the German original. The two most
common meanings of ‘Gestell’ in German are a construction of wooden planks or
metal bars, or a solid frame that might be part of a piece of machinery (others
include the frame of a pair of glasses, or in the vernacular, a very thin person or
in hunting, a clearing in a forest). In either case the term denotes an object of
a structural nature, not a process, as Lovitt suggests in a footnote (Heidegger,
1977, p.19): the English ‘enframing’ foregrounds the act of ‘framing something
in’ or ‘enclosing’ something, which is arguably much stronger. More importantly
however, the English translation as ‘enframing’ misses the fact that the term
Gestell shares etymological roots with “bestellen” (“to cultivate”, in the agricul-
tural sense) and ‘stellen’ (“to place”). This etymological connection is crucial, as
it highlights that the Gestell and ‘bestellen’ are both modes of revealing - Hei-
degger’s point is that the nature in which this revealing unfolds is different. In
order to emphasise this I will use the original German ‘Gestell’, rather than its
English translation of ‘enframement’.
The essence of modern technology, it should be clear by now, is not to be found
in technological artefacts and/or practices, but in the mode of engagement with
the world around us that is expressed by that particular technological artefact or
practice. This ‘engaging with’ is what Heidegger refers to as ‘revealing’, but in
order to grasp the specific nature in which modern technology ‘reveals’ the world
around us, and what this tells us about the nature of ICTs, we should first clarify
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what Heidegger actually means by ‘revealing’. Here Heidegger once again takes
us back to the thinking of the Greeks, where the original meaning of things can
often be found as yet uncorrupted by subsequent translations and modifications
undertaken in the course of Western philosophy.
Where Heidegger uses the word ‘revealing’, he does so to emphasise that it is
a process of ‘bringing something forth’ out of the hiddenness of its Being, out into
the open so that it can be see for what it truthfully and originally is. It rests upon
the ontological premise that the true Being of things is hidden from our everyday
knowledge and engagement with our surroundings and needs to be brought out
of this concealed state. For instance, while the statue of Michelangelo’s ‘David’
might have been slumbering in the block of marble, it needed first to be brought-
forth as such by the artist. Revealing, as Heidegger points out, is a form of the
Ancient Greek concept of poie¯sis, a “bringing-forth [that] brings hither out of
concealment forth into unconcealment” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 11). The point that
is important in the current context of thinking about technology, is that there
are various modes of bringing-forth or poie¯sis. The purest and most original form
of revealing we find in nature (physis), which brings things like trees and flowers
into being out of itself. In contrast to this, Heidegger argues
what is brought forth by the artisan or the artist ... has the burst-
ing open belonging to bringing-forth not in itself, but in another (en
allo¯i), in the craftsman or artist. (1977, pp. 10-11, emphasis in the
original)
This kind of revealing that requires the involvement of a human actor, such as
the artist who brings forth the statue out of a piece of marble, or the craftsman
who carves a tool from a piece of wood, is what is meant by the Ancient Greek
concept of techne¯ (craft), the root of our word ‘technology’. Thus, because of
this original connection between the bringing forth of the artist or craftsman and
the bringing forth of nature, both being forms of poie¯sis, Heidegger insists that
“[t]echnology is ... no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing” (1977, p.
12).
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Revealing holds true for every kind of technology, from the most primitive
chisel (used by the craftsman to create his marble statue) and the hammer (used
by the carpenter to drive nails into planks of wood to build his table), through
to the most sophisticated modern technological equipment - Heidegger’s example
is the hydroelectric power station, but we can just as easily substitute something
we can more easily relate to, such as our own personal computer or smartphone.
As Heidegger notes in the quote at the beginning of this section, modern tech-
nology “too is a way of revealing” - both the hydroelectric power station and our
smartphone are ways of bringing-forth. At the same time, however, Heidegger
acknowledges that there seems something very out of place about the idea that
the work of the craftsman and modern high-tech processes like those we engage
in via power plants or computers should be the same thing:
one can object that it [revealing] ... might apply to the techniques of
the handcraftsman, but that it simply does not fit modern machine-
powered technology. And it is precisely the latter and it alone that
is the disturbing thing, that moves us to ask the question concerning
technology... . (Heidegger, 1977, pp. 13-14)
This obstacle raised by Heidegger runs counter to a number of contemporary
accounts of media and information technologies, and especially the internet, that
seek to place these technologies within the very same domain as craftsmanship.
Drawing on Ivan Illich’s concept of ‘tools for conviviality’ and the ideas of the
Arts and Crafts movement, Gauntlett (2011) for instance views the internet as a
shared social space, thriving on the creativity of its many users who are creating
and sharing content in much the same way that traditional craft activities have
been bringing people together for centuries, through the simple process of ‘mak-
ing things’. Similarly Chris Anderson, one-time editor of Wired magazine, has
diagnosed a movement of ‘Makers’ that are using the internet as a stepping stone
towards a “Web-like future” characterised by “ever-accelerating entrepreneurship
and innovation with ever-dropping barriers to entry” (cited in Morozov, 2014).
While the growing number of online DIY forums and similar sites might seem
to lend support to Gauntlett’s argument, from a Heideggerian perspective the
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pointing to the proliferation of such groupings could be read as the triumph of
the correct over the true. As Morozov points out, there is a short-sightedness to
such fetishisation of tools and the faith placed in their ability to lead us towards
a better society. Quoting the libertarian socialist Murray Bookchin, he suggests
that it “doesn’t make sense to speak of ‘convivial tools’, ... without taking a close
look at the political and social structures in which they [are] embedded? (ibid.).
While for Heidegger the fundamental process of making might connect online
creative acts with earlier ways of making things, there is a fundamental difference
in the way this making is carried out that we can understand by looking at his
concept of revealing. The point for Heidegger is that even though modern tech-
nology is just as much as revealing as traditional handcraft technology, the way
in which it approaches its object to bring forth into being its ultimate purpose,
is fundamentally different, in that
the revealing that holds sway throughout modern technology does not
unfold into bringing-forth in the sense of poie¯sis. The revealing that
rules in modern technology is a challenging [Herausfordern], which
puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that
can be extracted and stored... . (Heidegger, 1977, p. 14, emphasis
added)
The revealing that takes place through modern technology, Heidegger insists, is
no longer a poie¯sis and akin to the revealing that occurs in nature or at the hands
of the craftsman or artist, but is described as a challenging approach and as such
is alienated even from the original roots of technology in Ancient Greek techne¯.
In order to comprehend Heidegger’s juxtaposition between revealing as bringing-
forth and revealing as challenging, let us imagine two contrasting scenes: first,
let us imagine a farmer ploughing a field, the plough being dragged by a horse,
with the farmer pushing along from behind. It is possible to imagine the snorts
of the horse and the grunts of the farmer under their heavy labour, the boots
of the farmer thick with mud and his shirt drenched with sweat. In our minds
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we can add more details to the scene, such as the smell of earth mingled with
animal and sweat, and the blisters on the farmer’s hands and his aching limbs
after a day’s work on the fields. If we imagine, on the other hand, a modern
agricultural scene, many of these ‘earthy’ details will be missing: the farmer will
still be there but he won’t be trudging through the field but sat high above it,
controlling the leavers of a modern agricultural vehicle. The smells of sweat and
horse are replaced with diesel fumes. The yield of a day’s labour will be much
greater of course, but the point for Heidegger is that technological innovation has
removed us from what we are engaging with. Thus the tall and imposing vehicles
of modern agriculture that raise the farmer high above the field that is the source
of his livelihood, are emblematic of the progressive distancing that characterises
the course revealing has taken. Where a simple implement like a horse-driven
plough or even a spade still allows for intimate contact between the human and
the earth, modern agricultural equipment distances the human from his envi-
ronment. The ‘earthy’ details described in the first scene (the mud and sweat)
are emblematic of the harmonious nature of the relationships between humans
and their surroundings and thus the first scene is in keeping with Dasein’s mode
of being as a being-in-the-world. The second scene on the other hand speaks
of a severance of this original connectedness, marked by increasing instances of
technological mediation.
Another way of marking this contrast is to consider the difference between
the works of art below, the first being Van Gogh’s well-known painting of a pair
of peasant boots (figure 7.1), the second Andy Warhol’s black and white print
Diamond Dust Shoes (figure 7.2).
We can first contrast these works at the level of the medium in which they
are executed. The first is an oil-painting, the singular presence of which in time
and space imbues it with what Walter Benjamin refers to as ‘aura’ in his famous
essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Technical Reproduction” (Benjamin, 2008
[1936]). Warhol’s work on the other hand, Diamond Dust Shoes (1980) is pre-
cisely the opposite, a screenprint that is intended to be reproduced, preventing
its unique existence in time and space. Thus multiple versions of the above exist
in different colourings. Warhol’s work exploits, albeit in a critical sense, the very
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Figure 7.1: Vincent van Gogh: A Pair of Shoes (1886)
idea of mass production that is the subject of Benjamin’s essay on photography,
a point that is heightened by the irony of its title. Warhol’s shoes, in contrast
to van Gogh’s, are precisely not unique. They are devoid of any sense of their
owner’s identity, reduced to anonymous objects, echoing the theme of mass pro-
duction that is at the heart of Warhol’s work.
The depth of the contrast between Warhol’s pile of anonymous shoes and van
Gogh’s peasant boots reveals itself when we consider the following passage from
Heidegger’s “Origin of the Work of Art” essay, where he describes the van Gogh’s
painting:
From out of the dark opening of the well-worn insides of the shoes the
toil of the worker’s tread stares forth. In the crudely solid heaviness
of the shoes accumulates the tenacity of the slow trudge through the
far-stretching and ever-uniform furrows of the field swept by a raw
wind. On the leather lies the dampness and richness of the soil. ...
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Figure 7.2: Andy Warhol: Diamond Dust Shoes (1980)
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The shoes vibrate with the silent call of the earth... This equipment
is pervaded by uncomplaining worry as to the certainty of bread,
wordless joy at having once more withstood want, trembling before the
impending birth, and shivering at the surrounding menace of death.
This equipment belongs to the earth... . (1971c, p. 14, emphasis in
the original)
For Heidegger, van Gogh’s peasant boots are full of reverberation of the fullness
and complexity of the world wherein human Dasein is fully embedded. The shoes
depicted in Warhol’s work, by contrast, are imbued with a sterile detachedness
from their wearer and the context of their use, an anonymity that is augmented
by its technical reproduction.
This point was also made by Jameson, for whom Warhol’s work epitomises
the “depthlessness” of postmodernism, where the substance of works like van
Gogh’s is hollowed out from within (Jameson, 1991). Arguably, however, today’s
cultural logic suffers from an even more radical surface-level superficiality. The
“Well Worn” line of the Converse lifestyle footwear brand presents an even more
acute contrast to Heidegger’s peasant boots: here, a mass-produced object is
artificially imbued with a sense of wornness - the very traces that, if authentic
and not produced within the sterile environment of an assembly line - would make
it unsellable. The stamp “Well Worn” constitutes a Baudrillardian simulacrum:
a copy without an original, which by placing it side by side with van Gogh’s
peasant boots and Warhol’s Diamond Dust Shoes, shows up the trajectory of
progressive withdrawal that marks technological revealing.
7.3 Withdrawal from Withdrawal: the “Con-
nectivity” of ICTs
Both the juxtaposition of traditional peasant’s labour with modern-day agricul-
ture, and that between van Gogh’s painting of the peasant boots with Warhol’s
Diamond Dust Shoes and today’s example of Converse’s “Well Worn” range
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demonstrate that technological development has occurred along a trajectory of
progressive distancing: Heidegger’s point is that wherever we use technology to
engage with the world, we are doing so in an indirect way - in other words, tech-
nology might help us perform a task more effectively, but at the same time, it
also removes us from what we are engaging with. This progressive distancing
that occurs with the increasing sophistication of technology is what Heidegger
refers to as withdrawal from authentic Being. This concept describes how hu-
man being-in-the-world changes when revealing begins to manifest itself in the
shape of the Gestell, and is particularly useful for thinking about how media
and communications technologies shape the process of communication, arguably
a fundamental component of human being-in-the-world.
In the context of digital ICTs, withdrawal paradoxically manifests itself as
the very connectivity that is fetishised by uncritical new media discourse. To
understand this Heideggerian insight, it is useful to consider a simple example
of technologically mediated communication: for instance, a conversation over the
telephone is mediated in the sense that a technological implement has lodged
itself between two human beings. While this device enables two people living
at opposite ends of the globe to “connect” with each other, the complexity of
the reality of human communication is compressed into a mediated exchange
that either person can choose to terminate at his or her will by putting down
the receiver. Media technologies, Heidegger notes, give us the impression of
reducing distance, but leave us unaware of how they have changed our idea of
what communication, that fundamental aspect of Dasein, is:
All distances in time and space are shrinking. Man ... now receives
instant information, by radio, of events which he formerly learned
about only years later, if at all. ... Distant sites of the most ancient
cultures are shown on film as if they stood this very moment amidst
today’s street traffic... . The peak of this abolition of every possi-
bility of remoteness is reached by television, which will soon pervade
and dominate the whole machinery of communication. Man puts the
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longest distances behind him in the shortest time. He puts the great-
est distances behind himself and thus puts everything before himself
at the shortest range. Yet the frantic abolition of distance brings no
nearness; for nearness does not consist in shortness of distance. (Hei-
degger, 1971, p. 163, emphasis added)
The way in which Heidegger problematizes our ideas of distance poses an open
challenge to McLuhan’s argument that electric media have brought about a
‘global village’, an argument that resonates in the optimistic accounts of the
global connectivity of “social media”.
Of the buzzwords that accompanied the rise of Web 2.0, the concept of “social
media” is one of the most ideological: a prime example of the “wholesale transfer
of value systems” between academic and commercial discourses that characterises
commentary on the internet more generally (Cavanagh, 2007, p. 6). By describ-
ing the rise of digital communication networks in terms of sociality, it reinforces
the dichotomy between “old” and “new media”, suggesting a strange a-sociality
in the case of the former and constructing a view of the latter as fundamentally
inclusive and geared towards the communicative needs of their users. As Van
Dijk argues, “the very word ‘social’ associated with media implies that platforms
are user centered and that they facilitate communal activities, just as the term
‘participatory’ emphasises human collaboration” (2013, p. 11). The social net-
working site Facebook is an excellent example of the readiness of businesses to
jump on the ‘connectivity bandwaggon’: on its start page (figure 7.3), it promotes
itself as “help[ing] you connect and share with the people in your life”:
By presenting itself as an aid in this way (note the use of the word “help”),
Facebook is reinforcing its status as a tool, a neutral platform where its users can
feed their desire for connectedness. However, what is being constructed here as
a primordial human need, is in fact an invention of the ideological complex sur-
rounding new media, where needs are created by technological innovation (Apple
is another prime example) and fed by techno-evangelist rhetoric. From a Heideg-
gerian perspective, the innate instrumentality of digital communication networks
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Figure 7.3: Facebook start page
arguably reverts connectivity into its opposite, in a way that is similar to how
Converse’s “Well Worn” trainers relate to van Gogh’s peasant boots.
Social media like Facebook indeed allows us to form “connections” with people
around the globe, giving us access to their status updates, photographs, and other
material posted on their ‘walls’, and vice versa, at least to the extent that we
have decided to make these available through our privacy settings. Referring
to these connections in terms of “friendships” suggests they are extensions of
previous forms of sociality, however, the actual content of our online activities
demonstrates the extent to which the virtue of connectivity is a simulacrum: a
copy without an original. For instance, the documenting of key stages in the lives
of our children from the first scan is something that happens without their explicit
permission, thus undermining their privacy and potentially affecting their future
lives in as yet unforeseeable ways. The point is that social media have contributed
to a fetishisation of “connectivity” that is ideologically grounded in a primary
human connectedness - precisely Heidegger’s idea of Being-in-the-world. This
fetishisation however obscures the innate instrumentality that underlies these
forms of networked communication, and that is grounded not in Being-in-the-
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world but in its reduction to mere readiness-to-hand.
The extent to which our concept of connectivity is determined by instru-
mentality becomes apparent when considering another example: the dating app
“Tinder” for smartphones. It connects with a user’s Facebook profile to be able
to provide pictures for other users to view. As Tinder uses GPS, a registered user
will only see the pictures of people registered in their geographical area. Figure
7.4 is a screenshot of the Tinder start page.
Figure 7.4: Tinder start page
A person registered on Tinder will be presented with a stream of pictures of
other registered users that have been selected for compatibility, based on their
geographical location, social networks and interests (all this data is collected
from a user’s Facebook profile). The user can then sort the ‘candidates’ into two
categories depending on whether they appeal at first sight or not, by ‘swiping’
them either to the left (where the red cross is located), or the right (where the
green heart is located). Tinder’s slogan is “It’s how people meet”, but I would
argue that the instantaneous sorting of human beings into categories similar to
Facebook’s ‘like button’ (a ‘dislike’ button has been frequently requested but is
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as yet not available) amounts to a reduction of what Heidegger argues is distinct
about human Being. To use a term we discussed at length in chapter five, the ease
with which a person can be swiped into a pile of ‘possibles’ or ‘rejects’ signifies a
reduction of humans to pure readiness-to-hand.
The problem with describing social media in terms of connectivity, a discourse
that is reinforced by the marketing rhetoric used by the networks themselves is
not just that they rely on a very limited, instrumental understanding of connec-
tivity. A more serious consequence is that our general ideas of communication
are being shaped by these limited, technologised parodies of Heidegger’s idea
of human Being-in-the-world. For Heidegger, this is one of the dangers associ-
ated with the essence of modern technology: a blindness to the ways in which
our thinking is already determined by the logic of instrumentality. Social media
highlight how technological revealing is not a connecting, but rather its opposite:
withdrawal. As Taylor and Harris (2005) argue, it is in the very nature of tech-
nological withdrawal from Being to obscure the extent of this withdrawal. So it
happens, as we have seen in the examples of Facebook and Tinder, that precisely
through fetishising connectivity digital ICTs achieve its opposite, or what we can
be described as ‘withdrawal from withdrawal’.
7.4 The Exploitative Tendencies of the Gestell:
a De-objectification of Objects
Heidegger emphasises that any kind of technology is a mode of revealing. At the
same time, as we have seen, there are different modes in which revealing can take
place. The ploughing of the field by traditional means and through use of modern
agricultural machinery differ in the degrees of separation they incur between
Dasein and the world. In the previous section we have seen how these instances of
‘withdrawal’ can be mapped onto media and information technologies to highlight
how their emphasis on connecting people masks an underlying process whereby
the meaning of connectedness itself is being called into question. The revealing
that takes place through modern technology has another tendency however, and
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one that is of particular significance for digital media and information technologies
and social networks in particular: what is revealed according to the logic of the
Gestell is not revealed in order to expose its true Being, as for instance in the
case of Michelangelo’s David, which was revealed from the block of marble in the
sense that his figure was already slumbering within it. Where revealing takes
place according to the Gestell, it approaches its object according to a logic of
exploitation, of minimum expenditure and maximum gain.
The concept of exploitation is one evoked by Karl Marx in his critique of capi-
talism, and is still used in this sense to denote the “extraction of unpaid, coerced,
and alienated labour” (Andrejevic, 2011, p. 278). I will argue that Heidegger’s
critique of technology mobilises a similar concept, one that however is not exclu-
sively aimed at the labour power of human beings and the alienation of human
beings from the product of their labour. It is not limited to human beings at all
but at the world as a totality. Heidegger’s concept of exploitation is thus much
broader than the Marxist conception of it, because it represents the ultimate
consequences of an instrumentality that is grounded in the modern metaphysical
interpretation of the world. From this perspective, Marx’s concept of exploita-
tion becomes part of the Heideggerian conception of exploitation, and in the
following sections I will explore the ways in which the exploitation and surveil-
lance in the informational economy can be understood within the frameworks of
a Heideggerian notion of exploitation. Marxist approaches to the study of ICTs
could thus benefit from engaging with Heidegger, as his ontological account of
technology could bring to these approaches the kind of deeper understanding of
the complexities of our technological reality that they frequently lack.
To ground a Heideggerian notion of exploitation in his critique of technological
thinking, let us for a moment return to his comparison of traditional agricultural
practices with modern, industrialised agriculture. This time Heidegger draws our
attention to the way in which different modes of revealing act upon their object:
The field that the peasant formerly cultivated and set in order [bestellte]
appears differently than it did when to set in order still meant to take
care of and to maintain. The work of the peasant does not challenge
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the soil of the field. In the sowing of the grain it places the seed in
the keeping of the forces of growth and watches over its increase. But
... the cultivation of the field has come under the grip of another kind
of setting-in-order, which sets upon [stellt] nature. It sets upon it in
the sense of challenging it. (Heidegger, 1977, p. 15).
The point that bringing-forth (poie¯sis) and challenging are two kinds of revealing
and as such emanate from the same source, as it were, but that they are at
the same time so fundamentally different, is much more obvious in the German
original: the peasant’s ‘setting in order’ of the field is a bestellen, where the
‘setting upon’ of modern agricultural techniques is a stellen - the two concepts
have the same etymology. This simultaneous convergence and divergence of the
two modes of revealing is another example of the prime importance of etymology
for Heidegger in revealing the true nature of phenomena. As I argued earlier, the
common etymological root of bestellen and stellen emphasises that both are types
of revealing. This common root gives to both processes a common grounding and
origin, but at the same time opens up a space for exploring the different ways
in which revealing can unfold, e.g. by means of exploitation, or what Heidegger
also refers to as ‘challenging’ or ‘setting upon’.
Where revealing takes place as a ‘challenging’, whatever is revealed also
changes. For instance, the field ploughed by the peasant and the horse vs. the
field ploughed through modern agricultural machinery are no longer one and the
same field. The former is the source of the peasant’s livelihood in the purest sense
of the term, the site of his toil and sweat that as such commands that he treat it
with respect, that he take care of it and maintain it, as Heidegger argues above.
The field of the farmer in the modern agricultural scene on the other hand is a
resource from which something of value is extracted, but what is extracted is not
connected to the peasant in the same way as where it is the sweat of his manual
labour that extracts it, rather it is already destined to be processed further so
that its value may increase. The point for Heidegger is that wherever something
is approached in the mode of ‘challenging’, it is hardly even still an ‘object’, as
this suggests something that stands alone with intrinsic value.
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The examples Heidegger uses to make his point often strike us as archaic -
which might lend support to criticisms that Heidegger harbours a desire for a
return to pre-technological. The frequent references to peasant life do seem to
indicate a tendency towards what Taylor (2014) describes as ‘vo¨lkitsch’, but as we
saw earlier, Warhol’s pop art work Unique Shoes echoes and augments Heidegger’s
point. The full extent of the de-objectification of the object that Heidegger argues
is characteristic of the Gestell is arguably explored by Baudrillard in his concept
of the totalitarian semiotic order. In the System of Objects he explains how in
today’s heavily mediated environment, the commodity is no longer imbued with
value in the Marxist sense, rather, it acts as a mere signifier in the semiotic
sense but without a referent. For Baudrillard consumer society is devoid of real
objects - what we have instead are simulacra, signifiers without a signified. The
success of the Mac computer brand is an example of this semiotic order - what
we consume is not the object but the brand, the latter “full of signification but
empty of meaning” (Baudrillard, 2001, p. 17). Baudrillard’s semiotic order takes
Benjamin’s point about technical reproduction and makes it total, and thus, can
be understood as an updating of Heidegger’s ontologically grounded concept of
the Gestell. These clear conceptual links show the depth of Heidegger’s insight
when we see past its ‘vo¨lkitsch’ associations.
Thus returning to Heidegger, what is approached in the mode of the ‘chal-
lenging’ is not left to stand for or by itself to unfold whatever usefulness it might
have, but is already ‘switched’ into a cycle of further processing. To emphasise
the object-lessness of whatever is ‘switched’ into this cycle, Heidegger introduces
the concept of the Bestand. This is usually translated into English as ‘standing
reserve’, but what this translation passes over is the fact that Bestand contains
the word ‘stehen’ - to stand, and thus harks back to the way in which humans and
things stand in the world. An object, for instance, in German is ‘Gegenstand’,
that which stands against us. Heidegger’s point that an object absorbed by the
Gestell “no longer stands over against us as object”, it has a new kind of stand-
ing that is hardly even still a standing as this implies a degree of uprightness,
of independence. Any such uprightness is however flattened or levelled by the
Gestell:
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Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at
hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further
ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this way has its own standing.
We call it the standing-reserve. (1977, p. 17)
As Lovitt points out in his footnote on the translation of Bestand (Heidegger,
1977, p. 17), Bestand (standing-reserve) thus contrasts with explicitly with
Gegenstand (object), a point that is lost in the English translation.
It is the principle of the Gestell that its revealing is a challenging, and in
thus challenging whatever is revealed is revealed as standing-reserve. Heidegger
provides a number of examples of how revealing as challenging changes the nature
of the thing that is revealed. For instance, he argues that the Rhine river that is
the topic of H’´olderlin’s poem is not the same as the Rhine that is “set upon” by
being “dammed up into the power plant” (ibid, p. 16). Where the former reveals
the river in the mode of poie¯sis as an object of beauty, the latter reveals it as the
source of water power. While Heidegger admits that in both cases “perhaps” the
Rhine remains “still a river in the landscape” (ibid.), its ontological status has
been fundamentally changed. It is already integrated into a cycle of processing
and storage that functions according to the principle of efficiency, of minimum
input and maximum output. The Rhine is part of a cycle of processing that
involves the water power supplier, the plant they have built into the Rhine to
extract from it the necessary energy and even the humans receiving the power -
however, they are not readers of Hlderlin’s hymn, admiring the flow of this great
river but they have become consumers of the water’s energy. The Gestell has
thus changed the relationship between the river and Dasein from a respectful
coexistence to one of pure utility:
The hydroelectric plant is set into the current of the Rhine. It sets
the Rhine to supplying its hydraulic pressure, which then sets the
turbines turning. This turning sets those machines in motion whose
thrust sets going the electric current for which the long-distance power
station and its network of cables are set up to dispatch electricity. In
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the context of the interlocking processes pertaining to the orderly dis-
position of electric energy, even the Rhine itself appears as something
at our command. (Heidegger, 1977, p. 16)
Nature isn’t approached as the habitat of Dasein within which it is with other
beings according to its original and authentic mode of being, but instrumentally in
that it constitutes a resource that can be mined for profitability. It is important,
however, that where both the field that is ploughed using modern agricultural
machinery and the Rhine that is mined for its capacity to supply water power have
been rendered ‘standing reserves’ and “at our command” as the above passage
suggests, this is not seen as the result of the innovations of the technological
instruments that are used in either case. Rather, as I argue in the following
section, the Gestell is the ultimate realisation of the technological thinking that
emerged with the Western philosophical tradition, the effects of which Heidegger
can help us trace in our current information-technological environment.
7.5 The Gestell as the Ultimate Realisation of
Technological Thinking
Heidegger argues that “[w]hatever stands by in the sense of standing-reserve no
longer stands over against us as object” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 17). We noted earlier
Heidegger’s agreement with the fact that both the river Rhine in Hlderlin’s poem
and the river Rhine that is ‘set upon’ by the water power company remain a river
running its course through the landscape, so how does this sit with his insistence
that the latter, rendered standing-reserve, loses its status as ‘object’? This is an
important question, because it links back to Heidegger’s critique of the Western
philosophical tradition which, as we argued in chapter 6, is based on its setting
up of the world as ‘object’ for a human subject to engage with, understand and
ultimately control.24 The explanation is that the finitude of objects that is a
24From the perspective of Heidegger, Western philosophy might have come to the agreement
that the domain of the noumenon or the ‘thing in itself’ is unknowable as human experience is
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requirement of ‘objectification’ is transcended, as it were, by the tendency of the
Gestell to switch whatever it approaches into a cycle of further transformation
with the purpose of unlocking from it its maximum utility. As Heidegger argues,
The revealing that rules throughout modern technology has the char-
acter of a setting-upon, in the sense of a challenging-forth. That chal-
lenging happens in that the energy concealed in nature is unlocked,
what is unlocked is transformed, what is transformed is stored up,
what is stored up, in turn, distributed, and what is distributed is
switched about ever anew. (Heidegger, 1977, p. 16, emphasis added)
Where objects are “switched about ever anew” in a cycle of transformative pro-
cesses to unlock from them their utility, they lose their status as object and
become standing-reserve.
Here again we can draw links to Baudrillard’s ‘system of objects’ - for Bau-
drillard modern consumer society has ceased to unlock even ‘utility’ from objects
- they have been reduced to mere signifiers. Baudrillard uses the example of
the car to explain how what we purchase is no longer an object that serves our
needs as individuals, but a category of object that reinforces our belonging to a
particular social category: objects, he argues, have become “categories of objects
which quite tyrannically induce categories of persons” (Baudrillard, 2001, pp.
16-17). The SUV is a piquant case in point: SUVs are purchased as symbols of
power and invincibility, which is evidenced by the fact that post 9/11, there was
a dramatic rise in the sales of SUVs. However, as pointed out in the recent BBC
documentary The Men Who Made us Spend, the particular design of SUVs in
fact means they are twice as likely to roll-over as a standard car.
The production of cars might at first seem far removed from that of comput-
ers; however, placing such seemingly disparate examples side by side and viewing
them through the prisms of Heidegger’s concept of the standing reserve and Bau-
drillard’s system of objects, allows us to see the pervasiveness of a mindset where
limited to the senses, but it is characterised by its persisting efforts to overcome these limita-
tions.
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truth has been replaced by correctness: the theme that runs throughout Hei-
degger’s thinking and this thesis to point out instances where our thinking has
become so overly rationalized that it displays irrational tendencies (exemplified
by the above example of the SUV).
Apple advertises the Macbook Pro as “environmentally friendly”, with the
product website emphasising the inclusion of a
highly efficient power supply that reduces the amount of power wasted
when bringing electricity from the wall to your computer. Lower
power consumption reduces energy bills and lessens the environmen-
tal impact of greenhouse gas emissions from power stations. (Apple,
2014)
The fact that Apple decided to include a sealed battery in the Macbook like
those already included in the iPod and iPhone, however belies this emphasis on
environmental friendliness, as it prevents the user from exchanging the battery in
order to prolong the life of his device. The reasoning behind this technical choice
is that the user will thus be compelled to buy a completely new device as soon as
the battery performance becomes noticeably weaker. This ‘planned obsolescence’
illustrates how Apple’s propagation of an environmentally friendly image, as seen
in figure 7.5 “Apple and the Environment” from their website, amounts quite
literally to a signifier without a signified in the Baudrillardian sense.
Figure 7.5: Apple and the Environment (Apple, 2014)
Apple has a very rapid cycle of innovation that is designed to tie in with the
lifecycle of its products. For instance, the performance of an iPhone will begin
to noticeably deteriorate around the time that its successor model is launched, a
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phenomenon that has been referred to as the “Apple trap” (Rampell, 2013): the
phone’s software becomes slower to respond and its battery drains much faster.
The phone owner is then left with the choice of either investing in a new battery,
or purchasing the new model of iPhone that will come in at a fraction of the
cost. Customers are thus locked into the “Apple trap”, which is exacerbated by
an intricate system of compatibilities and incompatibilities designed to maximise
customer loyalty. This is a germane illustration of Heidegger’s point of how the
Gestell strips objects of any intrinsic and lasting value, as they are quite literally
“switched about ever anew” in a process of constant upgrades.
Heidegger is also very clear that this switching about does not follow random
paths, rather, it is characteristic of the Gestell that it manages this process and
steers it according to the principle of utility or minimum energy expenditure,
maximum productivity. This is what characterises the systemic and totalizing
tendencies of the Gestell:
Unlocking, transforming, storing, distributing, and switching about
are ways of revealing. But the revealing never simply comes to an end.
Neither does it run off into the indeterminate. The revealing reveals to
itself its own manifoldly interlocking paths, through regulating their
course. This regulating itself is, for its part, everywhere secured.
Regulating and securing even become the chief characteristics of the
challenging revealing. (Heidegger, 1977, p. 16)
The drive towards objectification that is characteristic of the Western philosoph-
ical tradition thus culminates, somewhat ironically, in the loss of objects. As
argued earlier Baudrillard’s semiotic order is aimed at a similar “objectlessness”,
but what Heidegger offers is an understanding of how this de-objectification must
be seen within the context of the tradition of Western thought and how, following
on from this first point, technologies must be seen as a manifestation, rather than
a cause, of this de-objectification.
Heidegger’s approach allows us to see that, even where it exhibits the Gestell’s
systemic, exploitative tendencies in the most drastic way, what manifests itself is
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not a destructive force of technology itself, but the essence of technology that is
nothing technological. In fact only if we recognise that the Gestell is the culmina-
tion of the modern scientific mindset that is rooted in Western metaphysics does
it become fully clear what Heidegger means when he says that the “essence of
technology is by no means anything technological” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 4). The
essence of modern technology is the Gestell, rooted in the scientific approach to
the world:
Modern science’s way of representing pursues and entraps nature as a
calculable coherence of forces... The modern physical theory of nature
prepares the way first not simply for technology but for the essence
of modern technology... Modern physics is the herald of enframing...
.(1977, p. 21)
The Gestell is the consequence of the Western metaphysical tradition that gives
rise to modern science because in this approach to understanding the world (set-
ting up the world as what Heidegger refers to as ‘world picture’, a notion with
particular relevance to technology that we explored in chapter 5), control is al-
ready inherent.
It follows that the Gestell, the cyclic or systematic exploitation of nature as
resource, cannot be a consequence of modern technology: in the same way as the
craftsman’s chisel did not give rise to revealing as poie¯sis, modern technology did
not provoke a revealing that is a challenging (as a modern phenomenon challeng-
ing, of course, has no Ancient Greek equivalent expression). Rather, the reverse
is true:
Particular kinds of technology in the ordinary sense of gadgets and
tools and machines only respond to this enframing [of the Gestell] -
they are the consequence, not the cause, and, as such, help reveal
things as standing reserve. (Leverette 2008, p. 345, emphasis added)
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The importance of this point cannot be emphasised enough as where tech-
nology is seen as the cause of the exploitative approaching of the world that we
witness in numerous contexts, it is easy to frame one’s critique along Luddite lines
where technology itself becomes the object of critique. A current example that
stems not from the field of ICTs but illustrates the difference between a critique
that is aimed at the technological vs a critique that is aimed at the essence of
technology is the much hyped extraction of natural gas from the earth by the
process of hydraulic fracturing or ‘fracking’. This is a controversial practice as it
is necessary to drill deep pipelines into the earth and to fill these with toxic fluid
in order to be able to fracture the shale rock and release the gas. The risks of
surrounding earth being contaminated by the fracking fluid, combined with the
enormity of resources needed to drill the underground pipelines are emblematic
of an approaching of the earth as ‘raw material’ in the exploitative sense of the
Gestell. Thus, the millions of tons of water needed for the drilling process are
‘switched’ into the cycle of processes needed for the extraction of gas. Where
criticisms of ?fracking? frequently focus on fracking as a technological process,
emphasising the “dangers of fracking”, from a Heideggerian perspective the prob-
lem is not a technological one but rooted in the exploitative mindset for which
the fracking technology is only a vehicle. This demonstrates once again that
Heidegger’s perspective is not compatible with a demonisation of technology, as
technology is only the visible manifestation of its deeper underlying essence that
is in itself “nothing technological” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 4)
To demonstrate even more clearly how the systemic, totalising tendencies of
the Gestell map onto our current information-technological environment the next
section will look at some more specific examples. As I have sought to emphasise
throughout this thesis, it is the interconnectedness of all digital data-processing
entities, the existence of an immaterial matrix of data flows beneath the material
manifestations of these technologies that calls for the urgent attention of criti-
cal thinking, as they enable the surveillance and commercial exploitation user’s
online activities. I argue that a critique drawing on the abstract tendencies of
philosophy of technology is particularly suited to such a project, as it does not
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get too distracted by particular devices or applications but retains its focus on
the unifying features of these technologies.
7.6 The Gestell and the Immateriality of ICTs
Criticisms of Heidegger?s thinking on technology mostly centre on the claim that
he is overly abstract, making only very infrequent references to specific techno-
logical objects. Verbeek for instance argues that Heidegger is out of touch with
“technology itself” (2005, p. 62), and Feenberg is deeply critical of what he sees as
Heidegger’s conflation of the complexity of modern technology to simple instanti-
ations of the essence of the Gestell (Feenberg, 1999 and 2000). In response to such
critiques I would argue that Heidegger’s ontology of technology is by definition,
and deliberately, general: it was not developed as a critique of a particular tech-
nological phenomenon. The fact that he spends so little time analysing examples
of technological objects is necessitated by his critique of mainstream thinking on
technology and the distinction that he offers in replacement of this, that between
the realm of the “merely technological” and its deeper underlying essence. He is
trying to steer us away from what he sees as “correct” determinations towards
the unifying features of modern technologies.
To remind ourselves of what is meant by “correct determinations” we can con-
sider the “celebratory claims of rupture and transformation” (Andrejevic 2009:36)
that have accompanied the steady rise of social media. In academic circles, po-
litical discourse and the mainstream media, social networks like Twitter and
Facebook have been construed as the most powerful tool for protest in the 21st
century, whether for spreading democracy through the Arab world or for organis-
ing anti-government riots like the Tottenham riots in London in 2011. However,
as Andrejevic (2009) has argued, there is a danger that amidst all this emphasis
on change, we might lose sight of the structures of power and capital underlying
these user activities that have remained intact and which largely determine the
extent and directions user activities can take. Where critical theories of the me-
dia and ICTs are already zeroing in on these questions, I argue that Heidegger?s
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approach adds a new dimension to this understanding by allowing us to situate
practices like surveillance and the exploitation of user data in the context of wider
tendencies united by their adherence to the logic of technical rationality, or, in
Heidegger’s words, the logic of the ‘Gestell’.
Rather than being a hindrance, I argue that the abstract tendencies of this
concept allow us to consider the unifying features of such diverse phenomena
as social networking sites, CCTV surveillance systems and smart cards. In line
with Heidegger’s emphasis that the essence of technology is not to be found in
technology itself but in the logic that it articulates, it becomes possible to see
how beneath a surface of benign everyday user activity - the data produced via
this activity combines with its conversion into economic or political value in a
single informational system. As Gehl argues:
In a typical Web 2.0 site, there is a surface, where users are free to pro-
duce content and make affective connotations, and there is a hidden
depth, where new media capitalists convert user-generated content
into exchange-values. (Gehl, 2009, p. 25)
At the perhaps least disturbing end of the spectrum lies the commercial ex-
ploitation of the data created by users’ everyday wired activities. The data cre-
ated by users on social networking sites for instance - through posts, comments
on other people’s posts and supposedly personal messages - is collected and cat-
egorised in order to maximise the profits from the sale of targeted advertising,
which will then appear on the user’s profile. Similarly, by using the “free” services
of the internet giant Google (search engine, email, office software, etc.) users are
giving the company permission to collate this data and sell it on to advertisers.
The point is that users’ online activities are translated into “patterns of inter-
action, movement, transaction, and communication” (Andrejevic, 2007, p. 296)
and rendered commercially productive.
This illustrates the surface/hidden depth structure of online activities noted
by Gehl, but from a Heideggerian perspective we can distinguish between these
layers in terms of the correct and the true: on the surface we have the convenience
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of the technological functionalities - but Heidegger reminds us that it is precisely
the well-oiled running of the machine that should make us alert:
Everything functions. That is exactly what is uncanny. Everything
functions and the functioning drives us further and further to more
functioning. (Heidegger, 1993 [1966])
The monetisation of our convenient usage of these technologies is not just an ex-
ploitation of a technological opportunity, but part of a more general technological
rationality.
It is within this context that we also need to place our understanding of the
increasingly sophisticated strategies adopted by marketers. The importance of
correlating information about a user from different sources is becoming increas-
ingly important in order to construct a detailed profile of this person’s interests
and habits - a practice that is facilitated by the fact that data created by the user
in one context (e.g. via his activities on social networks or an online search) is
no longer retained in this context but can be accessed and combined with other
data, a process Marwick & Boyd (2010) refer to as the “content collapse”. Thus,
an online search for a flight from Munich to Athens will lead to a related ad being
posted on the user’s Facebook profile, a browse through a department store’s sale
section will lead to the products viewed being offered again on the dictionary
website Leo.org. A poignant example that is by now well-known is the case of a
father who discovered his teenage daughter’s pregnancy through the coupons for
baby clothing that the US retail giant Target sent in the post, based on her previ-
ous purchases. Offline and online activities are combined and become searchable
for marketers looking for
combinations of past behaviour, location, demographics, and temper-
ament, that make individuals more likely to be influenced by a finely-
pitched marketing appeal. For this new hype of marketing no detail
of an individual’s life is irrelevant: all contribute to the generation of
correlation-based patterns. (Andrejevic, 2009b)
175
7.6 The Gestell and the Immateriality of ICTs
The activities of users from which this kind of information can then be mined
has been referred to by Critical Theory approaches as “digital labour”, “ex-
ploited” by corporations (Andrejevic, 2011), and it is worth exploring these ar-
guments in a little more detail as this will show how Marxist critique, despite
the widespread antagonism most Marxist thinkers hold towards Heidegger, does
indeed fit within Heidegger’s more general critique of technological rationality.
As noted earlier, the Marxist notion of exploitation requires this labour to
be “unpaid, coerced, and alienated” (2011, p. 278). The activity performed by
Facebook users is certainly unpaid in that no financial remuneration is involved
- they are users of a so-called “free” service, and are creating data as part of
the communicative activities the service offers them - posting about themselves
and responding to the communications of others. When it comes to the ques-
tion whether this activity is coerced, meaning that users have no choice but to
perform these activities, some might argue that there is no obligation to use the
services offered by Facebook & co., that users are entering into an agreement with
Facebook of their own accord and are thus accepting Facebook’s terms of use. In
Facebook’s Data Use Policy, how the data collected from user activities will be
utilised is clearly outlined, thus it might be said that users are fully aware of the
commercial use of their data:
We may put together your current city with GPS and other location
information we have about you to, for example, tell you and your
friends about people or events nearby, or offer deals to you in which
you might be interested. We may also put together data about you
to serve you ads or other content that might be more relevant to you.
(Facebook, 2014)
Utilizing Etienne De La Boetie’s near 500 year-old concept of ‘voluntary servi-
tude’, which argues that the rule of a tyrant is only possible by the submission of
the people, it could be argued that the users of Facebook willingly contribute to
their surveillance and the commercial exploitation of their data. We can draw a
comparison with the notion of ‘informed consent’, borrowed from medical ethics,
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which is often invoked in the context of political surveillance (The Economist,
2013). The argument is that the user has been given the chance to make an
informed choice, and that by agreeing to the terms of use of the given device or
service, also agrees to the consequences of this use.
However, in the case of Facebook the question of ‘informed consent’ or even
‘choice’ is highly problematic. With Facebook being the most popular social
networking site worldwide (Fuchs, 2014) and counting two thirds of UK internet
users amongst their user base, there is arguably an element of coercion in that no
other network can offer users similar coverage - joining other networks would come
as a significant disadvantage. Further to this, even though Facebook outlines,
however sketchily, how it will use the data from its users, and even though it
emphasises that their privacy policy gives users the power to “decide what and
how much [they] share”, most users are unlikely to go through this information.
As Fuchs points out, “the policy’s complexity and length makes it unlikely that
users read it in detail”, and further, that no privacy settings exist that would allow
users to disable advertising on their profiles. So taking into account Facebook’s
dominant status, the unlikeliness that the user is fully aware of how his data is
being used, and the fact that he cannot opt out of advertising strongly suggest
an element of coercion.
Finally, Andrejevic argues that labour is exploited where it is alienated, in
Marxist terms this means that the labourer is ‘alienated’ from the product of his
labour in that he has no use of it, rather it is turned back on him for purposes
of control. In the case of Facebook, the value of the ‘labour’ undertaken by
Facebook users is indeed something they are alienated from in that the value
extracted from their online activities is uncoupled from the original purpose of
the activity: users have no ultimate benefit of the sale of their information other
than being able to use the service.
I have pointed out how new media are on the one hand portrayed as ‘tools
of conviviality’ and on the other, as facilitators of governmental surveillance and
commercial exploitation. Alienation arguably occurs precisely because these two
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perspectives coincide. Beneath the material manifestation of Facebook as a tech-
nology or application that users engage with, lies an immaterial matrix of com-
mercial and governmental interests, or, as Andrejevic puts it, a
virtual construct that allows us to defy the laws of physics by gossiping
globally, but one that is subject to manipulation by those who control
the infrastructure. (2011, p. 280)
It is precisely this inherent ambiguity that Heidegger’s ontological approach is
suited to exploring. His concept of the Gestell, criticised by many as abstract,
makes it possible to expose the deeply rationalising tendencies that ICTs exhibit
but which precisely cannot be pinned down to any particular form of usage. It
captures the multi-layered and inherently contradictory nature of the digital in-
formational system: both the benign user activities that constitute its surface and
the instrumentalisation of this data by governments and corporations underlying
these activities.
7.7 The Need to take Critique beyond Privacy
In contrast to most celebratory mainstream accounts of ICTs I have sought to
emphasise that we need to beware of one-sided accounts that dissociate the eman-
cipatory potential of these technologies from an awareness of the processes of
surveillance and the commercial exploitation of users’ personal data that run
parallel to users going about their ‘emancipatory’ online activities. It is worth
reminding ourselves, however, why a continued emphasis on this underlying di-
mension matters - what are its implications for the individual and society? Cri-
tiques of surveillance have largely been framed in terms of the infringement of
individual and collective privacy, but more recently the argument has been made
by Critical Theory that critique must not be restricted to questions of privacy,
but must also take into account larger issues of power and control (Andrejevic,
2011). The question is, what can Heidegger offer in terms of a critical evaluation
of our communicative infrastructure that isn’t already problematized by Critical
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Theory approaches, and what would the advantage of such a critique be? This
section will briefly address the problem of limiting critique to matters of privacy,
before answering the question as to the explicitly critical dimension in Heidegger’s
thought that lends itself to a critique of power and control in the informational
infrastructure.
The case of the Target customer whose father discovered her pregnancy after
a number of vouchers for pregnancy-related items had arrived in the post is a
poignant illustration of how debates around the commercial use of user data have
centred around invasions of privacy. The punch line of the story was the fact
that the retailer had ‘overstepped a mark’ by violating a customer’s privacy. A
representative of the American retailer admitted that
[i]f we send someone a catalog [sic] and say, ‘Congratulations on your
first child!’ and they’ve never told us they’re pregnant, that’s going to
make some people uncomfortable... even if you’re following the law,
you can do things where people get queasy. (cited in Hill, 2012)
The point is that where people feel their privacy to be invaded, they might make
their feelings known. In cases such as this they have the option of complaining
against the offending party (as it happened in the case of Target), in other cases
however there is only the option of complying with the invasion of one’s privacy, or
being denied access to a service or product. This is the case with airport security,
for instance, where travellers need to subject themselves to random searches of
their luggage, pass through security scanning equipment and have their bodies
searched for forbidden goods. Should they object to such treatment, they will
not be permitted to board their plane.
A further complication is that what one person might consider an invasion
of his/her privacy, might be admissible for another person. What is seen as
‘private’, theorists like Helen Nissenbaum for instance argue, depends on the
context (Nissenbaum, 2010). However, it is risky to rely on a person’s subjective
assessment of whether they are feeling violated, as the further development of the
Target example shows as companies learn from expressions of subjective feelings
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of violation and adjust their tactics accordingly. As the Forbes journalist relates,
in order to pre-empt the feeling of ‘spookiness’ that was a sign that the customer’s
privacy had been violated, Target “got sneakier about sending the coupons”:
instead of sending people with high pregnancy scores books o’ coupons
[sic] solely for diapers, rattles, strollers, and the “Go the F*** to
Sleep” book, they more subtly spread them about. (Hill, 2012)
A Target employee was cited as admitting how
we started mixing in all these ads for things we knew pregnant women
would never buy, so the baby ads looked random. We’d put an ad for
a lawn mower next to diapers. We’d put a coupon for wineglasses next
to infant clothes. That way, it looked like all the products were chosen
by chance... we found out that as long as a pregnant woman thinks
she hasn’t been spied on, she’ll use the coupons. She just assumes
that everyone else on her block got the same mailer for diapers and
cribs. As long as we don’t spook her, it works. (Hill, 2012)
Privacy remains an important issue, in particular for the subjective experience of
the human being concerned. However, what this example shows is that critiques
of surveillance practices must not be limited to critiques of privacy invasion as
that way, as long as corporations remain within the legal boundaries of privacy
legislation, they are free to continue with customer surveillance for marketing
purposes. As Andrejevic argues, it is vital that debates about privacy should not
come to stand in for discussions that might more directly address the
question of who controls the information infrastructure and for what
ends - questions, in other words, of the power that both shapes the
use of new media technologies and the ways in which these uses in
turn reproduce existing power relations. (2011, p. 279)
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Andrejevic argues that the use corporations make of the data collected from their
customers needs to be analysed in terms of the Marxist concept of ‘exploitation’
in order to “invoke questions of power and control” (ibid.). So the question,
as noted at the beginning of this section, is what Heidegger can offer that isn’t
already problematized by Critical Theory approaches? Is it possible to distil a
critique of power and control in this infrastructure from Heidegger’s philosophy
of technology, and is there an advantage of this critique over other approaches?
I argue that although Heidegger’s network ontology does not contain an ex-
plicit critique of the concept of power, we can distil such a critique, in terms of
the interaction between humans and technology, from his ontological approach,
by recalling what contrasts Heidegger’s network ontology from Latour’s ‘network
metaphysics’. Heidegger offers us an ontological understanding of technological
objects that allows us to conceive of them as nodes in a network of material and
immaterial forces. In this network, both animate beings and inanimate objects
interact in a way that is similar to the ‘network metaphysics’ of Bruno Latour.
However, unlike Latour, who places humans and things on the same ontological
plane, Heidegger reserves a privileged position for human being, which he marks
with the specific title of DASEIN. Despite the fact that Dasein’s mode of Being
is a Being-with, rather than the Being-over-and-against that emerges from the
Cartesian subject, it is distinguished by its having an understanding of its own
Being. Heidegger is very clear that this is a property that is characteristic of
Dasein and that belongs to no other kind of Being.
This special position of Dasein is moreover evident from the place it occupies
in Heidegger’s network ontology - which is organised around spatial relation-
ships. Even the most banal piece of equipment approaches Dasein through this
readiness-to-hand. Where Western metaphysics has elevated the human subject
above the world he inhabits, Heidegger acknowledges the fundamental impossibil-
ity of this task. His concept of Dasein is an attempt to understand Being in terms
of the mutual imbrications between the human and his surroundings. What this
means for our understanding of our own information-technological environment
is that efforts to put these technologies to more ethical uses will not extricate us
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from the fundamentally technologised forms of Being that characterise our Being-
in-the-world. However, the point is that Dasein has a fundamental capacity for
recognising these forms of Being.
It has been argued that a critical theory of ICTs requires a normative concept
of power (Fuchs, 2014) - meaning it must take a political standpoint against
the abuse of power and condemn all behaviour and activity that is based on
or contributes to its abuse. Latour’s actor network theory doesn’t allow for a
normative critique of power within the network of human-technology interaction
because power is merely conceived of in terms of one actor’s capacity for affecting
another actor in the network. In fact he argues that an understanding of power
in the network of human and non-human entitites (which include technological
objects) has no need of “stable actors, ... stable statements [or]... a stable
repertoire of beliefs and interests” (Latour, n.d., p. 129), rather he advocates a
view of society that is without a fixed point of view. Ultimately, Latour seems
to be advocating the precise opposite of what Horkheimer sees as the defining
characteristic of a theory that is ‘critical’, in the sense that it is aimed at not
only analysing, but changing the status quo. Latour argues that all that (social)
science can, and ought to do, is describe - it cannot explain and it does not allow
of any judgements that “transcend the situation” (ibid., p. 130) - meaning that
are external to the network. The point is, however, that in Heidegger’s network
ontology there is no need for a judgement external to the network because as
the only being that has an understanding of its own Being Dasein forms part of
the network and is endowed with the capacity to reflect on its own conditions of
existence.
So although Heidegger is not part of the notion of Critical Theory in the way
Horkheimer originally conceived it, his concepts can help us formulate a critique
of issues in the field of ICTs that so far have been framed in Marxist terms,
such as the ‘exploitation’ of digital labour. Heidegger doesn’t use the notion of
‘exploitation’ as such, and his concept of the Gestell as a challenging revealing
that no longer approaches objects as objects but only ever as “standing-reserve”
appears in the first instance aimed at the natural world:
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The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging [Her-
ausfordern], which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it
supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such. (Heidegger,
1977, p. 14)
We can understand the ‘challenging’ of nature as its reduction to mere raw ma-
terial, and this is precisely what the river Rhine has become by being switched
into the cycle of processing for the extraction of water power. In our own earlier
example water, rock and other materials are set upon for the extraction of shale
gas from the earth through the process of fracking. Yet we know that it is never
the technologies themselves that are responsible for the challenging setting upon
nature to extract from it its maximum yield. Humans are involved in this process
of challenging, both as consumers of the energy that is exploited, and as active
agents in the process of exploitation - from the worker driving the machinery, the
managerial staff of the company through to the politicians that decide on how a
country’s energy supply is met.
Heidegger is clear, however, that the revealing that manifests itself as a chal-
lenging under the logic of the Gestell, though it might be executed by human
beings, is not under their control:
Who accomplishes the challenging setting-upon through which what
we call the real is revealed as standing-reserve? Obviously, man. To
what extent is man capable of such a revealing? Man can indeed con-
ceive, fashion, and carry through this or that in one way or another.
But man does not have control over unconcealment itself... .(1977, p.
18, emphasis added)
While revealing in the way of the Gestell occurs not “beyond human doing”,
it does not occur “exclusively in man, [n]or decisively through man” (ibid., pp.
23-24) either. The reason is that “[o]nly to the extent that man for his part is
already challenged to exploit the energies of nature can this ordering revealing
happen” (ibid., p.18).
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This is an absolutely crucial point: for Heidegger, the setting-upon nature
to extract from it its maximum utility is not a process that human beings have
control over, in the sense of giving the original impetus for it and having the
capacity to call a stop to it at any given time. What he is saying is that human
beings are themselves subject to the same challenging setting-upon that they
then exercise over their surroundings, in other words, the Gestell is not a purely
human activity of control over nature, rather it is something takes hold of human
beings themselves and treats them in the manner of standing-reserve. Where we
witness the exploitation of nature’s natural resources, this exploitative approach
to our environment is neither a result of the technologies used, nor is it within
our command as humans because it has already claimed us in a way that shapes
our thinking. As Heidegger argues,
when man, investigating, observing, ensnares nature as an area of his
own conceiving, he has already been claimed by a way of revealing
that challenges him to approach nature as an object of research, until
even the object disappears into the objectlessness of standing-reserve.
(1977, p. 19)
Here we see again the continuity that Heidegger sees existing between the basic
tenets of Western philosophy and modern technology. The setting up of the world
as object that is characteristic of Western metaphysics manifests itself in modern
science as much as it does in modern technology, both being modes of revealing
that objectify and seek to bring under control. From this perspective, the Gestell
emerges as the ultimate consequence of this trajectory that has ended in the
de-objectification of objects, rendering them mere standing-reserve.
The precarious consequence for human beings that Heidegger sees as a result
of this process is that human beings themselves, where they no longer stand
as subjects over and against objects, that in this general ‘objectlessness’ the
difference between human beings and inanimate objects is eradicated:
As soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man even as ob-
ject, but does so, rather, exclusively as standing-reserve, and man in
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the mist of objectlessness is nothing but the orderer of the standing-
reserve, then he comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall; that
is, he comes to the point where he himself will have to be taken as
standing-reserve. (Heidegger, 1977, pp. 26-27)
Where Heidegger’s ontology is defined by its upholding of the ontological differ-
ence between Dasein and other beings, it is the catastrophic effect of the Gestell
that this difference is threatened, and human beings themselves are rendered
worse than objects, namely standing-reserve. From this perspective, Latour’s
ontological levelling of humans and objects emerges as Heidegger’s worst fear as
it obliterates the privileged status of human Being that is evidenced by its own
ontological category as the only being that has an understanding of its own being,
in a way similar to the Gestell.
It can thus be said that the defining characteristic of the Gestell is the de-
objectification of objects and the de-humanization of humans, reducing both to
the status of standing-reserve. Rather than being just an ontological catastrophe,
however, the consequences of this ontological reduction manifest themselves in the
everyday in a very real and concrete manner. Heidegger for instance argues that
the “current talk about human resources, about the supply of patients for a clinic”
(Heidegger, 1977, p. 18, emphasis added) is evidence of this tendency. Where
corporations conceive of their employees as human resources, these employees are
not approached as human beings amongst human beings in line with Dasein’s
authentic being-in-the-world as a being-with, but in the manner of raw material.
This reduction of human beings to the status of standing-reserve, or resource
material, I would argue, manifests itself in today’s information-technological in-
frastructure to an even greater extent, with the commercial exploitation of user
data created via their activities on social networking sites like Facebook being a
case in point. These issues have been raised by Critical Theorists who draw on
the ideas of Adorno and Horkheimer, but where there could be a fruitful dialogue
with Heidegger’s ideas to gain an even greater understanding of the processes of
rationalization and instrumentalisation, there is a blind spot.
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Another example that is particularly apposite to this thesis, and which is cur-
rently mainly analysed from the position of Marxist critique, is the production
of consumer electronics. Fuchs (2014) relates how extensive foreign direct invest-
ment has created an ICT industry in China that employs millions of labourers
mostly from extremely poor, rural areas. The work undertaken by the mostly
female workforce is characterised by low wages, low job and social security, low
skills, repetitive and laborious work, long working hours as well as work that poses
risks to the employees’ health. Apple25 products, including the iPhone and the
iPad, the world’s most popular smart phone and tablet pc respectively, are man-
ufactured in a network of factories in southern China, including the Taiwanese
supplier Foxconn, who, with more than 1 million employees, is the largest private
sector employer. Though not the only company that has come under scrutiny,
a number of occurrences at this particular site over recent years highlight the
extent to which the production of affordable consumer electronics for the West
relies on the dehumanization of people in developing countries. A report by the
New York Times outlines the harsh conditions under which these consumer goods
are manufactured:
the workers assembling iPhones, iPads and other devices often labor
in harsh conditions... Employees work excessive overtime, in some
cases seven days a week, and live in crowded dorms. Some say they
stand so long that their legs swell until they can hardly walk. (Duhigg
& Barboza, 2012)
These poor working conditions are exacerbated by the high risks working
environments created by a lack of attention and concern for employee safety. The
report relates an instance where
137 workers at an Apple supplier in eastern China were injured after
25Apple is not the only electronics company doing business within a troubling supply system.
Bleak working conditions have been documented at factories manufacturing products for Dell,
Hewlett-Packard, I.B.M., Lenovo, Motorola, Nokia, Sony, Toshiba and others.
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they were ordered to use a poisonous chemical to clean iPhone screens.
(ibid.)
In 2011, two explosions at Chengdu production sites of the iPad injured 77 people
and killed four, despite Apple having been alerted to the hazardous conditions at
the site (ibid.). These occurrences highlight the real human cost that lies behind
the immateriality and airlight rhetoric of companies like Apple. Apple’s charac-
teristic design of its consumer electronics in spotless white belies the dark and
sinister materiality underlying their production. The gleaming, near-translucent
appearance of these products allows them to withdraw into complete readiness-
to-hand: what withdraws is the essence of these technologies, the Gestell, which
reduces human beings to raw material or standing-reserve. Thus a young man
disfigured in an explosion at the Foxconn plant in 2012 was merely “one of the
millions of human cogs powering the largest, fastest and most sophisticated man-
ufacturing system on earth” (Duhigg & Barboza, 2012). The abstract systemic
nature of the Gestell that renders human being-in-the-world a being-in-order-to,
a being that has become instrumentalised, is manifest in the opposition between
corporate interests and the welfare of the individual characteristic of large corpo-
rations. The above examples illustrate in horrific clarity the impact of the rule of
instrumentality on the experience of the individual, a phenomenon also described
by Marcuse in his work One-Dimensional Man (1991 [1964]). What I am trying
to show is how this critique can be, and in Marcuse’s case very probably was,
grounded in Heidegger’s critique of instrumentality.
I have repeatedly emphasised the cyclical nature of the Gestell: what it is
approached in the manner of the Gestell is “switched about ever anew” in “man-
ifoldly interlocking paths” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 16). This interconnectedness is
precisely evident in the consumer electronics supply chain, as even companies
like Foxconn rely on other companies for smaller parts and/or the supply of raw
materials. The latter are mined in African countries like the Congo and Rwanda,
where conditions of labour are often extremely precarious and workers often suffer
the threat of grievous bodily harm. The NGO “The Enough Project” for instance
has ranked the worlds’ leading manufacturers of consumer electronics according
187
7.7 The Need to take Critique beyond Privacy
to their efforts to reduce ‘conflict minerals’ from Congo in their production. Apple
was ranked 9th amongst the companies who
have taken proactive steps to trace and audit their supply chains,
pushed for some aspects of legislation, exercised leadership in industry-
wide efforts, started to help Congo develop a clean trade. But they
can still dig deeper in their supply chains and outreach. (Raise Hope
for Congo, 2014)
Samsung and Sony on the other hand are ranked distinctly lower, as companies
who
have taken some steps to investigate their supply chains, and are
members of industry-wide efforts. But more commitment and action
on tracing, auditing, certification, and legislative efforts is required of
them (ibid.).
The mobile phone manufacturer HTC on the other hand has been ranked second
to last as a company that has done
next to nothing to shift their practices toward conflict-free from Congo.
They are not members of industry-wide efforts, have not taken the
proper steps to investigate their supply chains, have said nothing
about legislation, and are not actively engaged with other stakehold-
ers. (ibid.)
What is clear from the above is that the exploitation of one actor in the ICT
supply chain relies on the exploitative practices of another actor higher up in
the chain. Thus emerges a cycle of exploitation that shows great similarities to
Heidegger’s theory of the Gestell as a cycle of setting upon nature following the
principle of efficiency (i.e. minimum input, maximum output). By understanding
these exploitative practices in terms of an ontological concept like the Gestell
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such critiques acquire a philosophical grounding that moves them beyond merely
correct interpretations of technology.
A question that presents itself is whether it would be possible for a company
to produce an electronic device like a mobile phone outside this cycle of exploita-
tive processes that would thus ‘spring open’ the logic of the Gestell. In 2013,
production of the ‘Fairphone’ began with an initial production size of 25,000.
Based in the Netherlands, Fairphone is a social enterprise aimed at producing
an ethical smart phone using “conflict-free, fair resources that put people first”
(Fairphone, 2014).
At first glance, this ‘ethically produced’ piece of technology could be seen as
realising the hopes harboured by traditional Marxism that technology could be
freed from the grip of negative rationalizing forces and turned towards positive
aims. As Marcuse writes:
The classical Marxian theory envisages the transition from capital-
ism to socialism as a political revolution: the proletariat destroys
the political apparatus of capitalism but retains the technological
apparatus, subjecting it to socialization. There is continuity in the
revolution: technological rationality, freed from irrational restrictions
and destructions, sustains and consummates itself in the new society.
(Marcuse, 1991 [1964], p. 31)
Similarly, current Critical Theory approaches are looking to alternative social
networking sites like Diaspora, which in a clear effort to distance itself from com-
mercially oriented sites like Facebook, claims that “Diaspora will never sell your
social life to advertisers, and you won’t have to conform to someone’s arbitrary
rules or look over your shoulder before you speak”. As Sevignani points out, Di-
aspora’s data storage and management is not centralised like it is with Facebook
and Google+, and that effectively, it “protects its users and their personal data
from exploitation” (Sevignani, 2012, p. 611). However, Diaspora cannot guaran-
tee its users protection from surveillance, as the immateriality of the digital data
flows forecloses all possibilities of such a guarantee.
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A closer analysis of the production of the Fairphone shows in a very similar
way how the systemic nature of ICTs interferes with the hopes for a socialization
of ICTs, a nature that is captured by Heidegger’s concept of the Gestell : while the
Fairphone contains specific components made of tantalum and tin from conflict-
free mines in Congo, these in all likelihood amount to no more than 1 gram of
the device (Beschke, 2014). The origins of the larger section of raw materials
utilised in the production of the phone is unknown. Another point made is that
“conflict-free” is not identical with “fair” based on the fact that the certifications
of the Congo mines, whilst ruling out extreme practices like child labour, are not
exhaustive. Further to this, the remuneration of workers at the A’Hong factory
in China where the phone is produced is such that it covers the minimum wage
plus overtime compensation, but it is less than the living wage, defined as the
wage “needed by a small, young family to eat and live”. Thus, the shortening of
the working week might even work against the interests of workers who desire to
work longer hours to balance their low wages.
What these structural problems illustrate is the complexity and interdepen-
dence of the various stages in the consumer electronics supply chain, so that even
where one element is singled out and made ‘fair’, it still relies on processes further
up in the chain that might not be, and further along in the chain it might become
part of processes that are again exploitative in their nature. Thus, in the final
instance, even if it were possible to single out the production of the ‘Fairphone’
in the way I have just argued it is not, the computer mouse used by the person
placing an order for the phone is likely to have involved precisely the exploitative
processes they are looking to condemn by their purchase.
The above examples demonstrate the depth of Heidegger’s insight, illustrating
the systemic, highly interconnected and exploitative tendencies of the Gestell:
the revealing that rules throughout modern technology has the char-
acter of a setting-upon... That challenging happens in that the en-
ergy concealed in nature is unlocked, what is unlocked is transformed,
what is transformed is stored up, what is stored up is, in turn, dis-
tributed, and what is distributed is switched about ever anew. Un-
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locking, transforming, storing, distributing, and switching about are
ways of revealing. But the revealing never simply comes to an end.
Neither does it run off into the indeterminate. The revealing reveals
to itself its own manifoldly interlocking paths... . (Heidegger, 1977,
p. 16)
The increasing use made by corporate entities and governmental actors of data
created by users’ activities online have been criticised in Marxist terms as the
exploitation of digital labour and described as a surveillance-industrial complex
(Fuchs, 2013). With very few exceptions (such as the work of Andrew Feenberg,
more recently also the work of Paul Taylor and David Gunkel), Critical Theory
approaches to ICTs have been resistant to engaging with the thought of Martin
Heidegger. However, the discussion we have just undertaken shows that the
conceptual frameworks Heidegger employs in his critique of modern technology
strike at the very same tendencies that are subject of Marxist critique, namely the
exploitation of human labour in the capitalist system. Though Heidegger does
not mount an explicit critique of capitalism, this critique is more than implicit in
his critique of the realities of our thoroughly technologised environment, as the
following example makes clear:
The forester who, in the wood, measures the felled timber and to all
appearances walks the same forest path in the same way as did his
grandfather is today commanded by profit-making in the lumber in-
dustry, whether he knows it or not. (Heidegger, 1977, p. 18, emphasis
added)
Where Heidegger’s Gestell reduces everything to raw material, Marx argues the
market reduces everything to a commodity. In both cases, Andrew Feenberg
argues, we are dealing with “totalizing schemas of a kind of uncontrollable and




This chapter has focused attention on Heidegger’s concept of the Gestell: his
account of the rationalizing forces of modernity, which for Heidegger is insepa-
rable from the development of a Western subjectivity. I have emphasised that
this concept is Heidegger’s account, as I have aimed to show where looking at
contemporary issues in information and communication technology through the
lens of his thinking, we encounter the critiques of other thinkers, in particular
that of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory. There are other theories of tech-
nological modernity, and in the next chapter I will engage with that of the Polish
sociologist Zygmunt Bauman, but as much current critique of ICTs takes its cue
from Marx’s critique of capitalism, I have attempted to bring Critical Theory
and Heidegger in dialogue with one another where this dialogue can shed light
on urgent issues such as surveillance and the exploitation of our online activities.
It is important to emphasise, however, that I see Heidegger’s ontological account
of technology as a valuable supplement to existing critiques, in line with philos-
ophy’s tendency to “make things simple”, in the words of John Durham Peters
(Peters, 2008).
As such I hope to have opened up a space for more sustained dialogue be-
tween philosophy and technology and Critical Theory of ICTs, and in particular
I hope to have made an argument for why Heidegger’s thinking deserves special
attention. The possibility of a fusion between Heidegger’s phenomenology and
Marx’s critique of capitalism has been explored by a number of thinkers, notably
Herbert Marcuse and Andrew Feenberg (2005). It must be said, however, that
this project has suffered, and continues to suffer, from Heidegger’s problematic
political biography. It is for this reason that most current critiques of ICTs and
the informational economy that position themselves in the Critical Theory tra-
dition are antagonistic towards Heidegger. Hence the next chapter, which forms
the penultimate chapter of this thesis before I draw my conclusions, addresses
the issue of Heidegger’s politics. There are a number of events in Heidegger’s
biography that, for some, seem to demonstrate his affinity with National Social-
ist thought. A detailed exploration of all of them would be beyond the scope of
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this thesis, but as Fried (2012) argued, “how one deals with Heidegger and the
political, is in itself political”. I will limit myself to a brief summary of the bio-
graphical facts and comment on some instances where these have been, whether
intentionally or not, misconstrued. However, the real significance of what Wolin
(1993) and O’Brien (2010) have referred to as the “Heidegger controversy” is in
the context of the question concerning technology: I will argue that some of the
statements that have been construed as proof of his alignment with Nazi ideology
offer another dimension to our understanding of the most extreme consequences
of technological thinking. In other words, I will argue that Heidegger’s politics




From Politics to Techno-Logics
8.1 Introduction
The best of what Heidegger wrote - indeed the best of philosophy in general
- is not an injunction to agree with a proffered opinion, but a plea to all of
us to make our thinking more thoughtful.
Re´e cited in Oltermann, 2014
Much has already been said and written on the thorny subject of Heidegger’s
politics: about what to make of his membership of the National Socialist party,
about the fact that Heidegger never explicitly clarified his own position in re-
lation to their ideology and deeds, and the extent to which Heidegger’s earlier
writings, Being and Time in particular, contain elements of this ideology. The
recent publication of Heidegger’s Black Notebooks have caused the so-called ‘Hei-
degger controversy’ (Wolin, 1993) to flare up again, with fresh allegations about
a “profound antisemitism” at the core of Heidegger’s philosophy (Oltermann,
2014). The ongoing nature of the debate is strongly suggestive of two things:
it points to ambiguities in the “Heidegger controversy” (Wolin, 1993), but also
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to the existence of profound truths in Heidegger’s thinking that even his most
severe critics cannot disengage themselves from. One of Heidegger’s translators
has referred to the issue of Heidegger’s politics as a “ghost that comes back to
haunt us every 20 years” (Fried, 2012). With the publication and translation of
Heidegger’s works still ongoing,26 it is unlikely that this “ghost” will be laid to
rest any time soon.
It is not the purpose of this thesis to offer a definitive assessment of the “Hei-
degger controversy”. As mentioned above, there is no lack of material exploring
these matters, for instance the highly critical Heidegger: The Introduction of
Nazism into Philosophy by Emmanuel Faye (2009), which presents Heidegger as
one of the “main propagators of Nazism in the life of letters”, subtly contin-
uing to disseminate the ideologies of Nazism through thought and ideas after
Hitler’s military defeat (Faye, 2009, p. xxiii). Faye’s book follows on from Victor
Farias’ equally censorious Heidegger and Nazism (1989), Richard Wolin’s slightly
more tempered The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger
(1990) and Julian Young’s Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism (1997). Most of the
factual information presented within these works is indisputable (some of which
I recount in the following section), and every reader of Heidegger must decide for
himself whether Heidegger is more culpable than others at the time who failed to
predict the worst of the Nazi war crimes. However, what is argued here is that
accounts that stop at these indisputable facts are culpable of privileging the cor-
rect over the true: they are precisely the “correct determinations” that Heidegger
names as the signs of technologically determined thinking.
Thus some of the most outspoken denunciations in the above works are based
on the very misconstruction of Heidegger’s thinking that this thesis has aimed
to refute: that it presents a nave hankering after a pre-technological way of life.
Farias, for instance, claims to have unearthed from Heidegger’s work evidence of
a thought process nourished in traditions of authoritarianism, anti-
semitism, and ultranationalisation that sanction the homeland in its
26Part of the Gesamtausgabe, for which Heidegger dictated the order of publication himself,
is as yet unavailable even in German.
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most local sense. (Farias, 1989, p. 4)
Farias is one of many who take the “Vo¨lkitsch” in Heidegger’s writing (recall
his description of van Gogh’s peasant boots) as evidence of a deeper affiliation
with Nazi ideology as from there it seems only a small leap to Hitler’s nostalgic
visions, depicted in the Nazi propaganda images of healthy blond and blue-eyed
families pursuing healthy, countrified lives. It is on the point of such funda-
mental misreadings of Heidegger’s account of technological modernity that this
thesis seeks to intervene in the debate around the ‘Heidegger controversy’: they
reduce the profoundness and complexity of his account to a simple binary of op-
timism/pessimism. Heidegger’s observation that “pessimism and optimism are
positions that fall too short of the realm we are attempting to reflect upon” (1993
[1966]) we could thus easily apply to the short-sightedness of the approaches of
Farias et al.
The point is that in Heidegger’s ontology there lies a far more radical politics
than in the superficial readings that accuse him of lacking precisely in this qual-
ity: Heidegger’s concept of the Gestell, the heading under which he gathers the
totalising and instrumental features of modern technologies, is not a technologi-
cal concept in the strict sense, in that it is aimed at a critique of a technological
reality. Rather, the technological rationality embodied in the Gestell is such that
it evidences itself in a variety of modern phenomena, a spectrum at the most
extreme end of which stands the most horrific of modern catastrophes, the Holo-
caust. It is in this context, that Heidegger’s controversial remarks that have
prompted accusations of anti-Semitism need to be examined - as part of a contin-
uum that encompasses both overtly destructive technologies like bombs (to use
one of Heidegger’s own examples), but also far more covertly inhumane techno-
logical complexes like the digital informational matrix that is the subject of this
thesis.
This chapter is structured as follows: I will begin by briefly sketching the
‘case’ against Heidegger. The problem at the core of the Heidegger controversy is
Heidegger’s unwillingness to account for what some see as the condoning, others
as the outright support of Hitler’s politics whilst in a position of responsibility and
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influence as Professor and Rector at Germany’s prestigious University of Freiburg.
I will present the core facts unapologetically, as this unwillingness on Heidegger’s
part was never explained, and has come to be referred to emblematically as “the
silence” (Lyotard, 1990). One who voiced his resentment at Heidegger’s reticence
in very clear terms was Jrgen Habermas, who in 1953 published a damning article
on Heidegger in the German broadsheet Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, accusing
him of having drawn a curtain over his association with the Nazi regime. Haber-
mas’ outspoken critique, which arguably cemented the problematic relationship
between Heidegger and the tradition of Critical Theory, was preceded by a much
more direct and personal rift: that between Heidegger and his former student
Herbert Marcuse. I will explore this for two reasons: firstly, as it gives insight
into some of the reasons why Critical Theory today, with very few exceptions,
shirks Heidegger’s thinking even in matters of technology. Secondly, because un-
like Habermas’ critique, Marcuse’s accusations went beyond political polemics:
they were grounded in what he saw as Heidegger’s betrayal of philosophy, a failure
to offer a concrete alternative to the current historical situation.
We have seen that “abstractness” is one of the most commonly voiced criti-
cisms of Heidegger’s account of technology. However, it is precisely the abstract
terms in which Heidegger mounts his critique of technological modernity, tran-
scending any concrete technological reality, that make it so useful for illuminat-
ing how the effects of the same instrumental tendencies can be found at different
times and in different places. His notion of the Gestell allows us to highlight the
abstract systemic tendencies at work in our current information-technological sys-
tem, which ontologically is based upon abstraction from specific conditions: the
binary logic of digital ICTs sets up/sets upon [stellt ] human activity within this
system in such a way that it can be collected, stored, tracked and commercially
exploited.
By adding the rationalizing tendencies of the digital matrix to Heidegger’s
enumeration of manifestations of the essence of modern technology, which in-
cludes modern industrialised agriculture and the war atrocities committed by the
Nazis, it is important to note that no comparison is being drawn - neither a moral
one, nor one of scale. All of these phenomena are singular in innumerable ways,
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but share a sameness that we ignore at our peril. Recovering thus from Hei-
degger’s work a covert but nevertheless unmistakeable politics, these final pages
will fundamentally challenge any claim as to an inherently apolitical nature of
philosophy.
8.2 The “Case” against Heidegger
Despite efforts to prove Heidegger’s hopes for a National-Socialist redemption of a
Western culture in the grips of the rationalising forces of modernity were already
evident in his early thinking, and in particular the genesis of Being and Time, it
is the time period from 1928, when Heidegger first came to Freiburg to take the
Chair that Edmund Husserl had vacated, until his resignation from the Rectorate
in 1934, that forms the most contentious period in his biography. Heidegger had
managed to secure the post at Freiburg thanks to Edmund Husserl’s recommen-
dation and the publication of Being and Time(1927) - which was dedicated to
him “in friendship and admiration”. In 1933, the year in which Hitler became
Germany’s Chancellor, Heidegger accepted the post of Rector of the University
of Freiburg, and shortly afterwards became a member of the National Socialist
party, of which he remained a member until the end of the war. Following this
appointment it appears Heidegger broke off all contact with Husserl and famously
removed the dedication from all subsequent editions of Being and Time.
Heidegger’s inaugural address as Rector, entitled “The Self-Assertion of the
German University”, given on the 27th of May 1933, has occupied a central place
in the controversy. It is worth some attention as it illustrates some of the problems
underlying accusations of anti-Semitism and Nazi ideology in Heidegger’s work.
The address formed part of the evidence that led to Heidegger’s post-war trial
and conviction by the university denazification commission, the same committee
that also banned Heidegger from teaching at any German university, a ban that
remained in place until 1949. The ways in which the address has become an
instrument against Heidegger are a good example of the weaknesses that run
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through much of the anti-Heidegger polemic: they invent some elements and
misrepresent others.
Robert Steck’s review of Faye’s book for instance confidently asserts that
the address included “three ‘Heil Hitlers”’, and the declaration that the “Fu¨hrer
himself and he alone is German reality and law, now and for the future”27 (Steck,
2010). While the address does refer to the “splendour and greatness of this
departure” 28 (Heidegger, 1985 [1933], p. 480, trans. modified) and appeals
to what Heidegger outlined as the three duties of the German student - labour,
military and knowledge service (though the latter is often omitted in critiques, c.f.
(Wolin, 1993) 29 it does not contain the declarations Steck alleges to have found
- nor does it make any reference to Hitler as “The Fu¨hrer”. The noun “Fu¨hrer”
appears only in the plural, where it means “leaders” more generally, never in the
singular and politically laden sense preceded with the definite article. Despite the
evidence to the contrary, a range of sources assert that the “Fu¨hrer-declaration”
mentioned above forms part of the address.
These examples should be sufficient to suggest that some of the arguments
instrumentalised by the ‘case’ against Heidegger lack a solid foundation. They
merit critical interrogation also because Heidegger gave this address, and a num-
ber of other lectures, before their vocabulary - which from today’s vantage point
stands out in its archaicness and invites comparison with Hitler’s own nostalgia-
ridden rhetoric - had been co-opted by Nazi ideology. The German term “Volk”,
for instance, is easily translatable as “nation”, or “people”, but in some English
editions of the inaugural address has intentionally been left untranslated (e.g. W.
27As Heidegger argued in the Spiegel Interview, this sentence was not part of his address
but in a Freiburg student paper.
28In the Spiegel Interview it was suggested Heidegger was referring explicitly to the new
political direction he felt Germany was taking on Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor, which
Heidegger did not deny.
29According to Wolin, Heidegger’s emphasis on the three-partite nature of the service a
student owes his country contrasts starkly with Ernst Ju¨nger’s focus on the “war front” and
the “labor [sic] front” - Wolin argues that the presence of ‘knowledge’ service in Heidegger’s
argument demonstrates the strong emphasis he placed on this particular aspect (Wolin, 1993,
p. 212).
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S. Lewis’ translation in Wolin, 1993).30These are not merely questions of accuracy
but deeply political ones: translations like that of Lewis contribute to the idea of
a profound conservativism at the core of Heidegger’s work in light of which his
account of technology can be dismissed as ideological and misguided.
8.3 Don’t “Just do it”: Heidegger, Marcuse and
the Virtues of Abstract Thought
Those who are most sympathetic to Heidegger in “the controversy” often invoke
the undisputable fact of the philosopher’s profound influence on his Jewish stu-
dents. Why would thinkers like Hannah Arendt, who, as it is by now well-known,
even entertained a romantic relationship with Heidegger (Maier-Katkin & Maier-
Katkin, 2007), and who referred to him as “the uncrowned king of the empire
of thought” (Steiner, 1995) allow themselves to be affected by a thinking that is
anti-Semitic? Amongst these thinkers it is Herbert Marcuse whose relationship
with Heidegger is of particular interest, as the nature of the hopes shattered that
led to their alienation is immediately relevant to the subject-matter of this thesis:
it concerns what many see as Heidegger’s eschewing of the concrete in favour of
abstraction - a tendency which, as I have consistently argued, is precisely what
makes his approach to technology so suited to a critical analysis of ICTs. It
is aimed at the unifying features these technologies display across a variety of
devices and applications, and which is embodied in the principle of the digital
itself. Marcuse and Heidegger were separated by the concrete/abstract divide,
but even though Heidegger’s thinking might not be overtly political, the links
he draws between abstract technological tendencies and concrete catastrophes of
30Thus Heidegger’s argument that the “dritte Bindung der Studentenschaft ist die an den
geistigen Auftrag des deutschen Volkes” reads very differently in the respective translations.
Harries translates: The third bond of the student body binds it to the spiritual mission of
the German people (Heidegger, 1985 [1933], p. 476). Lewis, on the other hand, translates:
The third bond is the one that binds the students to the spiritual mission of the German Volk
(Wolin, 1993, p. 35).
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modernity, such as the Holocaust, contain a hidden but all the more profound
politics.
Prior to joining the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research, Herbert Marcuse
spent four years at Freiburg, writing his Habilitation (the German higher aca-
demic qualification needed to obtain a professorship) under Heidegger’s direction.
Like his contemporary Arendt, Marcuse was convinced that critical interpreta-
tion must always be aimed towards political praxis, and what he was hoping for
from Heidegger was a kind of concrete philosophy that would lead to a political
plan of action. Wolin locates the attraction of Heidegger’s work for Marcuse in
the “hermeneutical point of departure” in Being and Time, “the fact that human
Being or Dasein occupies center stage in Heidegger’s “‘existential analytic’”:
Marcuse ... reveres this philosophical approach as an Aufhebung
[abolishing] of the static, quasi-positivistic aspects of bourgeois philos-
ophy and social science, whereby humanity is viewed predominantly
as an object of scientific scrutiny and control, rather than as an active
and conscious agent of change and historical becoming. By identifying
Dasein as ... ‘that Being for which its very Being is an issue for it’ -
Heidegger’s thought displays a potential for the constructive transcen-
dence of the traditional (bourgeois) philosophical antinomy between
thought and being, res cogitans and res extensa, and - ultimately -
theory and practice. (Wolin, 1993, pp. 154-155, emphasis added)
The centrality of this aspect of Heidegger’s thinking has already been dis-
cussed in this thesis, for instance in the comparison between Heidegger’s privileg-
ing of human experience to Latour’s ontologically levelled cosmology of objects
and relations in chapter 5. Thus Critical Theory’s normative orientation towards
effecting social change, which Horkheimer’s programmatic essay nominated as its
primary and most important goal, is indeed able to ground itself in Heidegger’s
ontology of care, never however in Latour’s clinical universe where the relation-
ship between one human being and another can claim no experiential precedence
over the relationship between a human being and an object. This privileged lo-
cus of Being in Dasein without a doubt beckoned to Marcuse as a plane from
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which the individual could perform the “radical act” that would lead to his own
actualization, liberation and ultimately the overturn of the existing social order.
Classical Marxism did not cede this possibility to the individual.
The failure of Marcuse’s plan to integrate Marxism and existentialism however
was a failure to find, in Heidegger, instruction as to how exactly human Dasein
should escape from the “inauthentic” Being of conformism, of the masses, to
authentic Being that acts upon its own historical situation. From Marcuse’s per-
spective, the concreteness of Heidegger’s phenomenology of Being was a “pseudo-
concreteness”, as a philosophy that
was just as abstract and just as removed from reality, even avoiding
reality, as the philosophies which at that time had dominated German
universities. (Marcuse cited in Kellner, 1984, p. 36).
The “original phenomenological promise” (Wolin, 1993, p. 156) - the transcend-
ing of the lethargy of traditional “bourgeois” philosophy with which Marcuse had
hoped Heidegger would redeem philosophy as a whole - was thus seen as unful-
filled. These disappointed hopes still resonate in current critiques of Heidegger;
Feenberg (2005, p. xii) for instance argues that Heidegger’s account of technology
“leaves the question of action in the air”.
However, as remarked upon by Zˇizˇek in the quotation at the beginning of this
thesis, it is precisely today’s emphasis on action over thought that is problematic.
This tendency is exacerbated by our ubiquitously ready-to-hand communication
technologies and the discourses that espouse their virtues as short-cuts to social
change. Heidegger’s philosophical account of technology is an antidote to the
ubiquitous imperative “just do it”, as per the Nike slogan. It presents what we
might call a “phenomenology of abstractness”, the very advantages of which are
that it avoids the lure of attaching itself too closely to a particular state-of-the-art,
thus missing the immaterial structures of our technological experience that are
all the more powerful for their immateriality. As we saw in the previous chapter,
behind the ethereal outer of our consumer electronics, Apple being a particularly
telling example, lies hidden the very real, material cost of human life. This is
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what Heidegger’s “phenomenology of abstractness”, encapsulated by his concept
of the Gestell, allows us to see.
As I argued at the beginning of this chapter, the passages in Heidegger’s
work that have caused the most controversy are those we need to look to for his
insights into the reign of technological rationality. The meaning of these passages
has been, if not deliberately misconstrued, then at least received and interpreted
with a degree of negligence that is proportional to the damage it has caused
to Heidegger’s name. The passage we will be focusing on is where Heidegger
appears to liken modern industrialised agriculture to the mass extermination of
Jews in the Nazi concentration camps. These remarks have caused great offence
even amongst those who have engaged very closely with Heidegger’s work, and
who should have understood that they do not constitute a moral judgement,
but rather a critique of the devastating consequences of where the most extreme
technological rationality holds sway.
In making this argument I will draw on the account of the Holocaust given
by the Polish sociologist Zygmunt Bauman. Amongst Bauman’s closest family
there are survivors of the Holocaust, thus Bauman is connected to this historical
period in a very intimate way, and it is fair to assume that his perspective does
not contain the kind of bias that some argue pervades Heidegger’s thinking. I
propose that it is possible to read Bauman’s account of the Holocaust through
Heidegger’s notion of the Gestell : Bauman argues that the Holocaust is the
result of the rationalistic tendencies of a thoroughly technologised modernity,
and that as such it would be fateful to conceive of it as an historical aberration.
Rather, the real horror of the Holocaust lies in the ‘efficiency’ with which it was
executed, an efficiency that is concomitant with modern bureaucratic societies.
Heidegger’s notion of the Gestell has allowed us to expose some of the effects
of this hyper-rationality in the context of our current information-technological
landscape, where the exploitation of labour in the digital supply chain or the
surveillance of our private communications both constitute instances where what
it means to be human is put in danger. Nevertheless, the point is that both
contexts share a root in the logic of instrumentality, efficiency and rationality
that, as we have seen, has sprung naturally from the tradition of Western thought.
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In this sense, the current cultural context is one that at once stems from, and
reinforces, the rationality of ICTs.
8.4 The Gestell: Similarities are not Equiva-
lences
Agriculture is now a mechanized food industry, in essence the same as
the production of corpses in the gas chambers and extermination camps, the
same as the blockading and starving of countries, the same as the production
of hydrogen bombs.
Heidegger, 2012 [1994], p. 27
Heidegger’s “agriculture remark”, as it has come to be known, stems from
a talk entitled “Das Gestell”31 - a clear sign of the fact that it needs to be
understood in the context of his critique of the essence of modern technology.
Nevertheless it has caused deep and widespread uneasiness: Lacoue-Labarthe for
instance has referred to it as “scandalous and lamentably inadequate” (cited in
Elden, 2001, p. 77). I would argue, however, that interpreting Heidegger’s remark
as a moral judgement on the Holocaust represents either a fundamental failure to
recognise the basic tenets of Heidegger’s account of technology, or a lamentable
misconstruction that passes over the depth of insight Heidegger’s concept of the
Gestell can offer in terms of analysing our own technological environment. In
31The lecture formed part of a cycle of lectures given at the University of Bremen in 1949,
Insight Into That Which Is, Heidegger’s first speaking engagement after his ban from teaching.
The lectures have only recently been translated into English (by Andrew Mitchell, published
in 2012), hence the frequency with which the “agriculture remark” has been cited in English is
somewhat surprising, although its incendiary effects, given the fact that it could only be taken
out of context, less so. Mitchell translates Heidegger’s concept of the Gestell as “positionality”, a
translation I find problematic in that its main emphasis is relational. While I have emphasised
that Heidegger’s ontology is fundamentally spatial, the term “positionality” privileges these
spatial qualities over the fact that in German the term “Gestell” is closely related to “stellen”
and “bestellen”. As already argued, this shared etymological root is important as it denotes
how even the Gestell is a kind of revealing.
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bringing these developments into proximity with each other Heidegger was not
pronouncing a moral judgement, relativising the horrors of the Nazi war crimes,
but pointing out that in all of them he saw the same destructive forces of ra-
tionality at work, articulated both by the machineries of mass-scale agriculture
and by the horrific efficiency of the systematic extermination of Jews in the gas
chambers. It is this interpretation that allows, or even demands of us, to add the
rationalising tendencies of the digital informational matrix to the list.
The point is that parallels must not be confused with equivalences. In the con-
text of this thesis we have discussed two common dominant narratives concerning
the role and social impact of ICTs. In the first instance, I gave examples of the
argument that social media are fostering creativity, community and constitute
a force for social and political change. Elsewhere and in a very different narra-
tive, ICTs are seen from the perspective of the growing corporate exploitation
of user data and governmental surveillance. Considered in isolation, each narra-
tive suffers from a privileging of the correct over the true, in that it makes some
“correct determinations” about our information-technological infrastructure. In
the case of the former, it is correct to say that social media have facilitated the
coordination of protest actions. In the latter case, it is a correct observation that
the increasingly pervasive networked CCTV systems are symptomatic of a wider
trend towards growing government scrutiny and control.
However, it is only when considered side by side that the intrinsically con-
tradictory nature of the digital informational system becomes visible. These
contradictions call for an adequate theorisation, but we must then not be afraid
to let this concept do its work. In the present context, a fear of being accused of
drawing distasteful equivalences between Nazism and more general points about
technological dis-empowerment seems to have stopped thinkers from making le-
gitimate parallels. The value of Heidegger’s concept of the Gestell is that it draws
attention to the process of technological withdrawal in all its forms without at-
taching to it the label of optimism and pessimism, which is precisely why there
is no value judgement attached to his listing modern industrial agriculture and
the Nazi genocide in one sentence.
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The reactions to Heidegger’s agricultural remark might be read as symp-
tomatic of a different intellectual malaise, namely a bias towards the concrete
over the abstract. In listing “the production of corpses in gas chambers”, “the
blockading and starving of countries” and the “production of hydrogen bombs”,
Heidegger was drawing a parallel based on the underlying essence that he saw at
work in each of these phenomena. This relates directly to our earlier point about
how Heidegger doesn’t single out specific technologies for discussion at a material
level, but is more interested in pointing out the immaterial, structural parallels
that exist between seemingly highly diverse phenomena. A deep scepticism to-
wards parallels that derive their validity from a single underlying essence, rather
than from concrete existence, is the reason behind Heim’s reference to Heideg-
ger’s Gestell as a “metaphysical sphinx” that “terrorizes thought” (Heim, 1993,
p. 57), as much as for Feenberg’s remark that “he [Heidegger] literally cannot
discriminate between electricity and atom bombs, agricultural techniques and the
Holocaust” (Feenberg, 1999, p. 187).
8.5 Dasein and Temporality: Only Humans Can
Die
The misconstructions of Heidegger’s agriculture remark are echoed in the similarly
outraged responses to another passage from the third lecture in the series Insight
Into That Which Is, entitled “The Danger”, where a superficial reading might
suggest he is denying that millions died at the hands of the Nazis. However,
it is necessary to place this passage in the context of Heidegger’s concept of
Dasein - from this perspective, it emerges as a poignant testament to the extreme
consequences of technological rationality:
Hundreds of thousands die in masses. Do they die? They perish. They
are put down. Do they die? They become pieces of inventory of a
standing reserve for the fabrication of corpses. Do they die? They are
unobtrusively liquidated in extermination camps. ... To die, however,
206
8.5 Dasein and Temporality: Only Humans Can Die
means to endure death in its essence. To be able to die means to be
capable of this endurance. ... But in the midst of these innumerable
dead, the essence of death remains disguised. (Heidegger, 2012 [1994],
p. 53, translation modified, emphasis added)
Is Heidegger trying to deny the historical reality of one of humanity’s darkest
hours, the systematic killing of millions in concentration camps? He is not, and
it is mainly thanks to the absurd misconceptions of Holocaust deniers like Ernst
Zndel that such a possibility even haunts the public imagination (which, as the
Polish sociologist Zygmunt Bauman asserts, “only seem, if inadvertently, ...to add
to the public awareness of the Holocaust through the sensational headlines they
provoke” (Bauman, 1989, pg.x).
What Heidegger is arguing, is that Being towards Death is the unique possibil-
ity of human Dasein. It is part of the unique experience of time, or temporality,
that characterises the essence of human Being. In order to understand what
Heidegger is saying, we need to free ourselves from our banal, everyday under-
standing of time, which is defined by the passing of fixed units like hours and
seconds - precise entities that we take for granted in their scientific objectivity
as we do other physical categories such as weights or measures: they are part of
the ‘fixed ground plan’, the matrix according to which science orders our under-
standing of the world. The ubiquitous presence of clocks and watches as well as
our tendency to comments like “I only have five minutes” are emblematic of the
present-to-hand nature of our understanding of time.
For Heidegger, time is indeed fundamental to human Being-in-the-world, but
not as an “abstract container” for “clock-time” (Blattner, 2005, p. 311). Rather,
it is the very condition upon which our limited conception of ‘clock-time’ can at
all be experienced:
whenever Dasein tacitly understands and interprets something like
Being, it does so with time as its standpoint. Time must be brought
to light - and genuinely conceived - as the horizon for all understanding
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of Being and for any way of interpreting it. (Heidegger, 2008, p. 39,
emphasis in the original)
Dasein’s ability to experience this more fundamental temporality is what marks it
out from other beings. The temporal framework within which Being understands
itself, is fundamentally determined by its finitude - what Heidegger calls Being-
toward-Death. This is why Heidegger’s phrasing is important - he says that to
die “means to endure death in its essence” “ Mitchell’s translation as “carrying
out death in its essence” misses the temporal aspect of “endurance”.
The profound danger of the essence of technology is that at its most extreme,
it rids us of the capacity of this experience: Dasein is reduced to mere presence-at-
hand. This ultimate technological rationality is what Heidegger sees manifested
in the Holocaust: his point is that long before Nazis exterminated the Jews in
their gas chambers they had already rid them of their existence as Dasein, and
thus of the possibilities one can only claim as a human being - including death.
In other words: only human beings can die, and Heidegger sees the victims of the
gas chambers as having been stripped of all that makes them human even before
their death, it is for this reason that Heidegger can claim that they ‘did not die’.
Hence it is important to note that what has rid the victims of the gas chambers
of the possibility of death, abandoning them into an un-Dasein-like, dehumanized,
existence, is not the singular monstrosity of Hitler’s mind, but the reduction of
human Being-in-the-world to its technical manifestation, the ultimate rationaliza-
tion of all things that permitted the monstrosity of his mind to be administered
in such an “efficient” way. As Hemming puts it, Heidegger’s question “do they
die?” is really the question of
what kind of danger lurks in the advent of the total domination of
technology such that death itself (a most sacred moment in a life)
can be deprived of its sacrality and transmuted into the exercise of
mechanised and massified technique? (Hemming, 2011, p. 4)
208
8.6 Echoes of Heidegger’s Critique of Technological Rationality
Heidegger’s argument that the victims of the camps did not die thus, as Cohen has
suggested, becomes the “utmost condemnation of the Nazi regime, ... a radical
critique of what man can do to man” (2012).
The themes explored in this thesis relate to our current information-technological
environment. Apple’s consumer electronics, for instance, are not marketed as gad-
gets or devices but as the key to a human life worth living. A recent advert for
its flagship laptop, the Macbook Air, for instance quotes from Walt Whitman’s
poem “O Me! O Life!”:
O me, O life of the questions of these recurring. Of the endless trains
of the faithless. Of cities filled with the foolish. What good amid
these, O me, O life? Answer: that you are here. That life exists and
identity. That the powerful play goes on, and you may contribute a
verse. (cited in Vella, 2014)
For Heidegger, poetry is a domain of truth that is beyond the technological modes
of revealing. Apple’s co-opting of Whitman’s words however shows the extent to
which what constitutes life, or Dasein, is increasingly dictated by technological
modes of Being. In the same way as Heidegger’s controversial question “Do they
die?” forces us to acknowledge the ways in which Dasein has become the victim
of technological rationality, we should be turning this question onto the ways
in which our own Being-in-the-world is determined by technological rationality -
albeit in infinitely more subtle ways. In light of the above Apple advert we might
thus perhaps ask “Do they live?”
8.6 Echoes of Heidegger’s Critique of Techno-
logical Rationality
This penultimate section seeks to illustrate the strength of Heidegger’s critique of
modern rationality further by drawing parallels to other thinkers like Bauman and
Derrida - parallels conveniently ignored by those who seek to label Heidegger’s
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thinking a “scandalous and lamentably inadequate” (cited in Elden, 2001, p.
77) critique of the errors of technological modernity. In her book Eichmann in
Jerusalem: The Banality of Evil Hannah Arendt considers the trial of Adolf
Eichmann, one of the major perpetrators in the Nazi war crimes. Arendt was
heavily criticised for the subtitle in her book, which appeared to trivialise the
horrific crimes committed by the defendant, to the extent that she later apologised
for her choice of words. Arendt was trying to express the inexpressible, the
contrast between Eichmann’s calm demeanour during the trial and the crimes he
was being tried for.
Thus,
[t]he uncanny nature of the Holocaust stems from the fact that this
most egregious episode in humankind’s cruelty involved such a mind-
numbing number of victims not primarily because of the blood lust of
the sort of killers witnessed in other historical genocides, but rather,
because personifications of calmness like Eichmann were able to over-
see, with exemplary levels of bureaucratic efficiency, processes that
were highly “reasonable” in so far as one is able to forget the specific
tasks to which those processes were applied. (Taylor, 2014, p. 91)
Eichmann’s calm exterior becomes representative of the bureaucratic efficiency
of modernity and its dehumanizing tendencies. From this perspective, the truly
shocking aspect of the Holocaust is not the shrunken faces of the victims of the
concentration camps - confrontation with images such as these will lead to the
appropriate reaction, which is that of shock and horror - but the cold serenity of
its executers. In a paradoxical way, the failure to recognise this difference is a
failure to recognise the singularity of the event itself - a failure that nevertheless
remains pervasive, and that Arendt repeatedly addressed. Bauman recounts how
Hannah Arendt
was shouted down by the chorus of offended feelings when she sug-
gested that the victims of an inhuman regime might have lost some
of their humanity on the road to perdition. (Bauman, 1989, pg.x)
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Heidegger’s argument, which we find echoed in Arendt’s suggestion above, can be
illuminated further if we consider the historical concept of the outlaw. Agamben
(1998) tells of the “homo sacer”, a human being who under Ancient Roman Law
had lost his status as citizen, and who could thus be killed by anyone without
fear of recrimination: someone whose death had no sacrificial value. Outlaws in
Norse and Viking cultures were similarly unprotected. This reduction of a person
to non-personhood is, as Zˇizˇek argues, not historically specific but specific to the
technological rationality with which the West maintains its status of dominance
around the world:
Today, as a term denoting exclusion, it can be seen to apply not
only to terrorists, but also to those who are on the receiving end of
humanitarian aid (Rwandans, Bosnians, Afghans), as well as to the
Sans Papiers in France and the inhabitants of the favelas in Brazil
or the African American ghettoes in the US. Concentration camps
and humanitarian refugee camps are, paradoxically, the two faces,
‘inhuman’ and ‘human’, of one sociological matrix. (Zˇizˇek, 2002)
Zˇizˇek’s argument that “concentration camps and humanitarian refugee camps
are ... two faces ... of one sociological matrix” is characteristically radical of the
thinker, but it is another means of expressing Heidegger’s earlier argument about
modern technologised agriculture, the atomic bomb and mass extermination being
expressions of a single essence of rational, technologised modernity. Even more
importantly, it echoes precisely the inherently paradoxical, two-faced nature of
the information-technological matrix that is the subject of this thesis.
This is the argument Bauman makes in his account of the Holocaust. Bauman
argues that, rather than an “interruption in the normal flow of history, a cancerous
growth on the body of civilized society, a momentary madness among sanity”
(Bauman, 1989, p. viii)
[t]he Holocaust was born and executed in our modern rational soci-
ety, at the high stage of our civilization and at the peak of human
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cultural achievement, and for this reason it is a problem of that soci-
ety, civilization and culture. (Bauman, 1989, pg. x, emphasis in the
original)
The way in which the global imagination has absorbed the Holocaust, for Bau-
man, represents a danger - the danger that one singularly horrific impression
might conceal the way in which connections can be drawn from this event to the
structural features of Modernity:
These pictures ... represent only an extreme manifestation of a ten-
dency which may be discovered in all bureaucracies, however benign
and innocuous the tasks in which they are currently engaged. I suggest
that the discussion of the dehumanizing tendency, rather than being
focused on its most sensational and vile, but fortunately uncommon,
manifestations, ought to concentrate on the more universal, and for
this reason potentially more dangerous, manifestations. (Bauman,
1989, p. 102)
We find a very similar argument made by Jacques Derrida, when he states that
Nazism was not born in the desert... And even if, far from the desert,
it had grown like a mushroom in the silence of a European forest,
it would have done so in the shadow of big trees, in the shelter of
their silence or their indifference but in the same soil. I will not
list these trees which in Europe people an immense black forest, I
will not count the species. ... In their bushy taxonomy, they would
bear the names of religions, philosophies, political regimes, economic
structures, religious or academic institutions. In short, what is just as
confusedly called culture, or the world of spirit. (Derrida, 1987, pp.
109-110)32
32For this quote I am indebted to Mahon O’Brien’s paper on the “Heidegger Controversy”
(O’Brien, 2010)
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However, in Bauman’s argument that the Holocaust needs to be seen in the con-
text of our thoroughly modern, rational society, Adorno’s idea of the ‘totally
administered society’ clearly resonates: Adorno who so vociferously opposed Hei-
degger’s ideas. Both Adorno and Horkheimer saw a conformist society emerging
in Europe that had no room for the individual, but where everything was stream-
lined and institutionalized with a thoroughness that constituted a new kind of
totalitarianism. Adorno saw the greatest threat to man emanating from “or-
ganized mankind” (quoted in Bernstein, 2001 [1991], pg.4) and, as Bernstein
suggests in his introduction to The Culture Industry, for Adorno and Horkheimer
it wasn’t socialism that constituted the triumph of reason - but fascism, in that
it “continued reason”s work of domination through integration and unification”
(ibid.). This is further evidence in support of my argument that Heidegger’s con-
cept of the totalising Gestell is compatible with a Marxist critique of society, and
validates my suggestion that these meeting points merit further exploration.
Finally, it is interesting to note that more recently Bauman has conceived
of another phenomenon in the context of rational modernity - one that is much
closer to the immediate concerns of this thesis than the Holocaust. Nevertheless,
there is much to be learned from the parallels that Bauman draws: he speaks of
’liquid surveillance’, 33. as the modern-day “regimes of in/visibility characterised
by data-flows, mutating surveillance agencies and the targeting and sorting of
everyone” (Lyon, 2010, p. 325). Liquid surveillance denotes a surveillance sys-
tem that is no longer confined to traditional, visible and hierarchical structures of
control, but that is dispersed into the bureaucratic infrastructure. As such, it no
longer seeks to control, a goal which panoptic surveillance pursued via confine-
ment, but through exclusion (Bauman & Lyon, 2013, p. 64). The surveillance
mechanisms that best embody this new principle, as Bauman argues, are the
CCTV cameras around gated communities, shopping malls and the forecourts of
supermarkets (ibid., p.63). Another example would be how state securitization
33 The term ‘liquid surveillance’ was not originally coined by Bauman, but was coined by
David Lyon as a result of his conversations about the current state of surveillance, which have
been published as a book under the title Liquid Surveillance (Bauman & Lyon, 2013). The
adjective ‘liquid’ references Bauman’s earlier sociological works, e.g. Liquid Modernity (2000)
and Liquid Fear (2006)
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works increasingly through keeping people out, rather than keeping people in
- ‘undesirable’ persons are expelled, deported or refused entry, the latter easily
achievable through adding that person to a ‘no-fly list’ that is easily administered
via a database connecting international law enforcement agencies. The global in-
formational infrastructure enables a system of surveillance that doesn’t rely on
material structures of control, but that is ‘liquid’ in its dispersed centres of control
and its functioning via flows of information.
The English translation of Heidegger’s concept of the Gestell as ‘enframement’
suggests a rigid structure that does not immediately lend itself to thinking about
the ‘liquid’ tendencies of contemporary digital surveillance - we need to recall,
however, that the crucial aspect of this concept is an immaterial one, in that it
denotes a form of technological revealing. In this sense it is particularly suited
to helping us explore the forms of technical rationality that underlie surface-
level changes in the ways surveillance is administered. As noted earlier, however,
there is a danger that the tendency towards new in ICT discourse, of which ‘liquid
surveillance’ is an example, might lead us to lose sight of the hierarchical power
structures that have remained in place.
A crucial point Bauman makes is that in this modern surveillance system, the
surveilled are, wittingly or unwittingly, participating in and facilitating their own
surveillance. Employee performance for instance, Bauman argues, is no longer
enforced from above but “‘contracted out’, ‘outsourced’ or ‘hived off’ laterally
and judged according to a seller-buyer pattern rather than a boss-subordinate
relationship” (ibid., p.59). To bring an example, we can think of the CCTV
surveillance of the employees of the German supermarket chain Lidl, which was
not undertaken by the managers, but outsourced to a private security firm (Stern,
2008). On a wider scale and at the same time an example that pertains to each
of us, the use of a smart phone, social networking sites and store cards can all
be considered as ways in which we as individuals contribute to and facilitate our
own surveillance. Using the apt metaphor of the snail carrying its home, Bauman
thus argues that
the employees of the brave new liquid modern world must grow and
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carry their personal panopticons on their own body. Employees and
every other variety of the subordinated have been charged with full
and unconditional responsibility for keeping them in good repair and
assuring their uninterrupted operation (leaving your mobile or iPhone
at home when you go for a stroll, and thereby suspending the state of
being constantly at a superior’s beck and call, is a case of serious mis-
demeanour. Tempted by the allure of consumer markets and fright-
ened by the new freedom of the bosses to vanish, together with the
jobs on offer, subordinates are so groomed to the role of self-watchers
as to render redundant the watchtowers in the Bentham/Foucault
[panopticon] scheme. (Bauman & Lyon, 2013, p. 59)
In a recent interview the whistleblower Edward Snowden made a similar point,
arguing that established metaphors for the surveillance state, such as those that
draw on George Orwell’s book 1984 miss how surveillance today is driven by the
cooperation of those under surveillance:
They talked about things like microphones implanted in bushes and
cameras in TVs that look back at us. But now we’ve got webcams
that go with us everywhere. We actually buy cellphones that are
the equivalent of a network microphone that we carry around in our
pockets voluntarily. Times have shown that the world is much more
unpredictable and dangerous [than Orwell imagined]. (Rusbridger &
MacAskill, 2014)
Evoking Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, according to which a power relationship
between two parties requires mutual recognition, or in other words, the party
exercising power requires the other to yield to it, the modern surveillance system
has perfected the technique of enlisting the victim of surveillance into his/her
own surveillance.
Linking Bauman’s ideas of liquid surveillance to his account of the Holocaust
and the possibility of reading this account through Heidegger’s concept of the
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Gestell, it is interesting to note Bauman’s suggestion that a precedent, if needed,
for the ‘voluntary servitude’ exhibited by members of today’s surveillance soci-
ety, lies in the Jewish prisoners in the Auschwitz concentration camp who threw
themselves against the high-voltage barbed wire (ibid., p.56). Here it again be-
comes clear that Bauman views the Holocaust not as a unique moment in history,
but as an extreme manifestation of modernity’s bureaucratic rationality. Bauman
demonstrates that parallels between such disparate phenomena such as the Holo-
caust and modern-day bureaucratic surveillance can indeed by drawn, and what
is more, drawing these parallels is in fact necessary. It allows us to see the wider
causes of such phenomena, which would otherwise escape us in their immaterial-
ity, rooted as they are in the modern rationalist mindset that, as Heidegger has
shown us, is in itself not a modern phenomenon but rooted in the development
of Western thought. Heidegger’s notion of the Gestell articulates the essence of
such diverse phenomena as modern industrialised agriculture, famines and mass
extermination, as Heidegger listed them in his ‘agriculture remark’, and allows us
to expose the same totalising, de-humanizing tendencies where they are at work
in our own techno-bureaucratic environment.
8.7 Summary
To conclude this section, I would suggest that Heidegger’s “silence” emerges from
an awareness of how easily the truth is misplaced by correct determinations.
Accusations of revisionism (Fried, 2012) need to be balanced against the clear
echoes of Heidegger’s thought that we have seen in the work of other profoundly
influential thinkers. Bauman’s argument that the Holocaust does not form a
singular “picture on the wall” of history, separated from the rest of an otherwise
cheerful aspect by its singularly dark shades, could thus also be taken as referring
to Heidegger’s concept of the Gestell: through it,
one can catch a rare glimpse of many things otherwise invisible. And
the things one can see are of the utmost importance not just for the
perpetrators, victims and witnesses of the crime, but for all those
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who are alive today and hope to be alive tomorrow. (Bauman, 1989,
pgs.vii-viii)
One could argue that the critics’ passing over of the notion of ‘essence’ in Heideg-
ger’s argument that the Holocaust and modern industrialised agriculture or the
hydrogen bomb are ‘in essence’ the same, is precisely what Heidegger’s argument
is aimed at exposing as deeply problematic: the persistent failure to recognise
truth amidst an abundance of correctness.
Cohen’s (2012) reading of Heidegger’s remarks brings to them a level of sen-
sitivity, maturity and insight that is lacking in most other treatments. Cohen
suggests that in the “sameness” implied by Heidegger’s enumeration in the “agri-
culture remark”, lies an invitation to recognise and reflect on the singularity of the
effect of this sameness. Cohen links Heidegger’s ‘silence’ to the work of memory
and mourning that doesn’t pass over the singularity of the effect of that sameness.
He suggests Heidegger’s silence is a response brought on by the recognition that
to name, would be the ultimate violence of Auschwitz. Once, Cohen argues, the
horror it is articulated, it is inscribed into a technique of commemoration and its




9.1 Three Problems with the Question Concern-
ing Technology
This thesis sought to address the question of how Martin Heidegger’s philosophy,
and in particular his work on technology that is contained within his essay “The
Question Concerning Technology”, and his main work Being and Time, can help
us gain a better understanding of the ubiquity and implications of information
and communications technologies. In drawing the final conclusions, rather than
straightforwardly recounting the successive themes in Heidegger’s thinking that
have been investigated and summarised at the end of each chapter, I will take
a different approach: over the following paragraphs I will recount some of the
problems that usually characterise inquiries into how certain technologies impact
on social life, and how a philosophical approach, and in particular Heidegger’s
emphasis on rigorous questioning as explored in the present thesis, provides a
solution to some of these problems.
Questioning the ‘impact’ of information and communication technologies on
social life, one has to contend with three main challenges. The first is the risk
of making simplistic assessments of the role technology plays in shaping social
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life, assessments that suggest it acts quasi-autonomously and that its influence
is uniform and certifiable. The dominant narratives in academic, policy and
popular discourse, for instance that we live in an ‘Information Society’ (Webster,
2002 and 2006), a ‘Knowledge Society’ (UNESCO, 2005) or a ‘Network Society’
(Castells, 2000) are all culpable of such reductionism. They are what Francois
Lyotard referred to as ‘grand narratives’, or ‘metanarratives’, like ancient myths
or fairy-tales they imbue a succession of events with meaning (Lyotard, 1984).
As a result of a desire to make sense of what is happening, a single idea or morale
takes hold, whose first purpose was to explain a historical period, but it also ends
up shaping it. The way the idea that we inhabit an ‘Information Society’ has
taken hold in policy discourse is a very tangible example: the European Union’s
‘Directorate General for the Information Society and Media’ and the European
Commission’s ‘Information Society Newsroom’ are evidence of policy that is are
“driven by ideological assumptions rather than knowledge in... [its] efforts to
direct or regulate technical practices” (Scharff & Dusek, 2003, p. 383). Grand
or metanarratives impose a simple cause-and-effect dynamic that the realities of
technology adoption and dispersion have again and again refuted.
Another problem we encounter specifically with attempts to conceptualise
the impact of information and communication technologies, is the proliferation of
competing narratives. In recent years the idea of the ‘Surveillance Society’ has be-
come popularised, painting a more sinister picture of the ubiquity of information
and information-processing devices than that offered by the older ‘Information
Society’ or ‘Network Society’ narratives. Yet they persist as parallel monologues,
obscuring the fact that the surveillance and exploitation of user data can only
occur after this data has been created ? and it is created in the very contexts of
self-expression, sharing and global connectivity that drives techno-utopian nar-
ratives. It might be helpful to recall Gehl’s argument that
[i]n a typical Web 2.0 site, there is a surface, where users are free to
produce content and make affective connotations, and there is a hid-
den depth, where new media capitalists convert user-generated con-
tent into exchange-values. (2009, p. 25)
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The final problem with accounts that seek to make statements about the im-
pact of technology on human life I wish to raise, and that which weighs heaviest,
is that they claim to be able to offer an outside perspective, a transcendental
plane from which judgment can be reached. However, it was Marshall McLuhan
who famously argued that “whoever discovered water, certainly wasn’t a fish”
(cited in Taylor, 2010, p. 9), which is another way of saying that it is difficult to
see something clearly for what it is when one is surrounded by it. The overwhelm-
ing immediacy of our information-technological environment arguably makes this
distance very difficult, if not impossible, to achieve - as noted in chapter seven,
the tendency of equipment to withdraw into readiness-to-hand is amplified by
digital technologies: they do not only represent a withdrawal, but a withdrawal
from withdrawal. We are thoroughly immersed in this environment, but ironically,
scholarship on the media still suffers from an anxiety that it is still not being im-
mersed enough. In the debate around the need to ‘upgrade’ Media Studies in
view to keep up with ‘Web 2.0’, Merrin (2008) for instance expressed uneasiness
about being “being a media studies lecturer when your students know more about
media than you do”:
Now there’s a whole world of P2P music, film and TV; video-clips;
home-made mobile porn; customised avatars; graffiti, funwalls and su-
perwalls; tagging, texting, messaging, sheep-throwing, bitch-slapping
and virtual penguins that we’re struggling to keep up with. (ibid.)
The problem is that from this immersion we short-circuit straight through to
‘grand narratives’ about how these new technologies are shaping society. The
argument around the democratising power of social media is an example of this
kind of short-circuiting - a flurry of activity on Facebook leads straight to grand
conclusions about social media-driven revolutions, and thought is passed over in
the process.
In arguing for the need to consider Martin Heidegger’s thinking in seeking to
understand what the ubiquity and pervasiveness of ICTs means for social, po-
litical, cultural or economic life, I am not suggesting that Heidegger can give us
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the ‘definitive’ response. Of the problems I have just outlined that follow the
question of ‘technology’s impact’ around like its shadow, the problem of a tran-
scendental viewpoint remains steadfast, a problem from which the philosopher is
not exempt. Philosophers have always relied on information and communication
technologies, which led Kittler to point out the irony of the fact that “[m]ore than
any other theorists, philosophers forgot to ask which media support their very
practice” (Kittler, 2009, p. 23). For Kittler it is Heidegger who first developed
this kind of consciousness. Despite being an unusual philosopher in this sense,
Heidegger is a true philosopher in the most important sense, which is his own
awareness of what philosophy is for and what it can achieve. Thus he begins his
essay “The Question concerning Technology” with the words “in what follows
we shall be questioning technology. Questioning builds a way” (Heidegger, 1977,
p. 3, emphasis added). What I have tried to show in the present thesis is that
Heidegger’s thinking can ‘open up’ some of the issues that cause problems when
thinking about technology and, to use a wiser term than ‘impact’, its interaction
with the social.
One of the problems in accounts of the relationship between technology and
the social, as I mentioned earlier, is that they are prone to falling into the trap of
technological determinism. In chapter three I showed how Heidegger’s own think-
ing on technology is frequently reduced to his idea of the Gestell as a totalising
force that leaves no room for human agency, thus offering a “bleak diagnosis” of
mankind’s technological future (Verbeek, 2005, p. 4). However, closer engage-
ment with Heidegger’s argument shows that his distinction between the realm
of the “merely technological” and the “essence of technology” (Heidegger, 1977)
in fact prohibits a simple deterministic account of ‘technological effects’. What
characterises the majority of narratives about information and communication
technologies is a fetishisation of technological instruments - the idea of an ‘Infor-
mation Society’ for instance is largely premised on the ubiquity of information and
of the devices for processing it, which, as Webster has argued, merely amounts
to “describing our age in terms of its most palpable features” (Webster, 2002, p.
22).
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Further insight into the vacuous nature of most debates around technological
determinism comes from engaging with what I have called Heidegger’s ‘network
ontology’. This ontology contains the directive to think technologies not as self-
contained objects, but as complex structures the being of which is dispersed across
a network of both inanimate and animate nodes in a network. For Heidegger, no
technological object can be reduced to inanimate matter, as it always involves
a sociality both in terms of its making and its use. This not only disproves the
argument that Heidegger is a technological determinist, it dismantles the grounds
on which the simple technological determinism of the kind that still haunts me-
dia and communications studies in the shape of the spectres of Harold Innis and
Marshall McLuhan, is based. One might argue that the battle with technological
determinism has already been fought and won by the social constructivist argu-
ment as put by Bijker (1995). What Heidegger adds to this and similar accounts
is an ontological understanding of the nature of the interaction between techno-
logical objects and human beings. Critics might argue that such an ontological
account is provided with much more panache, simplicity and relevant real-life
examples by Bruno Latour and his actor-network theory. As I have argued in
chapter seven however, what is problematic in Latour’s network metaphysics is
that human being is granted no ontological priority over other beings, where Hei-
degger retains the centrality of human experience. Put bluntly, if the question
of technology matters, it needs to matter for someone - otherwise the question is
not worth asking.
As mentioned above, another challenge that opposes attempts to generalise the
‘impact’ of ICTs on the social has to do with what constitutes ICTs - as we have
seen, various narratives co-exist, cherry-picking from the wealth of information
and communicational devices, applications, activities and processes. In this thesis
I have deliberately avoided the term ‘media’ where possible, as it seems to exclude
technologies like smart cards and CCTV cameras, and have given preference to
the term ICTs as more representative of the ‘informational system’ we are dealing
with - which comprises any kind of artefact that is capable of processing data.
Heidegger’s account of technology, we have seen, is frequently accused of being
overly abstract and lacking in references to specific technologies (Heim 1993,
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Feenberg 1999 and 2000, Verbeek, 2005). Aside from the argument that needs to
be kept in mind that an ontology (which is what Heidegger is trying to achieve)
is by definition general, what I have tried to argue is that it is precisely this non-
specificity that makes Heidegger so suitable for thinking about the features that
characterise our information-technological system as a whole. His notion of the
‘Gestell’ is aimed at the unifying features of modern technological systems in their
tendency towards objectification as well as those instances where technological
rationality has gone beyond objectification toward an overall ontological levelling
of all things but especially the eradication of human being’s special status as
being that is Dasein.
Thus, Heidegger allows us to see that it is not the ubiquity of our technological
devices that marks this age as technological, but the pervasiveness of a techno-
logical rationality that has its origins in the tradition of Western thought. He has
been much criticised for leading us away from concrete technological realities to-
wards an abstraction that “terrorizes thought with a puzzling lack of specificity”
(Heim, 1993, p. 57), but I have aimed to show that this abstraction allows us
to see concrete technological realities in the wider context of an ongoing trend
towards rationalization. It allows us to connect seemingly disparate phenomena
- and where Zˇizˇek’s strategy is to consider “relationship[s] between phenomena
that are normally incomparable in order to create through theory an ‘impossible
short circuit ’, (Taylor, 2010, p. 9, emphasis in the original), I would argue that
Heidegger creates a seemingly impossible short circuit between concrete phenom-
ena to build theory, or rather thinking, the very step that short-hand narratives
like the ‘Information Society’ have ommitted.
9.2 A Saving Power?
I argued early on that next to the accusation of being a technological determinist,
the other accusation that is frequently made against Heidegger is that he is a
Luddite who would like to return from the exploitation of the earth,
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consumerism, and mass media to the world of the pre-Socratic Greeks
or the good old Schwartzwald peasants. (Dreyfus, 2009, p. 26)
I hope to have shown why this is equally untrue, as Heidegger’s concern is not the
concrete technological reality but the technological mindset underlying these real-
ities. As Heidegger argued in his famous interview with Der Spiegel, “[p]essimism
and optimism are positions that fall too short of the realm we are attempting to
reflect upon” (1993 [1966]). It is for this reason that from a Heideggerian per-
spective, Luddism represents a misrecognition of reality in the ideological sense.
Where social evil is concentrated in technology, the solution appears deceptively
simple: in order to deal with the evil caused by technology, the solution is to
either do away with this technology, or to produce better technology. This is
precisely the technological thinking that is the real heart of Heidegger’s critique
of technology, the truth that is displaced by an abundance of correctness in the
shape of the ongoing emphasis on problems created by concrete technologies.
Writing about the insight that art can give into the nature of the present,
McLuhan stressed in particular the ability of the artist “to sidestep the bully blow
of new technology of any age, and to parry such violence with full awareness”
(McLuhan, 2001). Thus the British Turner Prize winner Damian Hirst’s work,
entitled “In This Terrible Moment We Are All Victims of an Environment That
Refuses to Acknowledge the Soul” is deeply evocative of Heidegger’s point about
technological thinking. The work consists of rows and rows of narrow shelves
mounted on a wall, each shelf bearing a row of meticulously arranged pills and
tablets. Hirst’s point is that we are living in an environment that assumes it can
provide a treatment for every illness, where the illness is often a direct result of
the environment itself (we might think of stress-related headaches for instance).
We might also draw parallels with Zˇizˇek’s analogy of the ‘chocolate laxative’,
which, he argues, denotes
a kind of pseudo-Hegelian immediate coincidence of opposites: ac-
tion and reaction should coincide; the very thing that causes damage
should already be the remedy. The ultimate example is arguably a
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chocolate laxative, available in the USA, with the paradoxical injunc-
tion: do you have constipation? Eat more of this chocolate! (that is,
of the very thing that causes constipation). (Zˇizˇek, 2003, p. 97)
Both Hirst and Zˇizˇek echo Heidegger’s point, the irony of finding a technological
solution to the problem of technology. Heidegger, as Dreyfus points out, is not
supplying a recipe for getting technology under control so that it may serve our
rationally chosen ends. For Heidegger technology is neither the problem, nor the
solution: the problem is the reduction of Being to instrumentality, which merely
finds expression in technology:
What is dangerous is not technology. There is no demonry of tech-
nology, but rather there is the mystery of its essence. The essence of
technology... is the danger ... where Enframing reigns, there is danger
in the highest sense. (Heidegger, 1977, p. 28)
Given Heidegger’s emphatic denial of the possibility of a technological solution
to the problems of technology, it might seem puzzling then that Heidegger should
suggest that a ‘saving power’ emanates from the dangers posed by technological
‘enframing’. Yet, at the end of his essay on “The Question Concerning Technol-
ogy”, Heidegger once again quotes the poet Ho¨lderlin in saying that “where the
danger is, grows [t]he saving power also”. Despite the fact that instrumentality
has become the dominant mode of Being - to the extent that even human beings
are approached in this way, and in some extreme cases counting even less than a
means to an end (where they are exterminated en masse for instance, deprived
even of the capacity of dying a human death) - Heidegger insists that there is
a “saving power” that originates in the very source of the Gestell. In order to
comprehend this seemingly absurd point it is necessary to remind ourselves that
despite its totalising tendencies that seemingly remove it from all that is good
and truthful, the Gestell is still a mode of revealing. As such, it still confronts
us with Being, but we need to become aware of the particular way in which Be-
ing confronts us through the Gestell. It is from this recognition that the saving
power emerges, and it emerges in the shape of giving us the chance to realign
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the ontological structures that shape how we engage with the world. For Hei-
degger, we not only have the capacity to shape how revealing takes place, we
have a responsibility to do so. This is what Heidegger refers to as “the highest
dignity of [man’s] essence”. It is worth quoting from his “Letter on Humanism”
to emphasise that Heidegger is really speaking of a responsibility towards other
beings, not a right -
Man is rather ‘thrown’ ... into the truth of Being, so that ... he might
guard the truth of Being, in order that beings might appear in the
light of Being as the beings they are. Man does not decide whether
and how beings appear, whether and how God and the gods or history
and nature come forward into the clearing of Being, come to presence
and depart. Man is the shepherd of Being. (Heidegger, 1978, p. 159,
emphasis added)34
From the specific nature of human Being as a being that has an awareness of its
own Being, Heidegger argues emerges a responsibility: in other words, Dasein’s
ability to reflect on its own situation is as much a responsibility as it is a privilege.
For Heidegger, technology harbours a saving power because it shows up the
extent of the danger. The threat that emanates from the rule of the Gestell is
that technological thinking and Being might become the only way of thinking
and Being to the exclusion of alternatives, or what Heidegger calls ‘authentic’
Being. It is the realisation of this threat that brings with it the potential for
alternatives. However, this potential depends on whether we are aware of the
dangers currently affecting our being-in-the-world, our awareness of the threat
that emanates from instrumental ways of thinking and Being. Hence Heidegger
is clear that
[e]verything ... depends upon this: that we ponder this arising [of
the saving power] and that, recollecting, we watch over it. How can
34In Being and Time Heidegger elaborates on the specifics of Dasein, arguing that an essential
characteristic of human Being that transcends pure presence is the attitude of ‘care’ (Heidegger,
2008).
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this happen? Above all through our catching sight of what comes to
presence in technology, instead of merely staring at the technological.
So long as we represent technology as an instrument, we remain held
fast in the will to master it. We press on past the essence of technology.
(Heidegger, 1977, p. 32)
This is Heidegger at his most urgent, cautioning us not to get distracted by the
realm of the technological, and especially not to give ourselves up to the ease
with which we can see technology as a mere means to an end. Faced with the
ubiquity of information and communication technologies that has been the sub-
ject of this thesis, Heidegger’s plea could not be more timely. Our instrumental
understanding of technology blinds us everywhere to the ways in which they ar-
ticulate the hyper-rationality that is the logic of the Gestell, and this is reinforced
by the rhetoric used by governments and corporations to legitimise the expansive
surveillance measures that infringe on the privileges that define human Being.
9.3 Reflexivity: Questioning is the Piety of Thought
Repressive intolerance toward a thought not immediately accompanied by
instructions for action is founded in fear. .. .An aged bourgeois mechanism
with which the men of the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century were very
familiar displays itself anew but unchanged: suffering caused by a negative
condition ... turns into anger toward the person who expresses it... . Pseudo-
activity is allied with pseudo-reality in the design of a subjective position;
an activity that overplays itself and fires itself up for the sake of its own
publicity... Within absolutized praxis, only reaction is possible and for this
reason the reaction is false. ... When the doors are barricaded, it is doubly
important that thought not be interrupted.
Adorno, 2001 [1991], p. 200.
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Questioning is then no longer a preliminary step, to give way to the answer
and thus to knowledge, but questioning becomes itself the highest form of
knowing.
Heidegger, 1985 [1933], p. 474
In terms of our present situation, the purpose of Heidegger’s overall conceptu-
alisation of technology, which I have explored in this thesis in its relevance to the
current technological actuality, is to contribute to this awareness. The problems
that are symptoms of this reality, such as mass surveillance and the exploita-
tion of personal information, do not require a technological solution. They are
not grounded in technological reality itself, but in an underlying way of think-
ing that puts technology to use according to the essence of modern technology,
the Gestell. Hence it is awareness and thinking that are needed most urgently,
because it is thought that lays the foundations for our ontological orientation
towards the world, which determines how we engage with other beings in both
unmediated and mediated ways. As Heidegger argues,
Human activity can never directly counter this danger. Human achieve-
ment alone can never banish it. But human reflection can ponder the
fact that all saving power must be of a higher essence than what is
endangered, though at the same time kindred to it. (1977, pp. 33-34,
emphasis added)
Here we encounter what disappointed Marcuse and many others in Heidegger,
namely precisely the lack of recommendations for a concrete course of action that
would lead to an alternative historical situation. For Heidegger, however, the
understanding of thought as ‘theory’ and its concomitant opposition to praxis,
is rooted in Ancient philosophy, as he argued in his Letter on Humanism. The
result, Heidegger points out, we can still witness today in philosophy’s ongoing
attempts to justify its existence before the ‘sciences’. For Heidegger, thinking
is action in its purest and most original form. It does not require an externally
verifiable change in the physical composition of the universe. This is what the
sciences retrospectively analyse, as a result of which thinking in Heideggerian
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terms is then “judged by a standard that does not measure up to it” (ibid.,
p.148). For Heidegger,
Thinking does not become action only because some effect issues from
it or because it is applied. Thinking acts insofar as it thinks. Such
action is presumably the simplest and at the same time the highest,
because it concerns the relation of Being to man. (ibid., p.147)
Despite Adorno’s well-documented antipathy towards Heidegger, Adorno’s insis-
tence that “when the doors are barricaded, it is doubly important that thought
not be interrupted”, quoted at the beginning of this section, echoes Heidegger’s
point with even greater urgency.
The last of Marx’s “Theses on Feuerbach” famously takes issue with philoso-
phy on the grounds that “philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various
ways; the point is to change it”, an argument that even today is frequently in-
voked to articulate an opposition between thinking and doing. Heidegger was
very familiar with the argument, and responded in a 1969 interview on German
television that
when this statement is cited and when it is followed, it is overlooked
that changing the world presupposes a change in the positing of the
world. A positing of the world can only be won by adequately inter-
preting the world. (cited in Ward, 1995, p.130)
In the same way that Marx was not challenging the fundamental purpose of
philosophy, Heidegger’s response should not be read as an antagonistic towards
Marx. Rather, it stresses Heidegger’s point that thought in itself constitutes
action.
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9.4 Limitations of the Present Work and Rec-
ommendations for Further Research
This thesis has sought to make a contribution to current debates on the signif-
icance of ICTs for social, cultural and political life, by arguing for philosophy
of technology and in particular the work of Martin Heidegger to be taken into
account. It has been written from the perspective of Media & Communications
Studies, and as such constitutes a venturing out of this field into the field of
philosophy to show the great benefits a closer dialogue between the two disci-
plines can yield in questions of technology. My aim was to open up new insights
into productive ways of thinking about technology to Media & Communications
Studies, as well as the growing field of Surveillance Studies, outside the debates
that are already ongoing about social media in particular and which are often
constrained by a limiting concept of technology. Here I have sought to show how
thinking about technology in ontological terms can sidestep some of the traps
questions about the social significance of technology can often fall into, such as
excessive optimism or pessimism, and the unhelpful generalisations that come
with the simplistic technological determinism.
In writing this thesis I have not only had to familiarise myself with Heideg-
ger’s work, but to an extent also with other periods in the history of philosophy
and the thinkers that have shaped these periods where Heidegger argues that
these have been crucial to the way we think about, and engage with, technology
today. For instance, Heidegger’s argument that modern metaphysics has set up
the world as a ‘world picture’ required me to delve even deeper into questions
of basic ontology that are usually far beyond the remits of the study of Media
& Communications. Much of this has taken place through my engagement with
Heidegger’s own work, as he is a meticulous historian of Western thought, and
his thinking takes place in ongoing conversation with, and critique of, the ideas
of those who have gone before. To nevertheless make these questions understand-
able for non-philosophers and to show their value for thinking about information
and communications technologies, I have simplified at times, and used examples
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that allow the easy transfer of ideas from these to our more complex current tech-
nological reality (hence my frequent return to the example of the hammer). The
aim of this thesis has been to show how much of Heidegger’s work, a thinker who
is rarely mentioned in current debates about the significance of ICTs, is useful
for thinking about questions of the social significance of these technologies, e.g.
regarding the issue of surveillance. I have not argued that Heidegger’s approach
should replace all that we currently know, but that his work can offer valuable
insights to supplement and enrich our understanding. In particular, I have sought
to present ways in which current critical approaches to ICTs that work in the tra-
dition of Critical Theory could be enriched by the ontological framework offered
by Heidegger, which places the issues raised by Critical Theory in the context
of the cultivation of a mode of thinking that is reigned by instrumentality. The
advantage of this approach is that it also puts within our grasp the opportunity to
take stock of our thinking, because in this reflectiveness, according to Heidegger,
lies the possibility of developing non-instrumental ways of thinking.
In Marcuse’s reflections on modern One-dimensional Man he points out that
classical Marxism sees the potential for technology to be freed from the grip of
negative rationalizing forces and turned back upon these forces:
The classical Marxian theory envisages the transition from capital-
ism to socialism as a political revolution: the proletariat destroys
the political apparatus of capitalism but retains the technological
apparatus, subjecting it to socialization. There is continuity in the
revolution: technological rationality, freed from irrational restrictions
and destructions, sustains and consummates itself in the new society.
(Marcuse, 1991 [1964], p. 31)
The perspective drawn up by Heidegger’s thinking is at the same time more
pessimistic, and more optimistic: pessimistic, because from a Heideggerian per-
spective today’s information-technological system cannot be dissociated from the
immaterial power relationships underlying its material manifestations. At the
same time, however, we might say that for Heidegger there is no problem that
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requires a technological solution - the means are within a much closer reach as
they lie in the cultivation of our own critical awareness and thinking.
Even though Heidegger’s thought is not overtly political, I have sought to
argue that it has deeply political ramifications. This thesis could only consider a
number of meeting points between between the critique offered by Heidegger and
that offered by Critical Theory. These merit further exploration, in particular
with a view to inquiring how these linkage points could further illuminate our un-
derstanding of our current technological landscape. Feenberg has attempted such
a project in his work Heidegger and Marcuse: the Catastrophe and Redemption
of History (2005), but Feenberg’s misreading of Heidegger in a number of points
merits the continuing of the conversation he has started. In this sense I hope to
have contributed, to phrase it in Heideggerian terms, to a ‘clearing’ where such
a dialogue can take place.
Finally, the question might be raised whether, in pursuing the aim of making
Heidegger’s insights accessible and productive for debates about the significance
of ICTs for social and cultural life, I am not culpable of the instrumentalisation
that is at the very heart of Heidegger’s critique of technology. In other words:
in drawing out from Heidegger’s thought a critique of ICTs, have I not used his
thinking as a means to an end, when it is precisely the ‘means/ends’ thinking
that, for Heidegger, is at the heart of the essence of technology? Perhaps this
claim is justified. Lacan argued that language itself is violent, and we might recall
from the last chapter how Joseph Cohen interpreted Heidegger’s silence on his
politics: as an acknowledgement that to name, would be the ultimate violence
to Auschwitz. However, I would argue that the value of Heidegger’s thinking for
a critique of our contemporary information-technological landscape is such that
to pass it over in silence, so as to avoid the violence of instrumentalisation, is no
real alternative. One of the fundamental assets of Heidegger’s thinking is that
he is ever-conscious of the constraints within which it operates - and this is the
task of all thinking that wants to call itself critical. It must not be afraid to turn
critique upon itself. In this sense, I would argue that my project is in keeping
with Heidegger’s overall aim, which is to make our thinking more thoughtful.
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